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Essays on Development Economics
Todd J. Kumler
This dissertation uses individual-level and aggregate data to study topics in development eco-
nomics. The first chapter analyzes the impact of Chinese competition on Mexican labor markets.
Over the past two decades, the growth of manufacturing in China has significantly impacted in-
ternational trade. This paper explores how the dramatic rise in Chinese manufacturing exports
influences employment in Mexico through product competition in the US export market. Following
Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), we compare employment outcomes for formal workers living in
different Mexican labor markets to changes in Chinese import competition from 1993 to 2003. We
find that exposure to Chinese competition has negative labor market effects for formally employed
Mexican workers. In particular, a formally employed individual working in a labor market that
experiences the average change in exposure to Chinese competition is 2.0 to 2.7 percentage points
less likely to be formally employed in five years.
The second chapter examines the under-reporting of workers wages in Mexico. Non-compliance
of firms with tax regulations is a major constraint on state capacity in developing countries. We
focus on an arguably under-appreciated dimension of non-compliance: under-reporting of wages by
formal firms to evade payroll taxes. We compare two sources of wage information from Mexico —
firms’ reports of individuals’ wages to the Mexican social security agency and individuals’ responses
to a household labor-force survey — to investigate the extent of wage under-reporting and how it
responded to an important change in the social security system. We document that under-reporting
by formal firms is extensive, and that compliance is better in larger firms. Using a difference-in-
differences strategy based on the 1997 Mexican pension reform, which effectively tied pension
benefits more closely to reported wages for younger workers than for older workers, we show that
the reform led to a relative decline in under-reporting for younger workers. The empirical patterns
suggest that giving employees incentives and information to improve the accuracy of employer
reports can be an effective way to improve payroll-tax compliance.
The third chapter studies the effect of trade liberalization on fertility, sex ratios, and infant
mortality in India. We compare women and births in rural Indian districts more or less exposed
to tariff cuts. For low socioeconomic status women, tariff cuts increase the likelihood of a female
birth and these daughters are less likely to die during infancy and childhood. On the contrary,
high-status women are less likely to give birth to girls and their daughters have higher mortality
rates when more exposed to tariff declines. Consistent with the fertility-sex ratio trade-off in
high son preference societies, fertility increases for low-status women and decreases for high-status
women. An exploration of the mechanisms suggests that the labor market returns for low-status
women (relative to men) and high-status men (relative to women) have increased in response to
trade liberalization. Thus, altered expectations about future returns from daughters relative to
sons seem to have caused families to change the sex-composition of and health investments in their
children.
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1.1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, the growth of manufacturing in China has significantly impacted in-
ternational trade. Since the 1990s, Chinese exports have surged. This can be seen particularly in
the US import market, where US imports of Chinese products grew from 27 billion US dollars in
1991 to nearly 298 billion US dollars by 2006 (Figure 1.1). As the dollar share of US imports from
China increased from less than 5 percent at the beginning of the 1990s to over 15 percent by 2006,
China has displaced Mexico as the number two source of US imports (after Canada, Figure 1.2).
Several recent papers have analyzed the impact of the growth in Chinese exports on employment
and earnings in the US. In particular, a recent paper by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) concludes
that US labor markets with a greater share of industries that compete with Chinese imports face
decreased wages, increased unemployment, and lower labor force participation. A second study
using individual-level social security records finds that workers are more likely to exit the labor force
and receive lower cumulative earnings if they were initially employed in industries that experienced
high import growth rates from China (Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song, 2013).
Despite the growing evidence showing the negative employment effects for US workers as a
result of increased Chinese exports to the US, there is less evidence on how the dramatic rise
in Chinese manufacturing exports influences employment in other developing countries. Since
the composition of manufacturing and exported products is arguably more similar between China
and certain developing economies than between China and the US, understanding how Chinese
competition influences employment in other low- and middle-income countries is a question of
important policy interest. Furthermore, understanding the impact of the growth in Chinese imports
can shed light on the impact of competition between developing countries more generally.
In this paper, we explore the impact of increased US imports from China on formal employment
and wages in Mexico. This is a particularly apt comparison, since China and Mexico are the second
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and third largest exporters to the US. While total US imports from China have skyrocketed in the
last two decades, growth in US imports from Mexico has been more modest (Figure 1.1). While
the dollar share of US imports from China has been increasing (especially after 2001), the share of
US imports from Mexico has been relatively stagnant or in decline (Figure 1.1).
We follow an empirical methodology similar to Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) by comparing
employment outcomes for formal workers living in different Mexican labor markets to changes in
Chinese import competition from 1993 to 2003. To measure a local labor market’s exposure to
Chinese import competition, we combine changes in US imports from China by industry with
differences in initial industrial composition across local labor markets. Since US imports from
China can be driven by US import demand as well as Chinese supply, we exploit an instrumental
variable approach to isolate the supply-driven component of Chinese exports. Using longitudinal,
individual-level employment data for formal sector workers, we are able to determine how exposure
to Chinese import competition in a local labor market impacts a worker’s daily wage, the probability
of exiting the labor force, and the mobility of the worker to other labor markets in the medium-run.
We find that exposure to Chinese competition has negative labor market effects for formally
employed Mexican workers. A formally employed individual working in a labor market that expe-
riences the average change in exposure to Chinese competition is 2.0 to 2.7 percentage points less
likely to be formally employed in five years. This result is robust to inclusion of various individual
controls, and the findings hold regardless of the trade data sets used or the definition of local labor
markets. Furthermore, we find that while exposure to Chinese competition does not influence daily
wages, this competition does influence labor reallocation. Formal workers facing greater exposure
to Chinese competition are less likely to be working in manufacturing in the future, and conditional
on being formally employed in the future, workers have an increased probability of relocating to a
different labor markets or a different industry.
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There are several mechanisms explaining why increased import competition in the US could in-
fluence Mexican employment. First, if Mexican manufacturers are unable to compete with Chinese
producers, the quantity of exports from Mexico in uncompetitive industries may decline. In turn,
Mexican producers may reduce output or exit the market entirely, leading to job losses. Mexican
manufacturers may also respond to Chinese competition by changing the types of products exported
or the means of production. In this case, changes in employment depends on how labor appears
in the production function. Furthermore, changes in the production process may lead to changes
in employment for certain categories of workers but not others (for example, skilled or unskilled
workers).
If labor reallocates sluggishly to other labor markets or other industries, any job losses due to
Chinese competition would be sustained in the medium-run. Job losses among manufacturers could
then spillover to other sectors of a local economy. On the other hand, if labor is highly mobile and
workers reallocate to comparative advantage industries, employment declines and forgone earnings
may be muted. Ultimately, the impact of Chinese competition on local labor markets is an empirical
question; distinguishing between the mechanisms driving any changes in local economics is left to
future work.
Thia paper measures competition between China and Mexico in the context of the US import
market. However, the rise of Chinese manufacturing could also influence Mexican labor markets
through a rise in Chinese competition in the domestic Mexican product market. From 1991 to
2006, the proportion of imports to Mexico from China also increased. To the extent that Chinese
exports the same types of products to Mexico that it exports to the US, then our industry-level
measures of Chinese competition in the US import market may also capture Chinese competition
in the Mexican import market. While it is possible to construct a similar measure of exposure to
Chinese competition in the Mexican market, this measure is highly correlated with exposure to
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Chinese competition in the US import market. Thus, it is not possibly to separately identify the
impact of competition with China in the US market and in the Mexican market with the current
data and regression framework. However, given that the US import market is much larger than
the Mexican import market, it seems plausible that much of the effect on Chinese competition on
labor market outcomes in Mexico is driven by competition in the US import market.
This paper relates to several areas of research. In addition to Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013)
and Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2013), other authors have analyzed the impact of Chinese
exports on workers and firms in other countries. Using firm-level data from Europe, Bloom, Draca,
and Reenen (2011) find that firms more impacted by Chinese competition increased technological
innovation within these firms; in addition, the report labor reallocation to more technologically ad-
vanced firms. Bugamelli, Fabiani, and Sette (2010) find that Chinese imports increase competition
and reduce prices among manufacturing firms in Italy. Moreover, Hanson and Robertson (2010)
analyze how rising exports from China impacts export demand from ten developing countries (in-
cluding Mexico); they determine that demand for exports from these countries would have been
0.8 percent to 1.6 percent higher had China’s exports remained constant from 1995 to 2005.
In a forthcoming paper, Utar and Ruiz (2013) study the response of maquiladoras (Mexican
export processing establishments) to Chinese competition using plant-level data. The authors
determine that maquiladoras in industries with the greatest exposure to Chinese competition in the
US market experience a decline in employment and plant growth as well as an increased likelihood
of plant exit. Additional evidence suggests that increased exposure to Chinese competition prompts
movement toward higher-skilled and more technologically-intensive production. My analysis differs
from Utar and Ruiz (2013) in that we use individual-level data to look at how outcomes such as
employment, wages, and worker mobility are impacted by Chinese import competition. In addition,
we measure exposure to Chinese competition at the labor market level, which allows me capture
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any general equilibrium effects of competition within a local economy.
This paper also relates to several studies that employ a similar methodology to measure exposure
to trade shocks at the labor market level. Literature in this area has looked at the district-level
impact of India’s 1991 trade liberalization (Topalova (2010); Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova
(2010a); and Anukriti and Kumler (2014)), regional impacts of NAFTA in Mexico (Chiquiar,
2008), provincial impacts of bilateral trade agreements with the US in Vietnam (McCaig, 2011),
and regional impacts of trade liberalization in Brazil (Kovak, 2013).
Finally, this paper relates to the literature analyzing labor mobility resulting from trade expo-
sure. Artuc, Chadhuri, and McLaren (2010) use a structural approach to estimate workers’ costs in
switching to jobs in different sectors; their parameter estimates imply a slow reallocation of work-
ers in response to trade shocks. Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011) and Dix-Carneiro (2014) find
similarly sluggish reallocation of labor in response to trade shocks in Brazil. More generally, this
paper relates to research on reallocation of workers in response to economic shocks; more recent
papers in this area include Notowidigdo (2013) and Walker (2013).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the methodology for measuring a labor
market’s exposure to Chinese competition. Section 1.3 discusses the various sources of data, while
Section 1.4 details the empirical strategy. Section 1.5 presents the results, and Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Measures of Trade Competition
Since the mid 1990s, the value of Chinese exports to the United States has increased dramatically,
especially after China’s entrance into the WTO in 2001 (Branstetter and Lardy, 2006). The solid
blue line in Figure 1.1 plots the real value of Chinese exports to the US from 1991 to 2006. Over
this time period, the real value of Chinese exports to the US increased over ten-fold, rising from
approximately 27 billion dollars in 1991 to nearly 298 billion dollars in 2006. The penetration of
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Chinese exports also increased as a share of total US imports, as shown by the solid blue line in
Figure 1.2. The increase in Chinese exports to the US, however, was not uniform across industries:
while US imports from China increased significantly for many industries, other industries saw
sluggish growth. The real value of US imports from China increased by 15000 percent for some
industries, such as tires, socks, and office furniture; other industries had modest or even negative
growth (Table 1.1). For some industries, China became the dominant producer of goods for the US
market by taking over a large share of the US import market (Table 1.2).
In addition to the rise in US imports from China, there is also substantial spatial heterogene-
ity in the industrial composition of local labor markets in Mexico. Table 1.3 lists the share of
manufacturing employment in the largest industry for the twenty largest Mexican labor markets.
While some metro areas have a diversified industrial base (such as Mexico City and Monterrey),
many others have a large proportion of employment in one industry. For example, over 50 percent
of manufacturing workers are employed in the footwear industry in Leon, while over a quarter
of manufacturing workers are employed in one industry in La Laguna (the apparel industry) and
Chihuahua (the electric automobile parts industry).
To measure a local labor market’s exposure to Chinese competition, we combine the fact that
industrial composition differs across Mexican labor markets with the variation across industries in
the growth of US imports from China. Intuitively, if Mexican manufacturers are competing with
Chinese manufacturers in the US market, they will only compete in industries that have experienced
growth in Chinese exports to the US. In turn, the Mexican labor markets where these industries
are concentrated will face employment pressure due to Chinese competition.
Specifically, we interact the share of total Mexican employment in industry j working in a given
labor market m at the start of time period t (
Emjt
Ejt
) with the change in the real value of imports
from China to the US over the time period for the industry, ∆MUSjt . We then divide this interaction
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One concern with this measure of a local labor market’s exposure to Chinese competition is that
imports to the US from China and Mexico could be driven by US demand shocks. For example,
increased US demand for computers could increase imports of computers from both Mexico and
China. As a result, the realized increased in imports of computers from China would be correlated
with the realized growth in the imports of computers from Mexico; areas in Mexico that produce
computers would witness a potential increase in production and labor demand. OLS estimates
would therefore underestimate the true causal impact of Chinese competition in the US import
market on Mexican employment.
Previous papers, such as Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), have instrumented for Chinese
competition with industry-level imports from China for other advanced economies.3 One threat,
however, to the validity of this type of instrument (which we will explore later) is that demand
shocks are in fact correlated across high-income countries. This correlation between product de-
mand shocks and increasing US imports from China would once again lead us to understate the
true impact of Chinese competition on Mexican labor markets.
We therefore implement a different instrumental variables (IV) strategies to determine the
true causal impact of Chinese competition on Mexican labor markets. This instrument exploits
the fact that much of the increase in US imports from China over the sample period was driven
3Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) use imports for Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand,
Spain, and Switzerland.
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by changing supply-side factors in China. During the sample period, China became increasingly
integrated into world trade, culminating in China’s ascension to the WTO in 2001 (Branstetter and
Lardy, 2006). Other internal reforms in China, combined with large-scale rural-to-urban migration,
further increased Chinese ability to manufacture products for export markets as it transitioned to
a market-based economy (Chen, Jin, and Yue, 2010).
In addition, industries which experienced the greatest increase in US imports were those in which
China initially had a comparative advantage, before the dramatic increase in Chinese exports. This
is apparent in Figures 1.3 and 1.4. The red line indicates industries that were in the top third of
industries based on the 1991 Chinese import penetration ratio (measured as the total value of US
imports from China for an industry divided by the total value of US imports from the entire world
for the industry), while the blue line indicates industries in the bottom third for this measure.
The top third of industries witnessed dramatic growth in the real value of US imports from China
(Figure 1.3) as well as share of the US import market (Figure 1.4). At the same time, there was
very little growth in US imports for the bottom third of industries.
Using this observation, we predict the real value of US imports from China for an industry by
















By using the predicted value of US imports from China, this measure of import competition
with China focuses on the arguably exogenous supply-side factors driving the increase in US imports
from China. However, it is likely that these supply-side factors also led to an increase in Mexican
imports from China over this time period. In addition, it is likely that certain Chinese industries
had a high import penetration ratio in 1991 for both the US and for Mexico. As a result, this
instrument may also capture Chinese competition with Mexico in the domestic Mexican product
market. While US imports from China are much higher than Mexican imports from China, it is
important to keep in mind that this measure could reflect both types of Chinese competition when
interpreting the resutls.
1.3 Data
This paper combines data from several sources in order to analyze the effects of Chinese import
penetration in the US on local labor markets in Mexico. We conduct our analysis using data
on international trade flows from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN
Comtrade), which compiles import and export data from government agencies in close to 200
countries. We extract data from the UN Comtrade database on annual US Imports from China
and Mexico (as well as total US imports from the whole world); these data are reported at the
six-digit Harmonized System (HS) product level.
As a robustness check, we also construct our measure of exposure to Chinese competition using
a second data set on trade flows from the Center for International Data at UC Davis. This data
set cleans and standardizes US import and export data collected by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
These data are reported in nominal US dollars at the HS ten-digit product level; for consistency
with the UN Comtrade database, we use data starting in 1991. Compared to the UN Comtrade
database, the trade flow data from the Center for International Data at UC Davis is available at a
10
more disaggregate level. However, these data are only available for US imports.
To construct a measure of exposure to Chinese competition for each Mexican labor market,
we combine the trade flow data with variation in the industrial composition of employment across
labor markets. Industry employment data are calculated from aggregate employment statistics
published in conjunction with the Mexican Economic Census conducted every five years. In theory,
the Economic Census surveys all firms operating in Mexico, collecting information on a variety of
economic topics. While the microdata from the Economic Census are not publicly available, for this
study we make use of aggregate employment statistics published at the industry by municipality
level. In particular, we use these data from the 1994, 1999, and 2004 Economic Census, which
contain aggregate employment information for the preceding year (i.e. 1993, 1998, and 2003).
An important consideration for the analysis is how to define local labor markets in Mexico.
Mexico is divided into 2,438 municipalities, the administrative division below Mexican states.4
However, in many large urban areas, individuals living in one municipality may commute to a job
in a nearby municipality. To account for this fact, the Mexican government has defined various
metropolitan areas which combine two or more municipalities into one continuous geographic entity.
For municipalities contained within a metropolitan area, we combine these municipalities into the
corresponding metropolitan areas and define the relevant labor market as the metropolitan area.
We combine all remaining municipalities existing outside of a metropolitan area within a state
into a local labor market. Since both municipalities and metropolitan areas have changed over
time, we utilize municipality and metropolitan area classifications from the 1990 Mexican Census
of Population to ensure that borders of local labor markets are not impacted by population and
employment changes during the period of study. This leads to 86 separately defined local labor
markets (54 metro areas and 32 states).5
4Municipalities in Mexico are similar to counties in the US.
5The results are robust to using other definitions of local labor markets. This includes defining each municipality
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The Economic Census has employed different industry classifications over time. Industries in
the 1994 Census are classified according to the six-digit Clasificación Mexicana de Actividades
y Productos (CMAP, Mexican Classification of Activities and Products); there are 305 different
manufacturing industry classifications in the 1994 Census. Industries in the 1999 and 2004 Census,
meanwhile, are classified according to the 2002 revision of the Sistema de Clasificación Industrial
de América del Norte (SCIAN, Industrial Classification System of North America), also at the
six-digit level. There are 308 different manufacturing industry classifications in the 2002 SCIAN
classification. We use a concordance between CMAP 1994 and SCIAN 2002 to re-classify all
industries in all years using the 2002 SCIAN. A final challenge in measuring Mexican labor market
exposure to Chinese competition is integrating the industries in the trade flow data (reported at the
HS ten-digit or HS six-digit level) with the industries in the aggregate employment data (reported
at the SCIAN six-digit level). Our procedure for converting the industries in the trade flow data to
SCIAN industries is as follows.6 First, we use a concordance created by Pierce and Schott (2009) to
convert the more disaggregated ten-digit HS code trade flow data from the Center for International
Data at UC Davis to US NAICS codes, which are similar to Mexican SCIAN codes. We then
use the resulting mapping between US imports at the ten-digit HS level and the six-digit SCIAN
level to determine weights (calculated as a share of total world imports to the US over the sample
period) for each six-digit HS product code and each six-digit SCIAN code combination. These
weights are then applied to the UN Comtrade data to calculate trade flows at the six-digit SCIAN
level. Finally, with the trade flow data sets now at the SCIAN level, we are able to combine the
trade flow data with the employment composition data from the Census.
To analyze employment outcomes, we rely on data from the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro
outside of a metropolitan area as its own labor market, as well as using metropolitan areas based on the 2000 Mexican
Census of Population. In addition, the results are robust to grouping municipalities into labor markets based on
whether a significant portion of individuals living in a municipality report working in a different municipality, similar
to the strategy used by Atkin (2012).
6This is based in large degree on the method used by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013).
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Social (IMSS), the Mexican social security agency. These underlying data contain linked employer-
employee records for all formal workers at private firms in Mexico that are covered by IMSS.7 Each
record in the microdata includes information on the firm’s industry and location as well as the
individual worker’s daily wage, birth year, and state of birth. Since each worker receives a unique
individual ID, it is possible to follow workers over time and across jobs.8
The IMSS records are reported in wage spells for each worker-firm match. It is therefore possible
to determine a worker’s wage and employment for any particular day; we extract employment and
wages for June 30 of each year. These data are available from 1985 to 2005 although we only make
use of data from 1990 to 2003.
For workers that are observed working at two or more firms simultaneously, we select the worker-
employee match that has the highest wage. We also exclude any workers for whom a zero daily
wage is reported. Finally, we include working age individuals between the ages of 25 and 60.9 For
additional information on the IMSS data set, see Castellanos, Garcia-Verdu, and Kaplan (2004)
and Kaplan, Martinez Gonzalez, and Robertson (2005).
1.4 Empirical Analysis
Using the measures of Chinese competition and the data previously described, we run the following
basic regression models:
Yimt = α+ βExposuremt + γm + δt + agei +malei + ρXit + εmt (4)
7In theory, all private sector workers in Mexico are covered by IMSS. However, firms may not report workers to
IMSS to avoid the payroll taxes associated with financing IMSS. Unreported workers are considered informal. Fŕıas,
Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2009a) calculate that in 2000, 15.2 million workers were reported as working to IMSS out
of 27.2 million remunerated private sector workers. In the remainder of this paper, we refer to workers registered in
IMSS as employed in the formal sector.
8One limitation of the IMSS data is that it does not include information on hours worked.
9Covered IMSS workers can receive pension benefits starting at age 60. There is a significant increase in the
probability that a worker exits the IMSS data set after age 60.
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where Yimt is the outcome of interest (employment, wages, etc) for individual i employed in labor
market m at the beginning of time t, Exposuremt is the exposure to Chinese trade competition
measure for labor market m and time period t, γm is a labor market fixed effect, δt is a time period
fixed effect, agei is an age fixed effect, malei is an indicator for a male worker, and Xit are other
controls. To account for correlation across individuals employed in the same local labor market at
the start of each time period, standard errors are clustered at the metro area by time period level.
The main regressor of interest is Exposuremt. This regressor is constructed as previously
described in order to reflect Chinese competition in the US import market; however, as previ-
ously noted, it may also capture Chinese competition in the domestic Mexican product market.
Exposuremt is measured as changes over a five-year time period, corresponding to the Economic
Census (i.e. 1993 to 1998 and 1998 to 2003). In the IV regressions, the related instruments are
constructed and measured similarly. The inclusion of labor market fixed effects (γm) and time
period fixed effects (δt) control for any unobserved, time-invariant labor market characteristics as
well as any Mexico-wide trends.
All regressions include fixed effects for a worker’s age (in years) at the start of the time period.
Additional controls Xit are added to regressions to check robustness. These controls include wage-
quartile fixed effects based on a worker’s daily wage at the start of the time period,10 a worker’s
industry at the start of the time period, fixed effects for the size of a worker’s employer at the start
of the time period,11 and indicators for whether a worker was formally employed for the past one,
two or three years.
One additional control that is included in some regressions is the share of the local labor force
employed in manufacturing. Variation in Exposuremt is the result of differences in the composition
of manufacturing employment across industries as well as the share of employment in manufacturing
10Daily wage quartiles are determined for all of Mexico.
11Firm size categories are firms with one employee, firms with 2 to 20 employees, firms with 21 to 100 employees,
and firms with greater than 100 employees.
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and non-manufacturing in the labor market. Including the share of employment in manufacturing
as a control variable isolates the variation in Exposuremt coming only from differences in the
composition of manufacturing across labor markets.
For computational ease, we run equation (4) at the cell level. We weight each cell by the size
of the cell at the beginning of the time period.
Table 1.4 presents variable means from the individual-level IMSS employment data. Since
the main sample consists of all workers employed at the beginning of each period, Column 1 shows
statistics for workers employed in 1993 and Column 2 shows statistics for workers employed in 1998.
In general, formal workers employed in 1998 are more likely to be female and are slightly younger
than in 1993. In addition, formal labor market turnover is lower in the period from 1998 to 2003
than in the period from 1993 to 1998. Over time, real formal sector wages increased dramatically.
It is less clear whether the national share of employment in manufacturing has changed over time,
although the firm size of the average worker appears to have decreased.
Table 1.5 presents descriptive statistics for the variables measuring exposure to Chinese com-
petition. For ease in displaying and interpreting results, Exposuremt is calculated in 100,000 of
dollars of exposure per worker. For example, the mean of 0.0476 in the pooled sample indicates a
mean level of exposure of $4,760 per worker.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Main Results
Table 1.6 displays results for the main outcome of interest, which is an indicator for whether a
formally employed worker in t is also formally employed in t + 5. These regressions therefore
capture whether exposure to Chinese competition influences the probability that someone formally
employed in a given year remains formally employed in five years. The six columns represent
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regression models with different control variables, such as a worker’s initial industry, tenure, daily
wage quartile and firm size, as well as the initial manufacturing share of employment in a labor
market.
OLS results are indicated in Panel A. The estimated coefficients are consistently negative across
all columns; however, none of the coefficients are statistically significant. Furthermore, the point
estimates are relatively small. The largest estimate in Panel A (-0.086 in Column (1)) indicates
that an individual living in the average labor market (which experienced an increase of $4760 in
Chinese competition per worker) would be 0.4 percentage points less likely to be formally employed
in five years.
As previously discussed, OLS regressions may be underestimates of the true effect if Exposuremt
is driven by US import demand shocks. We therefore instrument for exposure to Chinese competi-
tion using Exposurepredmt . Panel B in Table 1.6 indicates the coefficients from first stage regressions
of Exposuremt on Exposure
pred
mt while Panel C shows the instrumental variable coefficients on
Exposuremt.
The first stage coefficients indicate a consistently positive relationship between predicted expo-
sure and actual exposure to Chinese competition. An increase in predicted exposure of $100000 per
worker is correlated with an $1100 per worker increase in actual exposure to Chinese competition.
This relationship is statistically significant, and the first stage F-statistics are sufficiently high,
regardless of the individual control variables included in the regression.
Panel C of Table 1.6 provides the paper’s main finding: formally employed workers in areas more
exposed to Chinese competition are less likely to be formally employed in five years. The coefficient
estimates suggest an economically meaningful impact of Chinese competition. A formally employed
individual living in the average labor market (which experienced an increase of $4760 in Chinese
competition per worker) is between 2.0 and 2.7 percentage points less likely to be employed in five
16
years.
The IV point estimates are approximately six to ten times larger than the OLS estimates in
Panel A. Since the instrument seeks to isolate the component of Chinese competition driven by
exogenous, supply-related changes in Chinese exports, the larger IV estimates suggest an upward
bias in the OLS results due to US demand for imports. However, since the instrument may also
capture Chinese competition in the Mexican market, the larger IV estimate could also reflect the
impact of this domestic competition that is less reflected in the OLS results.
In addition, the results in Panel C are generally robust to the inclusion of different control
variables. In particular, the inclusion of a labor market’s initial manufacturing share causes the
magnitude of the effect of Chinese competition to decline; however, the coefficients typically remain
economically meaningful and statistically significant. Thus, while part of the employment effect
of Chinese competition is driven by variation in manufacturing share across labor markets, the
employment effect is also driven by variation in the composition of manufacturing across labor
markets (as indicated by the coefficients in the even columns of Table (1.6)).
Having established that exposure to Chinese competition increases job losses in Mexican labor
markets, Table 1.7 provides IV results for other outcomes of interest. In Panels A and B, we
present coefficients from regressions of an individual’s real formal daily wage on exposure to Chinese
competition. While the coefficients are negative (i.e. Chinese competition leads to lower wages),
the coefficients are generally insignificant. This is the case whether workers that are not formally
employed in t+5 are included with zero wages in the regressions (Panel A) or whether these workers
are excluded (Panel B). Although we do not attempt to determine the mechanism behind the lack
of an effect of Chinese competition on daily wages, possible explanations include downwardly sticky
wages as a result of collective bargaining agreements or minimum wages provisions.12
12In addition, mismeasurement in daily wages could lead to imprecisely estimated coefficients.
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Panels C and D of Table 1.7 present results of IV regressions of an indicator for being formally
employed in manufacturing in five years on exposure to Chinese competition. Panel C (which
includes individuals that are not formally employed in t + 5) indicates that exposure to Chinese
competition reduces the likelihood that an individual is formally employed in manufacturing in five
years. However, conditional on being formally employed in t+5 as in Panel D, exposure to Chinese
competition does not have a statistically significant effect on whether an individual is employed in
a manufacturing industry.
Finally, Panels E and F of Table 1.7 displays results for outcomes of whether a formally employed
worker reallocates to another labor market or another industry in five years. Overall, it appears
that part of the impact of Chinese competition is mitigated by reallocation of labor to other labor
markets and industries, as exposure to Chinese competition increases the probability of being
formally employed in another labor market (Panel E) or another industry (Panel F).
1.5.2 Additional Results
In this section, we seek to validate and extend our main results. First, we confirm our results
using a different source of data for trade flows. Table 1.8 presents coefficients for OLS and IV
regressions of an employment indicator on Chinese competition using the UC Davis import data.
These results largely corroborate our previous findings. While OLS coefficients are negative, small,
and insignificant, IV coefficients indicate that Chinese competition has a statistically significant
and economically meaningful impact on whether a formally employed individual remains employed
five years in the future.
To test the validity of the results, Table 1.9 displays the results of a falsification test. We
run regressions of past employment outcomes on the measure of exposure to Chinese competition.
Specifically, for workers formally employed in time t, we look at an indicator for being employed
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in t − 3. If the research design is valid, then our measure of the change in exposure to Chinese
competition from t to t + 5 should not influence the probability a worker is formally employed in
t−3. Indeed, this is what we find in Table 1.9 . While the point estimates are consistently negative
across the different regression models, they are always small and statistically insignificant.
We explore heterogeneity in the effect of Chinese competition on formal employment in Tables
1.10, 1.11 and 1.12.13 Each panel in these tables displays results for a different sub-group. Table
(1.10) displays regressions by a worker’s sex (Panels A and B) and age (Panels C and D). First, it
appears that exposure to Chinese competition has a larger effect on whether a male worker remains
formally employed than on a female worker. The point estimates for males are consistently higher
than the point estimates for females, and only the coefficients for males are statistically significant.
When comparing the results by age (Panels C and D), the results appear to be driven by older
workers. Formal workers age 40 to 60 are more likely than workers age 25 to 40 to exit the formal
labor force as a result to exposure to Chinese competition. This differential effect could arise for
several reasons. For example, older workers may be less willing or able to move to a new employer,
industry, or labor market. Workers closer to retirement age may also choose to retire early and
drop-out of the formal labor force in response to job separations. It could also be the case that
firms are more likely to layoff older workers as a result of Chinese competition.
Regressions by manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries are shown in Panels A and B
of Table 1.11. Since manufacturing firms are the most likely to face competition with Chinese firms
in the US import market (as well as in the domestic Mexican market), it is not surprising that
manufacturing workers are more likely to exit the formal labor force in five years as a result of Chi-
nese competition. While coefficient estimates are negative for formal workers in non-manufacturing
industries, the results are insignificant.
13While results by subgroup are informative, any differences between subgroups should not be interpreted as a
causal relationship. Differential effects may occur for other reasons that cannot be controlled for; for example,
different groups may work in different occupations or work different hours.
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Finally, we divide the sample based on whether the labor market is in a border state or a
non-border state. Many maquiladoras, or plants which assemble or process imported raw inputs
and which export finished products back to the US, are geographically clustered in states adjacent
to the US-Mexico border. If the impact of Chinese manufacturing is truly driven by competition
in the US import market, we might expect a larger effect of exposure to Chinese competition in
border states. However, the results in Table 1.12 are inconclusive for several reasons. The IV
regression for non-border states (Panel A) suffers from a weak first stage. In addition, there are
only 19 labor markets in the border region regressions (Panel B), leading to an insufficient number
of clusters (38 labor market by time clusters). Ultimately, nearly all of the coefficients in Table
1.12 are statistically insignificant.
As a final robustness check, we confirm the plausibility of our results by running industry-level
regressions. We regress US imports from Mexico on US imports from China, as well as total US
imports (excluding China) on US imports from China:
Yjt = α+ βUSImpChinajt + ωj + φt + εjt (5)
In these regressions, the regressor of interest is USImpChinajt, which is a measure of US
imports from China for industry j in year t. The inclusion of industry fixed effects (ωj) and year
fixed effects (φt) isolates within-industry variation in USImpChinajt over time. Yjt captures either
US imports from Mexico or total US imports excluding China for industry j in year t. If Mexican
industries compete with Chinese industries in the US import market or in the Mexican import
market, we should expect β < 0. If β > 0, we would be concerned that demand factors or other
variables are driving the results.
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The coefficients for OLS regressions (Table 1.13) indicate a positive relationship between industry-
level US imports from Mexico and US imports from China (Column (1)). The relationship between
total industry-level imports to the US (excluding imports from China) and US imports from China
(Column (2)) is also positive, although the coefficient is insignificant. As previously discussed,
these relationships could be driven by several factors; one likely explanation may be that certain
industries experienced large increases in US demand over the time period (such as computers and
electronics). As a result, exports from China and Mexico (and potentially many other countries) to
the US simultaneously increased. This coordinated demand increase for imports from both China
and Mexico would cause an upward bias in the coefficient, potentially overwhelming any competitive
relationship between China and Mexico in the US import market. As a result, the industry-level
regressions in Table 1.13 provide one explanation for the small and insignificant point estimates in
Table 1.6.
Table 1.14 shows industry-level regressions using an instrumental variables approach. Columns
(1) and (2) of Table 1.14 display results from IV regressions using predicted US imports from
China as an instrument. These coefficients indicate that increased US imports from China reduce
US imports from Mexico as well as US imports from the rest of the world excluding China. In this
case, the industry level regressions using the predicted US imports from China instrument seems
to validate the use of Exposurepredmt as an instrument for exposure to Chinese competition in the
labor market regressions.
Since US imports from China are commonly instrumented using imports for eight other ad-
vanced economies from China as an instrument for US import from China, we also present IV
regressions using this instrument.14 Interestingly, when using this instrument, we find a a positive
and statistically significant relationship between US imports from China and US imports from Mex-
14The eight countries are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland.
This instrument is analogous to one used by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013).
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ico (Column (3) of Table 1.14) as well as a positive and statistically significant relationship between
US imports from China and US imports from the rest of the world (Column (4)).15 As previously
discussed, correlated import demand shocks across advanced economies provides one explanation
for the positive coefficients when instrumenting based on Chinese exports to other countries.16 Ul-
timately, these industry-level regressions suggest that instrumenting US imports from China using
imports for other advanced countries is not a credible instrument and predicted US imports from
China based on China’s initial comparative advantage is a more reliable estimation strategy.
1.6 Conclusion
The growth in manufacturing in China represents one of the biggest shifts in the world economy
over the past two decades. The resulting rise in exports from China has potentially pronounced
effects on manufacturers located in other countries that compete with Chinese manufacturers on
the global export market. This paper adds to the existing literature documenting how competi-
tion with Chinese manufactured goods influences workers employed in competiting industries in a
developing country. In particular, this paper explores how Chinese competition influences formal
employment and wages in Mexico. We find that exposure to Chinese competition has negative labor
market effects for formally employed Mexican workers. A formally employed individual working in
a labor market that experiences the average change in exposure to Chinese competition is 2.0 to 2.7
percentage points less likely to be formally employed in five years. This result is robust to including
various individual controls and to different definitions of local labor markets. In addition, we find
that while Chinese competition does not influence daily wages, formally employed workers that
15Appendix Table 1.A1 presents similar findings for regressions using the SIC-level trade flow data from Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson (2013). These results indicate a positive and significant relationship between Chinese exports to
the eight other advance countries and Mexico/CAFTA exports to the US, low-income country exports to the US,
and the rest of the world’s exports to the US. In addition, the results indicate a negative and significant relationship
between Chinese exports to the eight other advance countries and US exports to these same eight countries.
16Other hypotheses could also explain the positive coefficients. For example, if Chinese exports to advanced
economies caused Mexican firms to produce higher quality and more expensive products, we would see a positive
relationship.
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face greater exposure to Chinese competition are less likely to be working in manufacturing in the




Figure 1.1. Real Value of US Imports from China and Mexico, 1991-2006
Notes: Data from UN Comtrade database.
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Figure 1.2. Share of US Imports from China and Mexico, 1991-2006
Notes: Data from UN Comtrade database.
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Figure 1.3. Real Value of US Imports from China, 1991-2006, By Initial Penetration
Notes: Data from UN Comtrade database.
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Figure 1.4. Share of US Imports from China, 1991-2006, By Initial Penetration
Notes: Data from UN Comtrade database.
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1.8 Tables
Table 1.1. Change in Real Value of US Imports from China, 1991-2006
Ten Biggest Ten Smallest
A. Change in Real Value (billions)
Computer, Peripherals 39278.0 Breweries -2.7
AV Equipment 17481.1 Wineries 0.7
Semiconductors 14870.6 Explosives 0.9
Apparel 14752.0 Thread Mills 6.3
Radio, TV, Wireless Comm. 13032.7 Motor Vehical Metal Stamping 9.4
Household Furniture 12109.6 Cookie, Cracker, Pasta 14.3
Doll, Toy, Games 11999.0 Snack Foods 20.6
Footwear 10560.3 Fiber, Yarn 24.7
Commercial, Service Machinery 6539.1 Chocolate, Confectionary 30.1
Small Appliances 5280.7 Coffee and Tea 35.5
B. Percentage Change in Real Value
Tires 57664.70 Breweries -22.79
Millwork 36939.29 Wineries 60.08
Paper Mills 36452.70 Explosives 92.59
Cooper Rolling, Alloying 28819.29 Coffee and Tea 94.67
Gasoline Engine 28504.51 Broadwoven Fabric 107.73
Sawmill, Woodworking Machinery 19659.89 Carpet and Rug Mills 129.75
Hosiery, Socks 16933.39 Chocolate, Confectionary 156.63
Motor Vehical Seating 16923.04 Thread Mills 164.07
Metal Tank 16760.06 Cookie, Cracker, Pasta 185.00
Office Furniture 16097.67 Primary Nonferrous Smelting 228.35
Notes: Data from UN Comtrade database.
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Table 1.2. Change in Share of Total US Imports from China, 1991-2006
Ten Biggest Ten Smallest
A. Change in Share
Sporting Goods 0.5601 Carpet and Rug Mills -0.0252
Household Furniture 0.5302 Coffee and Tea -0.0091
Lighting Fixtures 0.4909 Breweries -0.0071
Doll, Toy, Games 0.4817 Snack Foods -0.0032
Computer, Peripherals 0.4686 Pharmaceuticals -0.0013
Hat, Caps 0.4655 Explosives -0.0010
Blind and Shade 0.4563 Wineries -0.0002
Footwear 0.4535 Petroleum Refineries 0.0003
Apparel Accessories 0.4301 Cookie, Cracker, Pasta 0.0041
Commercial, Service Machinery 0.4194 Primary Nonferrous Smelting 0.0045
B. Percentage Change in Share
Paper Mills 27156.86 Breweries -74.51
Tires 20679.69 Wineries -40.38
Gasoline Engine 11993.26 Explosives -14.63
Photo Film, Paper 10126.41 Coffee and Tea -13.51
Motor Vehical Seating 9749.54 Carpet and Rug Mills -13.26
Railroad Rolling Stock 8239.69 Pharmaceuticals -8.40
Sawmill, Woodworking Machinery 6998.06 Snack Foods -3.88
Computer, Peripherals 6205.25 Petroleum Refineries 6.57
Metal Tank 6107.83 Cookie, Cracker, Pasta 10.76
Brake Systems 5746.85 Chocolate, Confectionary 23.35
Notes: Data from UN Comtrade database.
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Table 1.3. Largest Industries in 20 Biggest Metro Areas, 1993
Metro Area Largest Industry Share of Manufacturing Employment
Valle de México Apparel 0.072
Monterrey Apparel 0.057
Guadalajara Footwear 0.087
Juárez Motor Vehicle Electric 0.222
Puebla-Tlaxcala Broadwoven Fabric 0.091
Tijuana Semiconductors 0.122
León Footwear 0.541
Toluca Bread, Bakery 0.067
La Laguna Apparel 0.299
San Luis Potośı-Soledad de Graciano Sánchez Major Appliacnes 0.072
Chihuahua Motor Vehicle Electric 0.274
Mérida Apparel 0.159
Aguascalientes Apparel 0.182
Querétaro Transmission, Power Train 0.071
Saltillo Clay Building Material 0.075
Mexicali Semiconductors 0.132
Cuernavaca Auto, Light Truck 0.130
Reynosa-Ŕıo Bravo AV Equipment 0.262
Matamoros Semiconductors 0.165
Tampico Petroleum Refineries 0.184
Notes: Data from 1994 Mexican Economic Census. Twenty largest metro areas as measured by total employment in 1993. Share calculated as employment in
industry in metro area divided by total manufacturing employment in metro area.
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Table 1.4. Summary Means
Employed in 1993 Employed in 1998
male 0.71 0.69
age, t 35.87 35.92
employed, t+5 0.59 0.61
employed, t-3 0.65 0.66
real daily wage, t 49.78 119.25
real daily wage, t+5 87.96 148.83
real daily wage, t-3 18.51 47.22
employed in manufacturing, t 0.35 0.36
employed in manufacturing, t+5 0.21 0.21
employed in manufacturing, t-3 0.25 0.24
real daily wage, if employed, t+5 150.31 245.57
real daily wage, if employed, t-3 28.59 71.60
employed in manufacturing, if employed, t+5 0.36 0.34
employed in manufacturing, if employed, t-3 0.39 0.37
employed in new labor market, if employed, t+5 0.08 0.06
employed in new labor market, if employed, t-3 0.05 0.09
firm size, t 1169.64 1143.66
N 5254740 6430079
Notes: Samples shown are formally employed workers in 1993 (first column) and formally employed workers in 1998
(second column).
Table 1.5. Summary Statistics, Exposure to Chinese Competition
∆ 1993-1998 ∆ 1998-2003 Pooled
Exposuremt 0.0497 0.0454 0.0476
(0.0741) (0.0568) (0.0658)
N 86 86 172
Notes: Standard deviations shown in parentheses. Exposuremt defined as in equation (1) and measured in $100,000
per worker.
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Table 1.6. Main Employment Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. OLS Regressions
Exposuremt -0.086 -0.054 -0.085 -0.057 -0.083 -0.048
(0.141) (0.125) (0.143) (0.128) (0.155) (0.138)
B. first stage Regressions
Exposurepredmt 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
C. Instrumental Variable Regressions
Exposuremt -0.552* -0.488* -0.572** -0.516* -0.505* -0.431
(0.288) (0.274) (0.290) (0.278) (0.296) (0.284)
industry effects N N Y Y N N
daily wage quartile effects N N N N Y Y
firmsize effects N N N N Y Y
tenure effects N N N N Y Y
manuf share N Y N Y N Y
F-stat 10.24 10.24 10.33 10.34 10.32 10.33
N 11684819 11684819 11684819 11684819 11684819 11684819
Notes: Outcome variable is an indicator for whether a formally employed worker in time t is also formally employed in time t+ 5. Each cell contains a coefficient
from a different regression. All regressions include time period effects, labor market effects, age effects (in years), and a male indicator. Standard errors are
clustered at the labor market by time period level. Trade flow data from UN Comtrade database and employment data from IMSS records. Regressions are run
at the cell level due to computational constraints and weighted by cell size. Exposuremt defined in Equation (1) and Exposure
pred
mt defined in Equation (3). ***
1%, ** 5%, *10% level.
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Table 1.7. IV Regressions, Other Outcome Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. dep. var.: real daily wage, t+5
Exposuremt -255.716* -171.922 -245.823* -169.068 -306.645 -216.928
(152.041) (119.904) (135.295) (110.240) (196.237) (171.467)
B. dep. var.: real daily wage, if employed, t+5
Exposuremt -230.463 -132.732 -235.217 -141.038 -377.047 -268.759
(171.988) (124.667) (158.605) (115.284) (264.043) (227.300)
C. dep. var.: employed in manufacturing, t+5
Exposuremt -0.339* -0.376** -0.382* -0.331 -0.285* -0.311*
(0.178) (0.175) (0.220) (0.202) (0.162) (0.160)
D. dep. var.: employed in manufacturing, if employed, t+5
Exposuremt -0.104 -0.208 -0.041 -0.022 -0.027 -0.120
(0.248) (0.207) (0.110) (0.102) (0.232) (0.194)
E. dep. var.: moved labor market, if employed, t+5
Exposuremt 3.301** 2.977* 3.607** 3.173* 3.278* 2.801
(1.680) (1.599) (1.828) (1.723) (1.918) (1.840)
F. dep. var.: changed industry, if employed, t+5
Exposuremt 3.249* 2.876* 3.563* 3.086* 3.228 2.692
(1.718) (1.606) (1.865) (1.730) (1.963) (1.855)
industry effects N N Y Y N N
daily wage quartile effects N N N N Y Y
firmsize effects N N N N Y Y
tenure effects N N N N Y Y
manuf share N Y N Y N Y
N (employed, t) 11684819 11684819 11684819 11684819 11684819 11684819
N (employed, t and t+ 5) 6972206 6972206 6972206 6972206 6972206 6972206
Notes: Sample of workers in Panels A and C are workers formally employed in time t, while sample of workers in Panels B, D, E and F are workers formally
employed in t and t + 5. Each cell contains a coefficient from a different regression. All regressions include time period effects, labor market effects, age effects
(in years), and a male indicator. Standard errors are clustered at the labor market by time period level. Trade flow data from UN Comtrade database and
employment data from IMSS records. Regressions are run at the cell level due to computational constraints and weighted by cell size. Exposuremt defined in
Equation (1). first stage coefficients are shown in Panel B of Table (1.6). *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% level.
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Table 1.8. Main Employment Regressions, UC Davis Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. OLS Regressions
Exposuremt -0.092 -0.061 -0.091 -0.063 -0.091 -0.057
(0.146) (0.130) (0.148) (0.133) (0.162) (0.145)
B. first stage Regressions
Exposurepredmt 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
C. Instrumental Variable Regressions
Exposuremt -0.463* -0.430* -0.484** -0.455* -0.419 -0.381
(0.244) (0.240) (0.245) (0.242) (0.259) (0.261)
industry effects N N Y Y N N
daily wage quartile effects N N N N Y Y
firmsize effects N N N N Y Y
tenure effects N N N N Y Y
manuf share N Y N Y N Y
F-stat 10.02 10.24 10.13 10.35 10.12 10.34
N 11684819 11684819 11684819 11684819 11684819 11684819
Notes: Outcome variable is an indicator for whether a formally employed worker in time t is also formally employed in time t+ 5. Each cell contains a coefficient
from a different regression. All regressions include time period effects, labor market effects, age effects (in years), and a male indicator. Standard errors are
clustered at the labor market by time period level. Trade flow data from UC Davis database and employment data from IMSS records. Regressions are run at
the cell level due to computational constraints and weighted by cell size. Exposuremt defined in Equation (1) and Exposure
pred
mt defined in Equation (3). ***
1%, ** 5%, *10% level.
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Table 1.9. Falsification Test, Employed in t− 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. dep. var.: employed, t-3
Exposuremt -0.039 -0.040 -0.047 -0.048 -0.045 -0.047
(0.293) (0.308) (0.308) (0.321) (0.057) (0.060)
industry effects N N Y Y N N
daily wage quartile effects N N N N Y Y
firmsize effects N N N N Y Y
tenure effects N N N N Y Y
manuf share N Y N Y N Y
N 11684819 11684819 11684819 11684819 11684819 11684819
Notes: Outcome variable is an indicator for whether a formally employed worker in time t is also formally employed in time t− 3. Each cell contains a coefficient
from a different regression. All regressions include time period effects, labor market effects, age effects (in years), and a male indicator. Standard errors are
clustered at the labor market by time period level. Trade flow data from UN Comtrade database and employment data from IMSS records. Regressions are run
at the cell level due to computational constraints and weighted by cell size. Exposuremt defined in Equation (1). first stage coefficients are shown in Panel B of
Table (1.6). *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% level.
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Table 1.10. IV Employment Regressions, By Sub-Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. males
Exposuremt -0.640** -0.593** -0.685** -0.640** -0.574** -0.515*
(0.291) (0.285) (0.301) (0.296) (0.292) (0.288)
N 8201533 8201533 8201533 8201533 8201533 8201533
B. females
Exposuremt -0.358 -0.250 -0.319 -0.236 -0.369 -0.254
(0.312) (0.270) (0.293) (0.263) (0.337) (0.301)
N 3483286 3483286 3483286 3483286 3483286 3483286
C. 25 to 40 years old, t
Exposuremt -0.479* -0.418 -0.507* -0.452* -0.427 -0.353
(0.278) (0.261) (0.284) (0.270) (0.292) (0.276)
N 8470695 8470695 8470695 8470695 8470695 8470695
D. 40 to 60 years old, t
Exposuremt -0.689** -0.624** -0.683** -0.632** -0.658** -0.588**
(0.298) (0.292) (0.287) (0.284) (0.298) (0.299)
N 3534599 3534599 3534599 3534599 3534599 3534599
industry effects N N Y Y N N
daily wage quartile effects N N N N Y Y
firmsize effects N N N N Y Y
tenure effects N N N N Y Y
manufacturing share N Y N Y N Y
Notes: Outcome variable is an indicator for whether a formally employed worker in time t is also formally employed in time t− 3. Each cell contains a coefficient
from a different regression. All regressions include time period effects, labor market effects, age effects (in years), and a male indicator. Standard errors are
clustered at the labor market by time period level. Trade flow data from UN Comtrade database and employment data from IMSS records. Regressions are run
at the cell level due to computational constraints and weighted by cell size. Exposuremt defined in Equation (1). first stage regressions not shown. *** 1%, **
5%, *10% level.
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Table 1.11. IV Employment Regressions, By Sub-Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. non-manufacturing, t
Exposuremt -0.253 -0.220 -0.252 -0.232 -0.231 -0.193
(0.192) (0.199) (0.187) (0.195) (0.199) (0.212)
N 7517134 7517134 7517134 7517134 7517134 7517134
B. manufacturing, t
Exposuremt -0.876* -0.733 -0.903* -0.765* -0.796 -0.643
(0.528) (0.455) (0.532) (0.464) (0.539) (0.474)
N 4167685 4167685 4167685 4167685 4167685 4167685
C. employed < 3 consecutive years, t
Exposuremt -0.280 -0.206 -0.384 -0.316 -0.336 -0.243
(0.268) (0.264) (0.268) (0.263) (0.311) (0.299)
N 4901486 4901486 4901486 4901486 4901486 4901486
D. employed ≥ 3 consecutive years, t
Exposuremt -0.637** -0.576** -0.604** -0.552* -0.653** -0.590*
(0.299) (0.286) (0.293) (0.285) (0.319) (0.306)
N 6783333 6783333 6783333 6783333 6783333 6783333
industry effects N N Y Y N N
daily wage quartile effects N N N N Y Y
firmsize effects N N N N Y Y
tenure effects N N N N Y Y
manufacturing share N Y N Y N Y
Notes: Outcome variable is an indicator for whether a formally employed worker in time t is also formally employed in time t− 3. Each cell contains a coefficient
from a different regression. All regressions include time period effects, labor market effects, age effects (in years), and a male indicator. Standard errors are
clustered at the labor market by time period level. Trade flow data from UN Comtrade database and employment data from IMSS records. Regressions are run
at the cell level due to computational constraints and weighted by cell size. Exposuremt defined in Equation (1). first stage regressions not shown. *** 1%, **
5%, *10% level.
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Table 1.12. IV Employment Regressions, Border versus Non-Border
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. non-border, t
Exposuremt -1.283 -1.164 -1.143 -1.054 -0.950 -0.802
(1.627) (1.465) (1.476) (1.365) (1.301) (1.194)
F-stat 0.83 0.79 0.84 0.79 0.84 0.80
N 8474305 8474305 8474305 8474305 8474305 8474305
B. border, t
Exposuremt -0.179 -0.170 -0.221* -0.211 -0.164 -0.150
(0.113) (0.132) (0.129) (0.147) (0.119) (0.143)
F-stat 10.44 11.73 10.64 11.95 10.64 11.95
N 3210514 3210514 3210514 3210514 3210514 3210514
industry effects N N Y Y N N
daily wage quartile effects N N N N Y Y
firmsize effects N N N N Y Y
tenure effects N N N N Y Y
manufacturing share N Y N Y N Y
Notes: Outcome variable is an indicator for whether a formally employed worker in time t is also formally employed in time t− 3. Each cell contains a coefficient
from a different regression. All regressions include time period effects, labor market effects, age effects (in years), and a male indicator. Standard errors are
clustered at the labor market by time period level. Trade flow data from UN Comtrade database and employment data from IMSS records. Regressions are run
at the cell level due to computational constraints and weighted by cell size. Exposuremt defined in Equation (1). first stage regressions not shown. *** 1%, **
5%, *10% level.
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Table 1.13. Industry-level Regressions, OLS
dep. var.: mex exp US world exp US
(1) (2)
chn exp US 0.151*** 0.052
(0.009) (0.054)
year fe Y Y
ind fe Y Y
N 2688 2688
Notes: Each column represents a different regression. chn exp us, mex exp us and world exp us measured in
inflation-adjusted US dollar. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% level.
Table 1.14. Industry-level Regressions, IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. First Stage Regressions
dep. var.: chn exp US chn exp US chn exp US chn exp US
chn exp pred 0.063*** 0.063***
(0.005) (0.005)
chn exp other 1.216*** 1.216***
(0.012) (0.012)
B. IV Regressions
dep. var.: mex exp US world exp US mex exp US world exp US
chn exp US -0.045 -0.844*** 0.188*** 0.194***
(0.035) (0.214) (0.009) (0.058)
year fe Y Y Y Y
ind fe Y Y Y Y
F-stat 178.93 178.93 10996.31 10996.31
N 2688 2688 2688 2688
Notes: Each column represents a different regression. chn exp us, mex exp us, world exp us, chn exp pred and
chn exp other measured in inflation-adjusted US dollar. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% level.
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1.9 Appendix: Tables
Table 1.A1. Industry-level Regressions, Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dep. var.: chn exp US can exp US cen exp US low exp US row exp US US exp oth
A. Reduced Form Regressions
chn exp other 1.401*** 0.016 0.312*** 0.048*** 0.445*** -0.056***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.003) (0.033) (0.008)
B. IV Regressions
chn exp US 0.011 0.223*** 0.034*** 0.318*** -0.040***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.002) (0.024) (0.005)
year fe X X X X X X
ind fe X X X X X X
N 6749 6749 6749 6749 6749 6749
Notes: Each cell contains a coefficient for a different regression. Data from Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013). Industries with no exports for a given im-
porter/exporter pair are assigned zero exports; results are robust to excluding these observations. chn = China, can = Canada, cen = Mexico and CAFTA
countries, low = Low-income countries, row = Rest of world, and oth = eight other advanced economies. See Appendix of Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) for
country classifications. *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% level.
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2.1 Introduction
A growing body of research suggests that lack of state capacity — in particular, difficulty in raising
taxes to fund public goods — is an important constraint on the growth of developing countries
(Burgess and Stern, 1993; Besley and Persson, 2013). Developing countries generally have low ratios
of tax revenues to GDP and large informal sectors. Mexico, the focus of our study, is no exception: it
has the lowest tax revenue share of GDP in the OECD, between 15 and 20 percent during the period
we study, and the informal sector has been estimated to make up 40 percent or more of total output
(OECD, 2011b; IMF, 2010; Schneider and Enste, 2000). Given weak enforcement institutions and
widespread evasion, the task of improving the fiscal capacity in developing countries is a difficult
one, and there is acute interest among researchers and policy-makers in potential remedies.
A key element of the general weakness of fiscal capacity is non-compliance of firms with tax
regulations. A large literature has focused on one dimension of non-compliance: the failure of
firms to register with tax authorities. Researchers have argued that this form of non-compliance
generates a variety of market distortions, including limits on informal firms’ employment growth
and access to formal credit markets (Gordon and Li, 2009; La Porta and Shleifer, 2008; Levy, 2008;
Busso, Fazio, and Levy, 2012).4 Governments in a number of countries have implemented programs
to reduce registration costs and induce firms to formalize, and there is an active empirical literature
on the effects of formalization.5
In this paper, we focus on a different dimension of non-compliance by firms, less appreciated
but arguably no less important: the under-reporting of wages by registered firms to evade payroll
taxes. This form of non-compliance has received surprisingly little empirical attention. One reason
may be that it has been shown not to be a significant issue in developed countries. For instance,
4Other notable theoretical work on firms’ decisions about whether to formalize includes Rauch (1991), De Paula
and Scheinkman (2011), and Galiani and Weinschelbaum (forthcoming).
5See e.g. Bruhn (2011), Kaplan, Piedra, and Seira (2011), Fajnzylber, Maloney, and Montes-Rojas (2011), Mon-
teiro and Assunção (2012), McKenzie and Sakho (2010), de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2012).
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using audits of individual tax returns in Denmark, Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen, and Saez
(2011) find little evasion when incomes are reported by employers or other third parties.6 The view
that third-party reporting is effective in ensuring compliance is widespread among practitioners and
government agencies in developed countries (see e.g. Plumley (2004) and OECD (2006)). Another
reason for the limited attention to wage under-reporting may be that it is difficult to study. It
has been rare for researchers to have micro-level information on firms’ wage reports, and rarer still
to have access to an alternative source of wage information at a sufficiently disaggregated level
to permit inferences about the extent of non-compliance (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002; Slemrod,
2007). As a consequence, it has not been clear to what extent the accuracy of third-party reporting
carries over to developing-country settings.
In this paper, we compare two sources of wage information from Mexico — firms’ reports of
individuals’ wages to the Mexican social security agency and individuals’ responses to a household
labor-force survey (the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENEU)) — to draw inferences about
the extent of wage under-reporting and how it has responded to changes in the social security
system. In particular, we focus on a major pension reform that introduced a system of personal
retirement accounts, passed by the Mexican Congress on December 21, 1995 and implemented on
July 1, 1997. As discussed in more detail below, prior to the reform the social security benefits of
most workers were largely insensitive to the wages reported by firms on their behalf. The reform tied
individual pensions more closely to firms’ wage reports and made it easier for employees to observe
those reports. Workers already in the traditional system prior to July 1, 1997 retained the right to
choose, at the time of retirement, the pension that they would have received under the pre-reform
regime. Because older workers had little time to accumulate sufficient balances in their personal
6In another example, Saez (2010) finds significant bunching around the first kink point of the Earned Income Tax
Credit, suggesting misreporting, only among the self-employed. The Internal Revenue Service has documented that
compliance is higher for income groups with greater third-party reporting in the U.S. (Internal Revenue Service, 1996,
2006).
43
accounts, their expected pension was higher under the old regime. Younger workers had a greater
expectation of being better off under the new regime and hence had stronger incentives to ensure
accurate reporting. We use this differential impact by age as the basis for a difference-in-differences
estimation strategy.
To guide our empirical investigation, we have developed a simple partial-equilibrium model
of endogenous compliance by heterogeneous firms, summarized briefly in Section 2.3 below and
presented in full in the Appendix. Firms are assumed to be monopolistically competitive and to
differ in productivity (in a setting similar to Melitz (2003) but without international trade). The
cost of evasion is assumed to be increasing both in the unreported part of the wage per worker
and in firm output, for reasons that may include the greater difficulty of maintaining collusion
in larger firms, as argued in a recent paper by Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2009), or simply the
greater visibility of larger firms to auditors. One consequence of this assumption is that evasion
is declining in firm size in cross-section. The model further predicts that a social-security reform
like the one that occurred in Mexico, which raises the sensitivity of social-security benefits to the
reported wage, will lead to a decline in evasion for affected workers.
A key limitation of our study is that, although evasion decisions are taken at the level of
individual firms, the household labor-force survey does not contain firm identifiers and we are
not able to construct measures of evasion at the firm level. Instead, we construct measures of
evasion at the level of cells defined by different combinations of metropolitan areas, sectors, firm-
size categories and age groups, depending on the specification. Within each cell, we compare the
distributions of wage measures that in the absence of evasion should coincide — the post-tax wage
from the administrative records of the social security agency and the take-home wage reported on
the household survey — and measure evasion either as the difference in log median or log mean
wage or as the excess mass in the administrative-records distribution at the left tail. We focus on
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male workers, for reasons discussed below.
Using our evasion measures, we first document a set of cross-sectional relationships prior to
the reform. Evasion is substantial, as one might expect given the weak relationship between wage
reports and social security benefits for most workers. We also show that evasion is declining in firm
size, although evasion remains non-trivially positive even among quite large firms.
We then turn to the difference-in-differences strategy using the pension reform. We focus on
outcomes by age group at the level of local labor markets. We show that evasion rates by age
group followed similar trends prior to the reform, but that the oldest age group, ages 55-65, saw a
significant relative increase following the passage of the reform, a pattern that is robust across our
measures of evasion.
Overall, the results support the view that tying benefits to reported wages and making it easier
for workers to observe firms’ reports can be an effective way to improve payroll-tax compliance. It
seems likely that the change in incentives was more important than the change in information: if
incentives had not changed, and benefits had remained largely insensitive to wage reports, it is not
clear why information alone would have led to changes in compliance. But the “experiment” we
consider combined both elements, and the effects we estimate should be interpreted as combined
effects of incentives and information.7
This paper is related to a number of different literatures. There is a small literature on misre-
porting of social security contributions, including Nyland, Smyth, and Zhu (2006), Tonin (2011),
and Bérgolo and Cruces (2012), and Mao, Zhang, and Zhao (2013). This paper appears to be the
first to analyze how tying benefits more closely to reported wages can contribute to improved com-
pliance.8 Relative to this literature, the paper is also distinctive in its explicit consideration of firm
7Our argument should not be interpreted as advocating a system of personal accounts per se; one could imagine
a change in pension benefits under the traditional pay-as-you-go system that would have had similar effects.
8Bailey and Turner (2001) suggest verbally that tying pension benefits to contributions would have the effect of
reducing evasion.
45
heterogeneity and in using the comparison of firms’ administrative reports to workers’ responses to
a household survey to measure evasion.9
This paper is related to recent work on incentivizing decentralized agents to improve tax enforce-
ment. Kopczuk and Slemrod (2006), Keen and Lockwood (2010), and Pomeranz (2013) argue that
value-added taxes (VATs) have attractive enforcement properties in part because they give each
party in a supply-chain transaction greater incentive to ensure that the other reports accurately.
A recent paper by Naritomi (2013) analyzes a Brazilian program to give consumers incentives to
ask for receipts from retail establishments and finds positive effects on compliance. In an ongoing
project, Khan, Khwaja, and Olken (2013) have randomized incentives to tax inspectors in Pakistan.
More broadly, this paper is in the spirit of a growing empirical literature in development economics
examining how corruption and other forms of illegal behavior respond to economic incentives, re-
cently surveyed by Olken and Pande (2012). It is part of a small but growing literature using
administrative records from developing countries to document various aspects of taxpayer behavior
(Pomeranz, 2013; Kleven and Waseem, 2013; Best, Brockmeyer, Kleven, Spinnewijn, and Waseem,
2013). It is also related to an active recent literature on the role of firms in tax systems (Kopczuk
and Slemrod, 2006; Gordon and Li, 2009; Dharmapala, Slemrod, and Wilson, 2011) and to a volu-
minous literature on tax evasion and avoidance, reviewed by Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998),
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), and Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012).
2.2 Institutions: The Mexican Social Security System
Because our empirical strategy relies crucially on incentives in the Mexican social insurance system,
this section describes the system and the pension reform in some detail. Because of data constraints,
9Papers using the general strategy of comparing information from more than one data source to infer illicit behavior
(in other contexts) include Pissarides and Weber (1989), Fisman and Wei (2004), Olken (2006), Gorodnichenko,
Martinez-Vazquez, and Peter (2009), Marion and Muehlegger (2008), Hurst, Li, and Pugsley (2011), Braguinsky,
Mityakov, and Liscovich (2010), and Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013).
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discussed in more detail below, we focus on the years 1988-2003. In describing the characteristics
of the social security system and in the empirical work below, we will focus primarily on male
workers.10
The Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS), the Mexican social security agency, is the
primary source of social insurance for private-sector workers in Mexico. It administers pension
benefits, disability insurance, work injury compensation, childcare centers, and a large number of
clinics and hospitals, which are the primary source of health care for the formal, private-sector
Mexican workforce.11 Beginning with its creation in 1944, IMSS operated as a pay-as-you-go
(PAYGO) scheme financed by payroll taxes. By the late 1980s, however, rising health care costs
and an increase in the number of pensioners relative to the working-age population led to projected
shortfalls in the IMSS financial accounts. On Dec. 21, 1995, because of concerns about the
financial viability of the system, the congress enacted a comprehensive pension reform, to take
effect on July 1, 1997.12 This reform replaced the entire PAYGO pension system with a system of
personal retirement accounts (PRA). More extensive discussions of the pension reform are provided
in Grandolini and Cerda (1998), Sales-Sarrapy, Solis-Soberon, and Villagomez-Amezcua (1996), and
Aguila (2011).
10The incentives and empirical patterns for women are complicated by the facts that women’s labor force par-
ticipation changed relatively rapidly over the study period and that many women receive IMSS benefits through
their spouses, which provides an incentive to remain in the informal sector. In addition, because of relatively low
labor force participation by older women, sample sizes in the ENEU household survey (described below) are often
inadequate, especially when analyzing the data separately by metropolitan area (or metropolitan area, firm size and
sector), as explained below. We present the main tables and figures for women in the Appendix. To preview the
results, the cross-sectional patterns are robust for women, but the difference-in-differences results are not, possibly
for the reasons just discussed.
11Public-sector workers and workers for PEMEX, the state-owned oil company, are covered by separate systems.
In 2003, the government created an alternative system called Seguro Popular, which provides basic health coverage
for all individuals and is not tied to formal employment. In this paper, we focus on the IMSS system and sectors
with minimal government employment.
12This change followed an unsuccessful partial reform in 1992, described in the Appendix.
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2.2.1 Contribution Rates
IMSS requires contributions from both employers and employees based on reported wages; these
are supplemented by government contributions. Figure 2.1 presents the contribution schedule for
employers as a function of the reported real daily wages of each employee, for selected years. The
schedule reflects a complicated set of formulas determining contributions to the various components
of the IMSS system, principally health care, pensions, and child care.13 The figure illustrates that
the most significant changes in the schedule are for the highest-wage workers, earning above 500
pesos per day, due to changes in the maximum taxable income over the period, from 10 times to
25 times the minimum wage in Mexico City.14 The topcodes apply to no more than 5 percent of
wage-earners in any year and will play little role in our analysis. The total employer contribution
varied between 18 percent and 22 percent of the wage over the range in which almost all workers fall.
There was an increase in the employer contribution from 1990 to 1993, and then the reform in 1997
introduced a kink in the schedule, which raised contributions disproportionately on the lowest-wage
workers. Figures 2.2 displays worker contributions, which vary between 2 percent and 5 percent
over the relevant range and declined with the 1997 reform. Overall, while there were changes in
the contribution schedules, these were relatively modest over the relevant wage range.15 Looking
ahead to the empirical strategy, we also note that the changes in contributions were the same for
all age groups and their effects will be differenced out in our difference-in-differences procedure.
13Full details are presented in Appendix Tables 2.A1 and 2.A2.
14There are three minimum wage zones in Mexico, corresponding to higher-, medium- and lower-wage municipalities,
respectively. The minimum wage in Mexico City is typically used for indexing purposes, and where we refer to the
minimum wage (without specifying zone) we are referring to the minimum wage in Mexico City.
15Although the kink introduced in 1997 appears promising for econometric analysis, we do not find evidence of
significant bunching at the kink point. While the changes in top-codes also appear promising, we lack sample size,
particularly in the household data, to exploit them, at least using the basic strategy of the current paper.
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2.2.2 Non-pension Benefits
Any worker on whose behalf contributions are made to the system is entitled to free health care at
IMSS hospitals and clinics, for himself or herself, as well as for members of his or her immediate
family, independent of the reported wage. In addition, working mothers and widowed or divorced
working fathers are entitled to free child care during workdays for children under four years old.16
It is difficult to estimate workers’ valuations of these non-pension benefits. Conveniently for our
empirical strategy, however, the health care and child care benefits did not change with the 1997
pension reform. Under the assumption that employees’ valuations of the constant set of benefits
did not change differentially by age group over the study period, the valuations will be differenced
out in our difference-in-differences procedure.17
2.2.3 Pension Benefits
2.2.3.1 Pre-reform (pay-as-you-go) system Under the pre-reform regime, workers became
vested in the system after 10 years of contributions, and were then entitled to receive at least the
minimum pension. Pensions were calculated on the basis of the final average wage, defined as
the average nominal wage in the five years preceding retirement. Panel A of Figure 2.3 illustrates
the expected daily pension as a function of the final average wage for workers with 10, 20 and
30 years of contributions in selected years. The schedules combine a minimum pension guarantee
with a benefit proportional to an individual’s wage. At first glance, the pension values illustrated
in Panel A appear to be sensitive to the reported final average wage, but it is important to note
that in the years leading up to the reform inflation had severely eroded the real value of wages and
pensions, such that a large majority of workers had final average wages in the region in which the
16IMSS also provides an individual savings account for housing expenditures, which in some cases can be used to
contribute to an individual pension. See the Appendix for details.
17There has been a secular decline in the number of IMSS hospital and clinic beds per covered individual, but there
was no trend break in 1997 (IMSS, 2011, ch. 11). Below we will find no pre-trend in under-reporting prior to 1997.
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minimum was binding. Inflation exceeded 50 percent in every year in the volatile 1982-1988 period,
and exceeded 100 percent in 1987 and 1988; it was above 25 percent in a number of subsequent
years (1990-1991 and 1995-1996). (See Appendix Table 2.A4.) In response to public pressure, the
Mexican Congress in 1989 increased the minimum pension to 70 percent of the minimum wage and
indexed it to the minimum wage going forward, without raising the value of pensions greater than
the minimum.18 The congress subsequently raised the value of the minimum pension relative to
the minimum wage, until it reached 100 percent of the minimum wage in Mexico City in 1995.
As a consequence of the erosion of the real value of pensions above the minimum and the
legislative interventions to raise the minimum, the fraction of workers who expected to receive the
minimum pension remained high throughout the pre-reform period. Panel B of Figure 2.3 plots
the real value of the pension for male workers with 10, 20 or 30 years of contributions against the
final average wage percentile of 60-65 year old men in the IMSS data, for selected years.19 In 1990,
approximately 80 percent of male retirees with 10 years of contributions received the minimum
pension. The corresponding numbers for male workers with 20 or 30 years of contributions were
70 percent and 60 percent respectively. In 1997, just prior to the implementation of the pension
reform, nearly all workers with 10 years of contributions, roughly 50 percent of those with 20
years, and 40 percent of those with 30 years could expect to receive the minimum pension.20
Unfortunately, the data to which we have access do not contain total years of contributions by each
individual worker, and hence we are not able to calculate the precise number of workers receiving
the minimum pension. But analysts with access to this information report that approximately 80
18In 1991, benefits were indexed to the minimum wage, which slowed the erosion of the values of pensions above
the minimum. That is, if a worker’s final average wage was twice the minimum wage in 1991, the pension payment
in 1992 was calculated on the basis of twice the minimum wage. The real minimum wage declined steadily over the
period (see Appendix Table 2.A4) so the slowing of the erosion of pensions as a result of this change was modest.
19To calculate the final average wage percentile, we calculate the nominal wage at each percentile of the IMSS wage
distribution for 60-65 year old men in each of preceding five years, then take the average for each percentile.
20In addition, there was a penalty for retirement before age 65 of 5 percent per year (i.e. a worker who retired at
age 60 would have his or her pension reduced by 25 percent), but this penalty was not allowed to reduce the pension
below the minimum. This reduced the disincentive to retire early to workers with pensions near the minimum (Aguila,
2011).
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percent of retirees were receiving the minimum pension prior to the reform (Grandolini and Cerda,
1998).21
Strictly speaking, pension values were insensitive to final wages only for infra-marginal workers
whose true final wage corresponded to the minimum pension. If wages were under-reported to
IMSS, as we argue below, then the graphs in Panel B of Figure 2.3 likely overstate the fraction of
workers whose pensions were insensitive to under-reporting. To address this, in Panel C of Figure
2.3 we plot similar graphs using final average wage percentiles calculated from the ENEU household
data (described in Section 2.4 below), which should not be subject to under-reporting. We see that
somewhat smaller fractions of workers with 10, 20 and 30 years of contributions would have received
the minimum pension. But the key point is that the graph for 1997 resembles quite closely the
corresponding graph in Panel B: essentially all workers with 10 years of contributions would have
received the minimum pension, as well as more than 40 percent of workers with 20 years and more
than 20 percent of workers with 30 years.
2.2.3.2 Post-reform (personal retirement accounts) system Under the personal retire-
ment account (PRA) system, employees, employers and the government are required to make
contributions to workers’ personal retirement accounts in each period.22 Each worker is required to
choose an investment institution, known as an Administrador de Fondos de Ahorro para el Retiro
(AFORE) [Retirement Savings Fund Administrator], to manage his or her account.23 The reform
21In addition, because pensions were calculated only on the basis of the last five years of employment, any worker
who was certain that he or she would work for more than five years in covered employment could also be certain
that the current reported wage would not affect the pension benefit. In unreported results, we have investigated
whether we see an increase in reported wages five years before retirement, as one might expect if workers were being
sophisticated in adjusting strategically to the five-year rule, but we do not find a significant change.
22Over the 1997-2003 period, employers were required to contribute 5.15 percent of each employee’s wage, and
employees 1.125 percent; the government contributed 0.225 percent, as well as a “social quota” equal to 5.5 percent
of the current minimum wage in Mexico City. See Appendix Tables 2.A1 and 2.A2 for details. Employees also have
the option to contribute to a voluntary retirement savings account. See Lara-Ibarra (2011) for an analysis of the
effects of a change in the tax rate on these contributions.
23The AFORE management fees are in many cases substantial, and it is not clear that workers choose AFOREs
optimally. Duarte and Hastings (2010) investigate the role of behavioral issues in employees’ choices of AFOREs.
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also specified a minimum pension equal to the minimum wage on July 1, 1997, with further in-
creases in the minimum pension indexed to the Consumer Price Index. Eligibility for the minimum
pension was raised from 10 years of contributions to 25 years of contributions.
The establishment of the new pension regime created two categories of workers: “transition”
workers who first registered with IMSS before July 1, 1997, and new workers who first registered
after July 1, 1997. At retirement, transition workers are given a choice between receiving pension
benefits under the PAYGO scheme or the PRA scheme. The PAYGO pension is calculated as if
workers’ post-reform contributions were under the old regime. If a transition worker opts for the
PAYGO pension, IMSS appropriates the balance of his or her personal retirement account. The
only option for new workers is the PRA.24
To illustrate the impact of the reform on pension wealth, we conduct a simulation of pension
wealth under the two regimes, based on a similar simulation by Aguila (2011). In carrying out the
simulation, we choose a relatively optimistic annual return on the personal accounts: 8.59 percent,
the average return from 1998-2002, as in the more optimistic of the two scenarios considered by
Aguila (2011). We also assume that participants expected the real value of the minimum wage to
decline, as it had done for more than a decade (see Appendix Table 2.A4). Assumptions of lower
interest rates and less rapid declines in the real minimum wage would be less favorable to the PRAs.
Details of the simulation are in the Appendix.
One way to see the differences in incentives by age in the system is to compare pension wealth
for workers of different ages in 1997. Table 2.1 displays the real present value of pension wealth
by wage level for male workers of different ages in 1997, all of whom began working at age 25
24Under the personal-account system, individuals have three options upon retirement. One is to receive programmed
withdrawals from the individual’s AFORE, where the withdrawal amount is calculated based on the account balance
as well as the age and life expectancy of the individual and dependents. (A worker who receives the minimum
pension must choose this option.) A second option is to purchase an annuity from a private insurance company that
guarantees a fixed monthly pension. A third option, available to workers with a personal-account balance exceeding
130 percent of the cost of an annuity providing a monthly payment equal to the minimum pension, is to take a
lump-sum payment upon retirement.
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and expect to continue working until age 60, assuming real wages are constant over their lifetimes.
Numbers in italics indicate that the PRA pension is more valuable than the PAYGO pension. The
message of the simulation is clear: the PRA pension is expected to be more valuable only for
younger workers who expect to contribute to the personal account for 25 or more years, and among
these workers the PRA pension is relatively more attractive for higher-wage workers.25
We do not attempt to infer from the simulation exact crossing points at which the PRA becomes
preferable to the PAYGO pension; any such calculation would be sensitive to assumptions about the
path of interest and inflation rates, and it is not clear that workers are sophisticated in calculating
the precise values of pensions under the different systems. The basic message of the simulation,
which we believe was understood by participants at the time of the reform, is that for most workers,
conditional on qualifying for the minimum pension under the old regime, the personal accounts
could be expected to be relatively more attractive only for workers with a significant number of
years of contributions after 1997.
Another aspect of the pension reform, which may have been important in practice, is that the
law requires AFOREs to send an account statement to each holder of a personal retirement account
every four months. A redacted example of such an account statement appears as Figure 2.4. The
account statement reports previous balances (saldo anterior), new contributions (aportaciones),
withdrawals (retiros), interest earned (rendimientos), AFORE commissions charged (comisiones),
and final balances (saldo final) for the pension account as well as for the voluntary savings account
(see footnote 22) and the housing savings account (see footnote 16). The bottom section reports
3-year returns and commissions for each AFORE, as well as the average 5-year net return (at
25Another way to see the effect of the reform is to consider the values of the pensions for different numbers of years
of expected contributions, for a worker who entered then system on June 30, 1997, as presented in Appendix Table
2.A5. Note that workers with fewer than 10 years of contributions are better off under the new regime, since they
receive no pension under the old regime but a small pension under the new regime. But conditional on a worker
having at least 10 years of contributions, we again see that the attractiveness of the PRA pension is increasing in the
number of years of contributions and the wage. The median wage for male workers is just above 100 pesos/day, and
for a worker at this level the PRA only becomes more attractive if he expects to contribute for more than 25 years.
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left). It appears that these account statements made it significantly easier for workers to discover
how much employers were contributing on their behalf. This mechanism would not be expected to
reduce evasion if employers and employees were colluding in under-reporting wages, but it may have
reduced evasion in cases in which workers were unaware that their employers were under-reporting
their wages.
Neither before nor after the reform was there a reward to employees for revealing evasion by
their employers, beyond ensuring accurate reporting of their own wages. The social security law
provides for fines if establishments are caught evading taxes. The fines ranged from 70-100 percent
of the amount of evasion over the 1995-2001 period and have ranged from 40-100 percent, with
most exactly at 40 percent, since 2001.26 Although we argue that evasion has been widespread, at
least one aspect of IMSS reporting requirements does appear to have been strictly enforced. By
law, firms in Mexico are required to pay the relevant minimum wage and a holiday bonus called
an aguinaldo, worth two weeks of salary — approximately 4.5 percent of annual earnings. In order
to avoid fines, establishments are required to report wages of at least the corresponding minimum
wage plus 4.5 percent throughout the year.27
2.2.4 Other Dimensions of Tax System in Mexico
One reason that firms in developed countries engage in relatively little under-reporting of wages
may be that it does little to reduce their overall tax burden. If corporate or personal income taxes
are as high as payroll taxes and difficult to evade, then lower payroll taxes due to under-reporting
will be offset by higher taxes on corporate or personal income. In Mexico, the corporate income tax
are generally higher than the payroll tax on paper: it went from 39 to 34 percent over the 1988-2003
26In addition, the law requires employers with 300 or more employees are required to submit an audit by a certified
public accountant to IMSS (since 1993) as well as to the Mexican tax authority (since 1991).
27Prior to 1991, there are a scattered few reports of wages below this level; beginning in 1991, IMSS stepped up
enforcement of this rule and such wages have no longer been observed.
54
period.28 But corporate tax evasion and avoidance are rife in Mexico. For instance, the OECD in
1992 found that, in part due to various loopholes, 70 percent of corporate tax declarations reported
no taxable income (OECD, 1992). By all accounts, tax evasion remains high (OECD, 2011a).
In addition, the social security agency and the Mexican tax authority first signed an agreement
to share data in June 2002; thus for almost all of the period under study, there was no chance
that information reported to the social security agency would affect the corporate tax burden. It
appears, in other words, that evaded payroll taxes were not offset by increases in other taxes.
Also, it does not appear that individual income taxes provided a strong disincentive to most
workers to have their wages reported accurately. Mexico provides extensive tax credits for low-
wage workers, originally instituted to offset the regressive effects of VATs, with the consequence
that many workers legally pay no income tax, or even receive funds from the tax authority (i.e. face
a negative income tax.) In 1997, for instance, individuals making less than 3.2 times the minimum
wage in Mexico City faced a zero or negative tax rate (OECD, 1999, p. 80).
2.3 Conceptual Framework
There is a growing literature on the role of firms in tax systems, but to our knowledge there exists
no off-the-shelf model to guide the analysis both of cross-sectional differences in firm behavior
and of differential responses across firms to tax changes.29 To organize our empirical analysis, we
have developed a simple partial-equilibrium model of the compliance decisions of heterogeneous
firms, in which employees and firms collude in under-reporting (as in Yaniv (1992)) and firms are
monopolistically competitive and differ in productivity (as in Melitz (2003)). To save space in the
28Source: OECD Tax Database, www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase.
29Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2009) consider a particular mechanism that generates greater compliance among
larger firms — the increasing difficulty of maintaining collusion as the number of employees increases — but do
not focus on differential responses to tax or benefit changes. Besley and Persson (2013, pp. 103-105) note that if
compliance costs depend on firm size, then firm heterogeneity will matter for compliance, without taking a position
on the source of the firm heterogeneity or on the implication for responses to tax changes. Dharmapala, Slemrod,
and Wilson (2011) consider the optimal taxation of firms in a setting with firm heterogeneity and the implications
for firm size distributions, but do not focus on wage under-reporting.
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main text, we have put the full model in the Appendix; here we briefly summarize the main ideas.
If we let wr be the pre-tax wage reported by a firm to the government, wu be the unreported
wage (paid “under the table”), and τ be the tax rate (the sum of firm and worker contributions),
then the the net take-home wage received by workers is wnet = wu + (1− τ)wr. Rearranging,
wu = wnet − (1− τ)wr (1)
In the empirics, wr will correspond to the wage reported by the firm in the administrative records
of the social security agency and wnet to the take-home pay reported by workers in the ENEU
household survey. As mentioned above and discussed in more detail below, we do not observe wnet
at the firm level, but we will be able to construct measures of the unreported wage at a more
aggregated level.
We assume that the cost of evasion is given by xc(wu), where c
′(wu) > 0, c
′′(wu) > 0 and x is
the output of the firm. One possible justification for this assumption is simply that auditors are
more likely to audit larger firms because their operations are more visible, as suggested by Besley
and Persson (2013, p. 66) — a conjecture that appears anecdotally to be relevant in Mexico.
Another is the argument of Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2009) that collusion in under-reporting is
more difficult to sustain in larger firms. Whatever the underlying mechanism, the assumptions
on the cost-of-evasion function give us our first key theoretical implication: in equilibrium, more
productive firms, which are larger, choose to evade less.
In our static setting, we model the per-period value of the future pension benefit as bwr, where
we call b the “benefit rate.” The total effective wage, inclusive of pension benefits, which we denote
by we, is then:
we = wnet + bwr = wu + (1− (τ − b))wr (2)
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We assume that the labor market is competitive and that workers’ labor supply responds to the
effective wage, we.
30 It can be shown that an increase in the benefit rate, b, will lead firms to rely
more heavily on the reported wage, wr, in the compensation package to achieve a given market-
clearing effective wage. This is our second key theoretical implication: an increase in the pension
benefit rate will lead to a decrease in the unreported wage, wu, within each firm. The model
considers homogeneous workers, but could be easily extended to consider more than one type of
worker, which differ in the benefit rate they face. An additional implication of the model is that a
decrease in the tax rate, τ , has an analogous effect to an increase in the benefit rate on compliance;
we return to this below.
An important issue in this context is the incidence of the change in the pension benefit rate on
wages. Theoretically, it is possible to show that, for a finite labor-supply elasticity, the effective
wage, we, is increasing in the benefit rate, b. The government ends up paying a larger share of the
effective wage and some of this increased contribution redounds to workers. But in general it is not
possible to sign the effects of the reform on the observable wage measures, the firm-specific reported
wage, wr, or the firm-specific take-home wage, wnet, for reasons discussed in the Appendix. It is
worth emphasizing, however, that in the model the response of wu to the policy change does not
depend on the incidence of the policy change on we, wr or wnet. In this sense, the model suggests
that it is reasonable to examine the effect of the policy change on evasion separately from the
question of incidence, which is how we proceed in the empirical analysis.
2.4 Data
The establishments’ wage reports are drawn from IMSS administrative records. All private Mexican
employers are in principle legally obligated to report wages for their employees, and pay social-
30We assume that workers observe both wnet and wr, and hence wu and we. In this sense, workers “collude” in
under-reporting in that they are aware of it and do not report it.
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security taxes on the basis of the reports. The IMSS dataset contains the full set of wage reports
for employees in registered, private-sector establishments over the period 1985-2005.31 The dataset
contains a limited set of variables: age, sex, daily wage (including benefits), state and year of the
individual’s first registration with IMSS, an employer-specific identifier, and industry and location
of the employer. Wages are reported in spells (with a begin and end date for each wage level) and
in theory we could construct a day-by-day wage history for each individual. To keep the dataset
manageable, we extract wages for a single day, June 30, in each year. Prior to 1997, records for
temporary workers were not collected in digital form. To ensure comparability before and after
1997, we focus on workers identified in the IMSS data as permanent, defined as having a written
contract of indefinite duration.
We select ages 16-65. To maintain consistency across years, we impose the lowest real value of
the IMSS topcode for wage reporting (which occurred in 1991) in all years. We drop establishments
with a single insured worker, since these are likely to be self-employed workers. In the interests of
comparability with the ENEU household data, we include only the metropolitan areas included in
the ENEU samples (described below). We also focus on sectors for which we are confident that
IMSS is the only available formal-sector social insurance program: manufacturing, construction,
and retail/hotel/restaurants. Other sectors contain a substantial share of public employees, who are
covered by a separate system.32 We focus primarily on men, for the reasons discussed in Section
2.2 above. (Results for women are reported in the Appendix.) We refer to the sample selected
following these criteria as our IMSS baseline sample. Further details on sample selection and data
processing in the Appendix.
The household data we use are from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENEU) [Na-
31The data have been used in several previous papers, including Castellanos, Garcia-Verdu, and Kaplan (2004),
and Fŕıas, Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2009b).
32We focus on manufacturing, construction, and retail/hotel/restaurants in part so that we can be confident that
respondents to the household survey are not mistaking coverage under the public-sector system for IMSS coverage.
58
tional Urban Employment Survey], a household survey modeled on the Current Population Survey
(CPS) in the United States, collected by the Instituto Nacional de Estad́ısticas y Geograf́ıa (IN-
EGI), the Mexican statistical agency. The original ENEU sample, beginning in 1987, focused on
the 16 largest Mexican metropolitan areas; although the coverage expanded over time, to maximize
the number of pre-reform years we focus on the original 16 areas. As in the IMSS data, we include
male workers ages 16-65, focus on the second quarter of each year, exclude self-employed workers,
impose the 1991 IMSS topcode in all years, and include only manufacturing, construction, and
retail/hotels/restaurants. All calculations below use the sampling weights provided by INEGI.
A very useful feature of the ENEU for our purposes is that it asks respondents whether they
receive IMSS coverage as an employment benefit. Beginning in the third quarter of 1994, the
ENEU also asked respondents whether they had a written contract of indefinite duration, the
legal definition of a permanent employee used by IMSS. Hourly wages are calculated as monthly
wages divided by 4.3 times hours worked in the previous week, and daily wages as 8 times hourly
wages. The ENEU wage measures are based on respondents’ reports of take-home pay, after social
security taxes have been paid. They also exclude bonuses paid less frequently than monthly, and
hence exclude the yearly aguinaldo bonus. The differences between the IMSS and the ENEU wage
measures are discussed further in the Appendix.
Although the ENEU survey does not contain a firm identifier, it does ask respondents about the
size of the firm at which he or she works. We use this information to generate a firm-size indicator
taking on values 1-10, 11-50, 51-100, 101-250, or 250+ employees.33 In addition, we drop workers
with reported daily wages below 30 pesos (in 2002 constant pesos, approximately US$3, about 50
percent of the lowest legal minimum wage.) In principle, both the IMSS and the ENEU data are
available over the 1987-2005 period. But there appear to be a number of data inconsistencies in the
33The survey allows for eight responses, 1, 2-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-50, 51-100, 101-250 and 250+. To ensure that sample
sizes within cells are sufficiently large, we create the five categories listed above.
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ENEU in 1987, the first year of the survey. In addition, the ENEU sampling scheme was redesigned
in the third quarter of 2003.
Our goal in the preparation of the datasets is to construct samples in the IMSS and ENEU data
that are as similar as possible. Table 2.2 presents summary statistics for the IMSS baseline sample
and various ENEU samples for 1990 and 2000, for a set of variables that are common between
the sources: daily (post-tax) wage, age, and share in large establishments (with more than 100
employees). Column 2 contains the “full” ENEU sample, containing all non-self-employed men
satisfying the age and sector criteria. Comparing columns 3 and 4, we see that ENEU workers with
IMSS coverage tend to be higher-wage and more likely to work in large establishments than workers
without IMSS coverage. Column 5 contains the sample that in principle should be the best match
for the IMSS baseline sample: ENEU workers who report receiving IMSS coverage and having
a written contract of indefinite duration — that is, who satisfy the definition of “permanent”
used by IMSS. The average wage for this ENEU sample is greater than for the IMSS baseline
sample, consistent with our argument below that there is under-reporting of wages in the IMSS
data. Because the contract-type variable is available only beginning in 1994, however, we have
prohibitively few years of pre-reform data for this sample. Instead, we will focus hereafter on the
Column 6 sample, ENEU workers who report receiving IMSS coverage and working full-time (i.e.
at least 35 hours in the previous week), which can be defined consistently over the entire period.
We refer to the Column 6 sample as our ENEU baseline sample.
The ENEU baseline sample is not an ideal comparison group, for several reasons. Some tem-
porary workers may work full-time, and some permanent workers may work part-time. Comparing
Columns 5 and 6 for the year 2000, we see that average wages are significantly lower in the Col-
umn 6 sample; this is attributable to the facts that temporary full-time workers earn relatively low
wages and that permanent part-time workers earn relatively high wages on average. It may also be
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that firms interpret “permanent” to mean something different from the legal definition (i.e written
contract of indefinite duration) when reporting wages. In addition, patterns of non-response may
differ between the IMSS and ENEU samples. It is well known, for instance, that richer households
tend to be less likely to respond to income questions in household surveys (Groves and Couper,
1998). The weighted employment totals from the ENEU data in Columns 5 and 6 are below the
IMSS totals in Column 1; this may in part reflect such non-response. These potential discrepancies
recommend caution in interpreting cross-sectional differences between the IMSS and ENEU base-
line samples. It is worth emphasizing, however, that our difference-in-difference strategy will focus
on changes over time in the discrepancies between the samples, and any time-invariant sources of
discrepancy will be differenced out.
As a check on the comparability of the baseline IMSS and ENEU samples (Columns 1 and
6 of Table 2.2), Table 2.3 compares the distributions in each sample across two dimensions that
will be important in our analysis, age and firm size. In order to ensure that we have sufficient
sample size in the ENEU to calculate the evasion measures below, we group individuals into five
age categories (ages 16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65). Comparing the rightmost columns for the
two panels, which indicate the share of employment in each firm size category as a share of total
employment, it appears that firm sizes in the ENEU are skewed slightly away from the smallest and
toward the largest size category (although there is non-monotonicity at intermediate sizes.) This
may be because respondents in the household survey do not distinguish between employees directly
hired by their employer and sub-contracted employees, or simply that respondents systematically
overestimate employment. It may also be that firms under-report employment to IMSS, although
the patterns of employment differences in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.5 tend to cast doubt on this
interpretation. The distributions of employment across age groups conditional on a particular firm-
size category also reveal some differences. In general, in the ENEU it appears that employment
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in smaller firms is shifted a bit toward younger workers relative to the IMSS (with the opposite
shift among larger firms). But the overall distributions across age categories (in the “all firm sizes”
rows) appear to be fairly similar. Given the issues in reconciling the samples discussed above,
it is perhaps not surprising that formal Kolmogorov-Smirnov or Wilcoxon tests reject the null
hypothesis that the samples are drawn from the same underlying distribution. Caution is thus
warranted in interpreting our results below. We nonetheless feel that the samples appear to be
sufficiently similar that it is not unreasonable to use the wage discrepancy between them as a
measure of evasion. We also note again that any differences between the samples that are constant
over time will be differenced out in our difference-in-differences procedure.
As a further comparison, Figure 2.5 plots employment totals over the 1988-2003 period for the
same samples as in Table 2.2. Perhaps surprisingly, we see that over most of the period the number
of workers in the IMSS sample is slightly greater than the numbers in any of the ENEU samples.
There are several potential explanations. The difference may reflect non-response by households
in the ENEU (perhaps varying systematically with income, as mentioned above). It may be that
some respondents are unaware that they receive IMSS coverage from their employer, or believe that
they are covered by the public-sector social security agency (known by the acronym ISSSTE) when
in fact they are covered by IMSS. It may also be that individuals live outside of the boundaries of
the metropolitan area in which they work, and hence are included in our IMSS sample but not our
ENEU sample. For our purposes, however, the most important lesson of the figure is that there
does not appear to have been a large change over time in the extent of the employment discrepancy
between the IMSS and ENEU samples in response to the pension reform. Nor does it appear that
there was a significant large inflow to (or outflow from) formal employment in response to the
pension reform.
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2.5 Cross-Sectional Comparisons of Wage Distributions
In this section, we consider cross-sectional differences in wage distributions between the IMSS
and ENEU baseline samples prior to the 1997 pension reform. We focus on the year 1990, in
part because (in unreported results) we have been able to validate the ENEU sample against the
population census from that year. To begin, Figure 2.6 plots simple histograms of raw data: pre-
tax daily wages from the IMSS baseline sample (gray bars) and daily take-home wages the ENEU
baseline sample (bars with black borders and no fill color), using bins that are 5 pesos wide. The
three vertical lines between 50 and 70 pesos (approximately US$5-US$7/day) represent the the three
minimum wages in Mexico, with the rightmost corresponding to the minimum wage in Mexico City.
Figure 2.7 plots similar histograms using the same samples but using only observations below 200
pesos (approximately US$20), with bins 2 pesos wide. The pattern is clear: there is bunching in the
IMSS sample slightly above the three minimum wages. These bunches correspond to 104.5 percent
of the minimum wages in each zone — the minimum reports to IMSS that did not incur penalties.
It is also evident that the IMSS distribution lies largely to the left of the ENEU distribution.34 The
bunching and shift to the left of the distribution is precisely what one would have expected, given
that, for most workers, social security benefits were insensitive to reported wages, as long as their
firms made the minimum contributions on their behalf.35
A key empirical implication of our model, as well as of the previous theoretical work by Kleven
et al. (2009), is that there is less evasion in larger firms. Figure 2.8 presents figures similar to Figure
2.7 (focused on daily wages below 200 pesos), separately for five firm sizes. Caution is warranted in
interpreting these figures, since observed establishment size in the IMSS data may itself be affected
34The exception to this generalization is at the far right tail. In Figure 2.6, we see that there is relatively more
weight at the topcode in the IMSS sample; there is also slightly more weight at high wage values just below the
topcode. This appears to reflect non-response by high-income households in the ENEU — a common pattern in
household surveys, as mentioned above.
35Note that we are showing the raw, pre-tax IMSS data here, to illustrate the bunching at the top-code and the
minimum reportable values; when we use the post-tax IMSS wage below, the discrepancy in the distributions is even
more evident.
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by firms’ compliance decisions. Subject to this caveat, it appears that there is less bunching on
the minimum allowable wage reports at larger firm sizes, suggesting greater compliance. Even in
establishments with 250 workers or more, however, there is evidence of bunching at the minimum
allowable wage report, suggesting some under-reporting even in quite large firms.
To quantify the extent of non-compliance, we construct three measures of evasion. Recall from
equation (1) that the unreported wage is the difference between the worker’s net wage and the
post-tax wage reported by the firm: wu = wnet− (1−τ)wr. As noted above, the ENEU survey asks
individuals their take-home wage, which corresponds to wnet, and the raw IMSS administrative
records contain the reported wage, wr. We know the social security tax scheduled in each year,
discussed in Section 2.2, and hence can calculate the IMSS post-tax wage. The ENEU data do
not contain firm identifiers, but we can construct an estimate of wu at the level of cells defined by
metropolitan area, sector, firm size categories and/or age groups.
At the cell level, our first measure of evasion is the log median ENEU take-home wage minus
the log median IMSS post-tax wage. Our second measure is defined analogously, using the mean
instead of the median. We refer to the first measure as the “wage gap (medians)” and to the second
as the “wage gap (means)”. Our third measure of evasion is an estimate of the excess mass at the
left tail of the IMSS wage distribution. Figure 2.9 illustrates the calculation. The dotted (blue)
curve is a non-parametric estimate of the ENEU distribution, the same one that underlies the
hollow-rectangle histogram in Figure 2.6. The solid (red) curve is a non-parametric estimate of the
post-tax IMSS distribution. (Note that this differs from the distribution underlying the sold-gray
histogram in Figure 2.6, which presents the pre-tax IMSS distribution.36) In principle, the ENEU
take-home wage and the IMSS post-tax wage are an “apples-to-apples” comparison; in the absence
of evasion, they should coincide. We calculate the excess mass as the fraction of the IMSS sample
36This is the reason why the spikes at the right tails of the solid (red) and dotted (blue) distributions, which
correspond to the IMSS and ENEU topcodes, no longer coincide.
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minus the fraction of the ENEU sample to the left of 15th percentile of the ENEU distribution.37
Intuitively, our excess mass measure reflects the share of the sample that has to be moved from
right to left across the vertical line in order to transform the dotted (blue) distribution into the
solid (red) distribution.38
The level of aggregation is an important issue when constructing these evasion measures. Al-
though sample size is not a severe constraint in the IMSS administrative records, the ENEU contains
on the order of 10,000-14,000 raw observations on male full-time workers in each quarter in the
country as a whole. When we divide these by age group, metropolitan area, firm-size category
and sector, cell sizes in the ENEU can become prohibitively small. We cannot avoid doing some
aggregation. As discussed above, we focus on five age categories and five firm size categories. We
also aggregate four-digit industries into three broad sectors: manufacturing, construction, and re-
tail/services. In addition, when constructing the evasion measures, we pool all four quarters within
a given year in the ENEU data.39 In this section, we present cross-sectional statistics using the
measures of evasion calculated at the metro area/sector/firm size category/age group level. Below
we will conduct the analyses are higher levels of aggregation, as appropriate to the questions being
investigated.
Table 2.4 reports simple cross-sectional regressions of our three evasion measures on age-group,
37In choosing the critical value for the excess mass calculation, we face a trade-off. On one hand, we want a value
that is clearly to the right of the region of bunching in the IMSS data. On the other hand, we do not want a value
so far to the right that the measure misses under-reporting behavior. (If, for instance, the under-reporting of wages
occurs only for workers below the median, using the 50th percentile as the critical value will completely miss the
under-reporting behavior.) The results using other higher percentiles than the 15th are qualitatively similar, although
slightly weaker in some years.
38This excess mass measure differs from other excess mass measures that have been used in the literature, for
instance by Saez (2010), Chetty, Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri (2011), and Kleven and Waseem (2013), in two
ways. First, in our setting we do not have to construct a counterfactual distribution, requiring assumptions about
how individuals in the region of bunching are distributed in the counterfactual; here effectively we observe the
counterfactual distribution in the ENEU household data. Second, it is common to scale the excess mass by the
density of the counterfactual distribution in the region of bunching; in our setting at the left tail the density of the
ENEU wage distribution is near zero, and dividing by this density might introduce significant errors, so we do not
re-scale.
39Because the survey follows households for five quarters, observations in different quarters are not independent,
but our econometric tests do not require an independence assumption.
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firm-size and sector indicators in 1990. For each evasion measure, we report simple regressions on
a set of age-group or firm-size indicators without controls (Columns 1-2, 4-5, and 7-8) and then
a regression including sector indicators and metro-area indicators (Columns 3, 6, and 9). For age
groups, there is clear evidence that evasion is higher on average for the youngest age group, ages
16-25 (the omitted category), perhaps not surprisingly, since the youngest workers tend to have
lower labor-force attachment and higher mobility across jobs. The differences in coefficients among
the over-25 age groups are generally not significantly different from one another. For firm size, the
general pattern is that evasion is declining in employment, consistent with the pattern in the raw
histograms in Figure 2.8. There appears to be some non-monotonicity in the relationship between
evasion and firm size for the intermediate size categories (51-100 and 101-250 employees), but it
appears robust that evasion is lower in 11-50 employee firms than in 1-10 employee firms (the
omitted category), and lower still in 250+ employee firms. The estimates are largely unaffected by
controlling for age group, metro area, and sector, which suggests that the pattern we observed in
the raw data in Figure 2.8 is not due to differing age or metro area composition in different firm
size categories. Finally, evasion follows a consistent pattern across broad sectors, with construction
displaying the greatest extent of evasion, followed by manufacturing, followed by retail/services.
2.6 Effect of Pension Reform on Compliance
We now consider how evasion varied over time in response to the pension reform. A simple set
of graphs illustrates our main finding. Figure 2.10 plots non-parametric estimates of the male
wage distributions, similar to those in Figure 2.9 but for wages levels below 200 pesos/day, by age
group, for three years, 1990, 1997, and 2003.40 Each column of graphs corresponds to an age group
(indicated in the x-axis titles) and each row to a year. The key empirical pattern is illustrated by the
40We present non-parametric density estimates, rather than histograms, because they are easier to interpret visually.
Histograms would convey a qualitatively similar message.
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contrast between the first column, corresponding to ages 16-25, and the last column, corresponding
to ages 56-65. There is a clear decline in bunching and shift to the right of the IMSS distribution
for the youngest age group. For the oldest age group, there is little evident decline in bunching or
shift to the right in the IMSS distribution.
A possible concern with Figure 2.10 is that the differential changes by age group may reflect
shocks to local labor markets which differ in their age composition. To remove the effects of local
labor-market shocks, we calculate the wage gap (medians) measure at the age group-metro area-
year level, regress it on a full set of metro area-year indicators, and average the residuals at the
age group-year level. Figure 2.11 plots these averages, with observations corresponding to the 2nd
quarter of each year. One point to notice is that, as we saw in Table 2.4, evasion is highest for the
youngest age group. But the more important point is that the gap for the oldest age group, 56-65,
increased relative to the gaps for the other groups. To the extent that there is another group that
appears to have seen a relative increase, it is the second-oldest age group, 46-55. For the oldest
age group, it appears that the differential increase may have begun between the 2nd quarter of
1995 and the 2nd quarter of 1996, which corresponds to the time of passage of the law; there was
significant discussion of the pension reform in the popular press around the time of passage, and
it is possible that employees anticipated the effects of the reform and started paying attention to
under-reporting even before the reform took effect in July 1997. However, to be conservative, in
our regression analysis below we will take July 1, 1997 as the date of the reform. Even using this
more conservative choice, it appears that there was a differential increase in evasion for the oldest
two age groups relative to the younger ones.
Table 2.5 reports regressions that capture the pattern illustrated in Figure 2.11. Motivated by
the figure, we look for a divergence in the time-path of evasion for the oldest age group relative to
the younger groups. We interact an indicator for the oldest age group with year effects for each year
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over the 1988-2003 period, omitting the interaction with 1995, the year the reform was passed. We
control flexibly for metro area-year interactions and age group-metro area interactions. The key
finding is that, across the three measures of evasion, we see little evidence of a differential pre-trend
but robust evidence of a relative increase in evasion for the oldest age group following the passage
of the reform. It takes a bit longer for the relative increase in the wage gap (medians) measure to
become statistically significant, but the fact that we see a similar pattern across the three measures
is reassuring.41 Overall, the results are supportive of our second main theoretical implication:
evasion for older age groups declined relatively less than evasion for younger age groups.
The results for our evasion measures do not seem to be driven by discrepancies in the reporting
of employment in the two data sources. Table 2.6 reports regressions similar to those in Table
2.5, but where the outcome variable is the difference in log employment — what we can call the
“employment gap” — between the ENEU and IMSS baseline samples within an age group-metro
area cell, rather than one of the evasion measures. There is no evidence of a differential change in
the employment gap for older workers in response to the reform.42
To conclude this section, we briefly consider the incidence of the reform on market-level net
wages, using the ENEU household survey alone. Table 2.7 reports specifications similar to those
in Table 2.5, where the outcome is the log net wage reported on the ENEU survey, and we are
able to control flexibly for individual characteristics. Column 1 includes just age-group and metro
area-year effects, then moving across the columns we add sets of dummy variables for schooling
categories, marital status, occupation, industry and firm size. The consistent message is that there
41As mentioned above, the results for the excess mass measure when using different critical values are slightly
weaker. This is particularly true in 2003, a year in which we have consistent ENEU data only for the first two
quarter. But for all critical values between the 10th and 35th percentiles the excess mass measures show a significant
differential change by 2001-2002.
42Note that the employment gap here captures discrepancies in the number of workers reported to the IMSS system
and the number who report on the household survey that they receive IMSS coverage; it does not capture changes
in the propensity of firms to offer formal (i.e. covered by IMSS) employment. As mentioned above, we leave the
investigation of the effects of the reform on the informal/formal employment margin for future work.
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is no systematic differential effect of the reform on net wages of the oldest age group. While this
non-result may appear surprising, it is consistent with recent evidence from other countries on
the effects of tax reforms on take-home wages. For instance, Saez, Matsaganis, and Tsakloglou
(2012) find little evidence of differences in take-home pay for workers of different cohorts facing
different payroll-tax rates. The authors speculate that institutional factors such as fairness norms
may constrain firms’ ability to offer different wages to otherwise similar workers facing different
effective payroll tax rates. Such factors may also be present in Mexico and may similarly prevent
firms from offering different take-home wages to different age groups. Also, as discussed briefly
in Section 2.3 and in more detail in the Appendix, in our theoretical framework the relationship
between the pension reform and the net wage is ambiguous, even without such institutional factors.
In short, based both on prior empirical work and on our model, it is not clear that we should have
expected to find a differential effect of the pension reform on take-home wages.
2.7 Conclusion
Improving firms’ compliance with tax regulations is a first-order policy issue in many developing
countries. Much of the debate has focused on how to induce firms to register with tax authorities in
the first place — what we might call the extensive margin of non-compliance. In this paper, we have
shown that under-reporting of wages among firms that are already registered — non-compliance
on an intensive margin — is also substantial and responds to incentives and the availability of
information in the social security system.
The results suggest that providing incentives to workers to ensure accurate reporting, as well
as information about firms’ reports, should be a consideration in the design of social-insurance
systems. Conceptually, our theoretical model suggests that an increase in such incentives and a
commensurate reduction of payroll taxes should have equivalent effects on evasion, other things
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equal. But the effects on government revenues are decidedly non-equivalent. If the policy goal is
to increase the fiscal capacity of the state, it appears that the tying benefits more closely to wage
reports may be the preferable option.
A number of interesting questions remain open. One is to what extent workers are aware of
under-reporting by their employers and, relatedly, to what extent the effects of the pension reform
we observe are due to the change in incentives versus the change in information. It seems unlikely
that the results we observe could be due solely to the increased availability of information post-
reform; if benefits had remained truly insensitive to wage reports, then workers would have had no
reason to act on the information once they received it.43 But it remains possible that there was an
important interaction between the change in incentives and the change in information. Separating
the two effects definitively will require a research design in which incentives vary separately from
costs of information.
Another important open question is whether increased pressure on firms to report accurately
(which increases compliance on the intensive margin) induces more firms to remain informal (re-
duces compliance on the extensive margin). Because of the nature of the IMSS data, we are not
able to observe firms as they move from formality to informality or vice-versa. But clearly a full
accounting of the costs and benefits of policies to increase intensive-margin compliance will have
to take such a response into account.
43Relatedly, a reduction of the cost of acquiring information about firms’ reports would not be expected to have
an effect, as long as the cost remains positive, as workers would not be willing to pay even an ε cost to acquire it.
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2.8 Figures
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Notes: Variation in IMSS employer contribution rates at levels above 500 pesos/day are primarily due to changes
in topcodes, which varied from 10 to 25 times the minimum wage in Mexico City over the period. Average 2002
exchange rate: 9.66 pesos/dollar.
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Notes: Variation in IMSS worker contribution rates at levels above 500 pesos/day are primarily due to changes in
topcodes, which varied from 10 to 25 times the minimum wage in Mexico City over the period. Average 2002 exchange
rate: 9.66 pesos/dollar.
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C. Value of pension by ENEU wage percentile, ages 60−65
10 yrs conts. 20 yrs conts. 30 yrs conts.
Notes: Final average wage (2002 pesos/day) is average nominal daily wage over five years prior to retirement, deflated
to constant 2002 pesos. Figure indicates pension values for individuals with 10, 20 and 30 years of contributions to
IMSS. In Panel B, we calculate the nominal wage at each quantile of the IMSS wage distribution for 60-65 year old
men in each year and take the average for that quantile over the preceding five years. Panel C is constructed similarly
using wage distributions from the ENEU baseline samples. See Section 2.4 for details of samples and Section 2.2.3
for details on pension benefits. Average 2002 exchange rate: 9.66 pesos/dollar.
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Figure 2.4. Account Statement
 
Notes: The box at top right (“Cuánto tengo en mi cuenta individual”) reports total balance. The first row of boxes
in the middle section (“Mi ahorro para el retiro”) pertains to the retirement pension and reports previous balance
(“Saldo anterior”), new contributions (“Aportaciones”), withdrawals (“Retiros”), interest earned (“Rendimientos”),
AFORE commission charged (“Comisiones”), and final balance (“Saldo final”). The second and third rows in the
middle section report balances in the individual’s voluntary savings account and housing account. The bottom section
reports 3-year returns and commissions for each AFORE, as well as the average 5-year net return (at left).
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1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Year
IMSS admin. records ENEU full−time w/ IMSS
ENEU w/ IMSS ENEU permanent w/ IMSS
ENEU w/out IMSS
Notes: Samples are the same as those in Columns 1 and 3-6 of Table 2.2; refer to that table for details. ENEU totals
are calculated using sampling weights. The dashed vertical line indicates the date the pension reform was passed by
Congress (Dec. 21, 1995); the solid vertical line indicates the date the reform took effect (July 1, 1997). Observations
correspond to the second quarter of each year. See Section 2.4 and the Appendix for details of sample selection.
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0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550
real daily salary (constant 2002 pesos)
IMSS admin. records
ENEU household survey
Notes: The ENEU wage is the real daily take-home wage reported to the ENEU household survey. The IMSS wage
is the real daily pre-tax reported wage from the IMSS administrative records. Wages in 2002 pesos. Average 2002
exchange rate: 9.66 pesos/dollar. Samples are IMSS and ENEU “baseline” samples of men. Data in both samples
are from second quarter of 1990. Vertical lines indicate minimum wages in the three minimum-wage zones in Mexico
(A, B, C). Bins are 5 pesos wide. The rightmost bin captures all individuals with reported wages at or above the
minimum IMSS topcode over the study period (from 1991). See Section 2.4 and the Appendix for further details.
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40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
real daily salary (constant 2002 pesos)
IMSS admin. records
ENEU household survey
Notes: Histogram is similar to Figure 2.6 but only includes workers with wages less than 200 pesos/day (approx.
$20/day) in constant 2002 pesos. Bins are 2 pesos wide.
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Notes: Histograms are similar to those in Figure 2.7. Vertical lines indicate minimum wages in the three minimum-wage zones in Mexico (A, B, C). Bins are 2
pesos wide. Average 2002 exchange rate: 9.66 pesos/dollar. See Section 2.4 and the Appendix for further details.
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0 100 200 300 400 500
real daily wage, 1990
IMSS
ENEU
Notes: The wage variables are the real daily take-home wage from ENEU and real daily post-tax reported wage from
IMSS. Densities are estimated using 1990 data and an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth 3 pesos for IMSS data
and 6 pesos for ENEU data (using Stata kdensity command). Wages are in 2002 pesos. Average 2002 exchange rate:
9.66 pesos/dollar. (Densities are smoothed versions of histograms in Figure 2.6.) Vertical line is at 25th percentile of
the ENEU wage distribution. Data are from second quarter of 1990. Excess mass for 25th percentile defined as (area
under red, left of vertical line) - (area under blue, left of vertical line). Excess mass defined analogously for other
percentiles. See Section 2.4 and the Appendix for further details of data processing.
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0 50 100 150 200
real daily wage, ages 56−65
IMSS
ENEU
Notes: The wage variables are the real daily take-home wage from ENEU and real daily post-tax reported wage from IMSS. Densities are estimated and an
Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth 3 pesos for IMSS data and 6 pesos for ENEU data (using Stata kdensity command). Wages are in 2002 pesos. Average
2002 exchange rate: 9.66 pesos/dollar. Rows correspond to years 1990, 1997, 2003; columns to age groups 16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65. Samples are baseline
samples of men, only including workers with wages less than 200 pesos/day. Data in both samples are from second quarter. See Section 2.4 and the Appendix for
further details.
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1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Year
age 16−25 age 26−35
age 36−45 age 46−55
age 56−65
Notes: Each wage gap is the difference between the log median net wage from the ENEU survey and the log median
post-tax reported wage from the IMSS administrative records, using the ENEU and IMSS baseline samples. To
calculate deviated wage gaps, we calculate wage gaps separately by age group-year-metro area, regress them on a full
set of metro area-year dummies, and average the residuals at the age-group level. The dashed vertical line indicates
the date the pension reform was passed by Congress (Dec. 21, 1995); the solid vertical line indicates the date the
reform took effect (July 1, 1997). Observations correspond to the second quarter of each year. See Section 2.4 and
the Appendix for details of sample selection.
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2.9 Tables





PRA Contributions Plan 43 100 200 300 500 1079
25 35 PRA 398.6 815.0 1626.2 2437.3 4059.7 8751.9
PAYGO 398.6 398.6 603.8 890.2 1483.6 3200.1
30 30 PRA 398.6 523.4 1044.3 1565.3 2607.1 5620.5
PAYGO 398.6 398.6 603.8 890.2 1483.6 3200.1
35 25 PRA 398.6 398.6 659.1 987.8 1645.3 3546.9
PAYGO 398.6 398.6 603.8 890.2 1483.6 3200.1
40 20 PRA 398.6 398.6 403.9 605.4 1008.4 2173.9
PAYGO 398.6 398.6 603.8 890.2 1483.6 3200.1
45 15 PRA 398.6 398.6 398.6 398.6 586.6 1264.7
PAYGO 398.6 398.6 603.8 890.2 1483.6 3200.1
50 10 PRA 398.6 398.6 398.6 398.6 398.6 662.6
PAYGO 398.6 398.6 603.8 890.2 1483.6 3200.1
55 5 PRA 398.6 398.6 398.6 398.6 398.6 398.6
PAYGO 398.6 398.6 603.8 890.2 1483.6 3200.1
Notes: Values are real present discounted value of the future stream of pension benefits in thousands of 2002 pesos, for a male worker who began contributing at
age 25 and expects to continue until age 60. Numbers in italics indicate that personal retirement account (PRA) has a higher expected payoff than the pre-reform
pension (PAYGO). Average 2002 exchange rate: 9.66 pesos/dollar. 43 pesos is real daily minimum wage (in Mexico City) in 1997, 1079 pesos is the topcode we
impose (corresponding to the lowest real value of IMSS topcode over study period.) See Section 2.2.3 and the Appendix for further details.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. 1990
real avg. daily post-tax wage 121.02 163.88 172.98 143.88 166.73
(0.07) (1.58) (1.94) (2.62) (1.85)
age 31.75 31.46 32.13 29.98 32.22
(0.01) (0.15) (0.17) (0.29) (0.17)
fraction employed in ests >100 employees 0.52 0.43 0.55 0.18 0.55
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N (raw observations) 1691417 16169 11592 4577 10978
N (population, using weights) 1691417 2578847 1772523 806324 1645229
B. 2000
real avg. daily post-tax wage 123.60 148.20 161.15 120.78 166.42 155.80
(0.07) (1.31) (1.60) (2.16) (1.80) (1.59)
age 32.70 32.22 32.82 30.94 33.22 32.88
(0.01) (0.14) (0.16) (0.28) (0.17) (0.16)
fraction employed in ests >100 employees 0.58 0.44 0.59 0.10 0.63 0.59
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N (raw observations) 2420307 19171 14063 5108 11918 13246
N (population, using weights) 2420307 3509828 2384267 1125561 2042988 2225318
Notes: All columns focus on wage-earning male workers ages 16-65 in manufacturing, construction, and retail/hotel/restaurant sectors in 16 metropolitan
areas from the original ENEU sample. Column 1 reports statistics for IMSS baseline sample; Column 2 for full ENEU (household survey) sample (satisfying
aforementioned criteria); Column 3 for employees in ENEU who report receiving IMSS benefit in current employment; Column 4 for employees in ENEU who
report not receiving IMSS benefit; Column 5 for employees in ENEU who report receiving IMSS benefit and having a written contract of indefinite duration;
and Column 6 for employees in ENEU who report receiving IMSS benefit and working at least 35 hours in previous week (the ENEU baseline sample). Standard
errors of means in parentheses. In IMSS data, the fraction in establishments with >100 employees variable refers to permanent employees. In the ENEU survey,
the establishment-size question asks the total number of employees (without specifying permanent vs. temporary.) For further details, see Section 2.4 and the
Appendix.
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Table 2.3. Age Composition by Firm Size Category, 1990, Men
Age category (employment as % of row total)




1-10 employees 29.9 32.6 19.8 11.9 5.8 14.5
11-50 employees 33.6 32.2 18.7 10.6 4.9 22.6
51-100 employees 35.0 32.5 18.5 9.8 4.2 10.8
101-250 employees 36.3 33.3 17.8 9.0 3.5 14.7
> 250 employees 37.7 34.8 17.5 7.6 2.5 37.5
all firm sizes 35.1 33.4 18.3 9.3 3.8
B. ENEU
1-10 employees 35.9 28.3 18.0 12.5 5.3 12.4
11-50 employees 33.5 33.3 18.4 10.3 4.5 21.0
51-100 employees 35.6 33.4 15.2 10.7 5.1 11.6
101-250 employees 30.2 31.2 21.5 12.4 4.7 10.5
> 250 employees 34.0 33.4 21.5 8.5 2.7 44.5
all firm sizes 33.9 32.5 19.7 10.1 3.9
Notes: Data are from IMSS and ENEU baseline samples. Percentages are calculated based on employment (using sampling weights, in the case of the ENEU)
in each cell. Panel B drops observations in ENEU baseline sample that are missing the firm-size variable (which make up less than 1% of sample). For further
details, see Section 2.4 and the Appendix.
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Table 2.4. Cross-Sectional Patterns of Evasion, 1990, Men
wage gap (medians) wage gap (means) exc. mass (15th percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
age 26-35 -0.054* -0.053** -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.154*** -0.154***
(0.029) (0.021) (0.024) (0.019) (0.017) (0.013)
age 36-45 -0.072** -0.072*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.170*** -0.170***
(0.034) (0.027) (0.028) (0.024) (0.017) (0.014)
age 46-55 -0.029 -0.025 -0.154*** -0.151*** -0.154*** -0.152***
(0.035) (0.031) (0.031) (0.027) (0.018) (0.015)
age 56-65 -0.020 -0.026 -0.167*** -0.174*** -0.117*** -0.119***
(0.044) (0.040) (0.038) (0.035) (0.020) (0.017)
11-50 employees -0.333*** -0.333*** -0.177*** -0.176*** -0.155*** -0.154***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.011) (0.010)
51-100 employees -0.475*** -0.469*** -0.283*** -0.280*** -0.247*** -0.242***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.015) (0.014)
101-250 employees -0.395*** -0.374*** -0.245*** -0.233*** -0.235*** -0.224***
(0.039) (0.037) (0.035) (0.032) (0.018) (0.016)
> 250 employees -0.500*** -0.464*** -0.233*** -0.200*** -0.288*** -0.268***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.030) (0.030) (0.018) (0.017)
construction 0.134*** 0.122*** 0.064***
(0.029) (0.025) (0.014)
retail/services -0.074*** -0.110*** -0.043***
(0.024) (0.021) (0.011)
constant 0.559*** 0.855*** 0.633*** 0.501*** 0.577*** 0.506*** 0.519*** 0.578*** 0.566***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.047) (0.016) (0.018) (0.039) (0.010) (0.007) (0.019)
metro area effects N N Y N N Y N N Y
R-squared 0.00 0.20 0.31 0.03 0.09 0.27 0.09 0.24 0.44
N 1062 1062 1062 1062 1062 1062 1062 1062 1062
Notes: Data are from IMSS and ENEU baseline samples, collapsed to metro area/age group/firm-size category/sector level for 1990. The omitted category for age
is 16-25, for firm size is 1-10 employees, and for sector is manufacturing. The wage gap (medians) is log median real daily take-home wage from the ENEU minus
log median real daily post-tax reported wage from IMSS, calculated. Wage gap (means) is analogous, using mean in place of median. Excess mass is calculated
as described in Section 2.5 and Figure 2.9. In calculating evasion measures, we pool ENEU data across quarters within year. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% level. See
Section 2.4 and the Appendix for further details of data processing.
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1(age > 55)*1988 -0.050 0.069** -0.019
(0.037) (0.031) (0.020)
1(age > 55)*1989 -0.030 0.077** -0.004
(0.042) (0.036) (0.016)
1(age > 55)*1990 -0.038 0.089** 0.002
(0.040) (0.038) (0.015)
1(age > 55)*1991 -0.047 0.069* 0.020
(0.039) (0.040) (0.014)
1(age > 55)*1992 -0.069 0.016 -0.007
(0.043) (0.042) (0.016)
1(age > 55)*1993 -0.067* 0.032 -0.014
(0.040) (0.038) (0.017)
1(age > 55)*1994 -0.011 0.062* -0.019
(0.045) (0.035) (0.016)
1(age > 55)*1995 -0.106** 0.029 -0.017
(0.045) (0.031) (0.017)
1(age > 55)*1996 0.019 0.087* 0.023
(0.040) (0.046) (0.017)
1(age > 55)*1998 0.042 0.093*** 0.023*
(0.037) (0.035) (0.014)
1(age > 55)*1999 0.048 0.129*** 0.035**
(0.041) (0.036) (0.015)
1(age > 55)*2000 0.041 0.133*** 0.034**
(0.039) (0.029) (0.013)
1(age > 55)*2001 0.095** 0.181*** 0.045***
(0.047) (0.039) (0.015)
1(age > 55)*2002 0.137*** 0.218*** 0.032**
(0.039) (0.034) (0.015)
1(age > 55)*2003 0.087** 0.204*** 0.029*
(0.040) (0.035) (0.015)
age group-metro area effects Y Y Y
metro-year effects Y Y Y
R-squared 0.92 0.89 0.96
N 1280 1280 1280
Notes: Data are from IMSS and ENEU baseline samples, collapsed to metro area/age group/year level. Wage gap
(medians) is log median real daily net wage from ENEU minus log median post-tax daily wage from IMSS. Wage gap
(means) is defined analogously, using means in place of medians. Excess mass is calculated as described in Section
2.5 and Figure 2.9. In calculating evasion measures, we pool ENEU data across quarters within year. *** 1%, **
5%, * 10% level. See Section 2.4 and the Appendix for further details of data processing.
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Table 2.6. Differential Effects of Pension Reform on Employment Gap, Men
dep. var.: log(empl., ENEU) - log(empl., IMSS)
(1) (2)
1(age > 55)*1988 -0.035 -0.035
(0.100) (0.090)
1(age > 55)*1989 0.040 0.040
(0.104) (0.087)
1(age > 55)*1990 0.065 0.065
(0.097) (0.091)
1(age > 55)*1991 0.100 0.100
(0.109) (0.098)
1(age > 55)*1992 0.044 0.044
(0.100) (0.083)
1(age > 55)*1993 0.090 0.090
(0.092) (0.076)
1(age > 55)*1994 -0.231** -0.231***
(0.101) (0.082)
1(age > 55)*1995 0.017 0.017
(0.108) (0.093)
1(age > 55)*1996 0.003 0.003
(0.102) (0.092)
1(age > 55)*1998 0.042 0.042
(0.104) (0.092)
1(age > 55)*1999 0.027 0.027
(0.106) (0.096)
1(age > 55)*2000 -0.011 -0.011
(0.094) (0.084)
1(age > 55)*2001 0.009 0.009
(0.105) (0.098)
1(age > 55)*2002 0.087 0.087
(0.103) (0.089)
1(age > 55)*2003 0.033 0.033
(0.091) (0.080)
age group effects Y
age group-metro area effects N Y
metro-year effects Y Y
R-squared 0.55 0.68
N 1280 1280
Notes: Samples are IMSS and ENEU baseline samples, collapsed to metro area/age group/year level. *** 1%, **
5%, * 10% level. See Section 2.4 and the Appendix for further details of data processing.
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Table 2.7. Differential Effects of Pension Reform on ENEU Take-Home Wage, Men
dep. var.: log daily net wage, ENEU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1(age > 55)*1988 -0.034 -0.058* -0.055** -0.059** -0.060**
(0.037) (0.031) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
1(age > 55)*1989 -0.010 -0.023 -0.041 -0.051* -0.052*
(0.040) (0.034) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
1(age > 55)*1990 -0.021 -0.040 -0.059** -0.064** -0.065**
(0.040) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
1(age > 55)*1991 -0.041 -0.038 -0.040 -0.050* -0.052*
(0.039) (0.033) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
1(age > 55)*1992 -0.040 -0.049 -0.054* -0.061** -0.059**
(0.042) (0.033) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
1(age > 55)*1993 -0.068 -0.036 -0.063** -0.067** -0.070**
(0.043) (0.035) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
1(age > 55)*1994 0.028 0.013 0.005 0.002 0.001
(0.043) (0.035) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
1(age > 55)*1995 0.024 0.013 -0.010 -0.017 -0.022
(0.043) (0.036) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
1(age > 55)*1996 0.056 0.045 0.033 0.021 0.018
(0.043) (0.035) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
1(age > 55)*1998 0.037 0.009 -0.009 -0.016 -0.019
(0.044) (0.036) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
1(age > 55)*1999 0.016 -0.043 -0.053* -0.068** -0.069**
(0.040) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
1(age > 55)*2000 -0.019 -0.077** -0.065** -0.072** -0.072**
(0.040) (0.034) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
1(age > 55)*2001 0.018 -0.057* -0.055* -0.061** -0.062**
(0.040) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
1(age > 55)*2002 0.062 -0.031 -0.022 -0.026 -0.028
(0.039) (0.031) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
1(age > 55)*2003 0.015 -0.038 -0.040 -0.049 -0.053*
(0.044) (0.037) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
age group effects Y Y Y Y Y
metro-year effects Y Y Y Y Y
schooling effects N Y Y Y Y
married indicator N Y Y Y Y
occupation effects N N Y Y Y
industry effects N N N Y Y
firm-size effects N N N N Y
R-squared 0.13 0.40 0.46 0.47 0.48
N 667566 667566 667566 667566 667566
Notes: Sample is ENEU baseline sample. Take-home wage is the post-payroll-tax net wage as reported on ENEU.
Estimates use population sampling weights provided in ENEU dataset. Controls include sets of 9 schooling indicators,
22 occupation indicators, and/or 50 industry indicators, in addition to the sets of five age-group and firm-size
indicators, in indicated columns; details of category definitions are in the Appendix. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% level.
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2.10 Appendix: Additional Institutional Background
In this section, we provide additional details about IMSS, including information on the 1992 pension
reform, the housing sub-account, and the pension simulation.
2.10.1 1992 Pension Reform
In an effort to restore financial stability to the IMSS system, the Mexican congress enacted a first
attempt at pension reform in May 1992. This reform created a system of personal retirement
accounts called the Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro (SAR) to operate alongside the established
PAYGO pension system. Employers contributed two percent of each worker’s wage, depositing the
contributions into a commercial bank of their own choosing. The commercial bank then transmitted
the funds to the Mexican central bank. The central bank guaranteed a minimum two percent
real return, and workers were supposed to receive a lump-sum payment at retirement equal to
the accumulated balances. Several problems plagued the implementation of the SAR system,
however. The scheme suffered from poor regulatory oversight and management. Commercial banks
received low fees for administering the collection of employer contributions, weakening incentives
for these banks to provide efficient record-keeping or enforce the mandatory contributions. In
addition, workers were often unaware of the balances in their accounts or even of which bank held
their accounts. This led to the creation of multiple accounts, especially for workers who changed
employers; by 1997, over half of the 20 million accounts were duplicates (Grandolini and Cerda,
1998). As a result of these difficulties, the reform was widely considered a failure, with workers and




As an additional social-security benefit for workers, employers contribute five percent of a worker’s
wage, up to 10 times the applicable minimum wage, to the Instituto del Fondo Nacional de la
Vivienda de los Trabajadores (INFONAVIT).44 Employees can apply for housing loans through
INFONAVIT. If approved, a worker can use the accumulated funds as a down payment on a house
purchase; loan payments are subsequently deducted from employees’ paychecks.
Prior to 1992, accumulated contributions in INFONAVIT not used toward housing were pro-
vided to the worker at the time of retirement. However, INFONAVIT only provided nominal
accumulated contributions. Given the high inflation rates, the real value of nominal contributions
was typically quite small. The 1992 IMSS reform sought to correct this problem by requiring that
INFONAVIT provide workers with any unused contributions plus interest based on the operational
surplus of the agency. In practice, however, INFONAVIT continued to suffer from several problems,
including high rates of delinquency of loans, which limited the agency’s ability to pay interest and
resulted in a negative real rate of return (Grandolini and Cerda, 1998).
Following the 1997 reform, the INFONAVIT contributions are collected in a personal account
managed by the same AFORE that manages an individual’s retirement account (see the account
statement in Figure 2.4). Workers who choose the PRA system at retirement receive the unused
accumulated balances in their INFONAVIT account upon retirement. Transition workers that
choose the PAYGO pension at retirement only receive the account balances that were accumulated
between 1992 and 1997, thus forfeiting balances accumulated after 1997.
These changes in the housing account potentially made a substantial difference in the overall
value of social security benefits. It is also worth noting that they tended to reinforce the differential
change in incentives emphasized in the main text: the change in the administration of the housing
44Note that the INFONAVIT contribution is the component of contributions that uses the local minimum wage,
as opposed to the minimum wage in Mexico City, to calculate the top-code.
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accounts effectively made benefits more sensitive to reported wages, but only for those workers who
in the end choose the PRA pension.
2.10.3 Pension Simulation
As described in the main text, we conduct a pension simulation, based on the simulation in Aguila
(2011), in order to compare pension wealth at retirement under the PAYGO and the PRA systems.
Here we provide additional details of the simulation.
For the PAYGO system, the monthly pension is calculated based on the benefit schedule in
Table 2.A3, which was in effect from Jan. 1, 1991 to June 30, 1997. To calculate the final average
wage (the average nominal wage in the five years before retirement), we assume a constant real wage
and an annual inflation rate of 13.65 percent (the average annual inflation rate from 1988-2003,
excluding the high-inflation years of 1988, 1989, 1995, and 1996). Under these assumptions, the
final average wage is approximately 79 percent of the wage at retirement. Following Aguila (2011),
we discount the value of the monthly pension benefits to the present assuming a discount rate of
one percent.
Under the PRA regime, we calculate the total value of contributions over a worker’s career,
assuming a constant real wage.45 We then determine the total value of accumulated wealth at
retirement assuming a 8.59 percent annual return (the average return from 1998-2002, and the
higher of two rates of return considered by Aguila (2011)).46 We next calculate the schedule of
monthly annuity payments equivalent in expected value to total pension wealth at retirement,
assuming a life expectancy of 93 years for men — the life expectancy assumption used by IMSS,
which includes an adjustment for expected survivor benefits paid out to widows or dependent
45For the PRA regime, we include housing account contributions, which assumes that workers do not use housing
accounts for loans. Note that we do not include the housing account under the PAYGO system, as workers opting to
take the PAYGO pension at retirement only receive housing account contributions accumulated between 1992 and
1997.
46These real interest rates are net of management fees charged by AFOREs.
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children. As with the PAYGO pension, we discount the monthly pension assuming a one percent
discount rate.
There are a number of thorny issues in inflation indexing in the simulation. Beginning in 1997,
the minimum PRA pension was indexed to the Mexican Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the
minimum PAYGO pension was indexed to the minimum wage in Mexico City. The real value of
the minimum wage declined steadily over the 1997-2001 period, as it had been doing for many
years (see Appendix Table 2.A4). The values of the minimum pensions under the two regimes
thus diverged. In 2001, the Mexican congress passed a new law specifying that the CPI be used
to index the PAYGO pension as well as the PRA pension and adjusting the PAYGO minimum
pension to be equal to the PRA minimum pension. It is unclear what participants believed at
the time of the reform about how the indexing would be carried out. Following Aguila (2011), we
assume that participants expected a decline of 6.4 percent per year. At the same time, we assume
that participants expected the minimum pension under the PAYGO regime to be the same as the
minimum pension under the PRA regime, as the congress in fact subsequently legislated in 2001.
It is important to note that we have imposed a relatively optimistic assumption about future
interest rates and a relatively pessimistic assumption about the decline in the real value of the
minimum wage. Both tend to make the PRA pension appear relatively more attractive. We
emphasize that the simulation is mainly to illustrate that younger workers are more likely to expect
to opt for the PRA pension; we are not arguing that the pension reform made workers better off
overall. Indeed, it seems clear from the simulation that workers with low wages who would have
qualified for the minimum pension under the PAYGO system are generally worse off under the new
regime.
In addition to simulating the pension wealth of workers who started working at age 25 and
expect to continue working until age 60, but who are of different ages in 1997, as we present in
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Table 2.1, we also simulate the pension wealth of a worker who entered the system on June 30,
1997, the day before the new personal retirement accounts (PRAs) went into effect. The results
are presented in Table 2.A5. If the worker expects to contribute for at least 10 years (and thus
be guaranteed the minimum pension), the basic message is the same as in the previous simulation:
the PRA is more likely to dominate the PAYGO pension as one moves up and to the right in the
table. A new worker earning below 200 pesos/day (approximately 80% of our sample) would need
to contribute for at least 20 years, if not more, for the PRA pension to dominate the PAYGO
pension.
2.11 Appendix: Theory
In this section, we develop in full the model that we have summarized in Section 2.3 of the main
text.
2.11.1 Basic Set-up
Consider a setting with a competitive labor market populated by homogeneous workers and a con-
tinuum of heterogeneous, monopolistically competitive firms.47 Let τf be the payroll tax statutorily
imposed on the firm and τw the payroll tax statutorily imposed on workers; both are remitted by
the firm and will enter similarly in our model.48 Define τ = τf + τw and assume 0 < τ < 1.
Let wr be the pre-tax wage reported by a firm to the government, and wu the unreported wage,
the wage paid to workers “under the table.” The total wage paid by the firm is wf = wr + wu.
The net take-home wage received by workers is wnet = wu + (1 − τ)wr. We assume in the theory
47It would be possible to incorporate different types of workers in our framework, along the lines, for instance, of
Rothstein (2010). As long as evasion is worker-type-specific within the firm (i.e. as long as there is no internal equity
constraint preventing firms from evading more for some groups of workers than for others) conceptually this exercise
would be straightforward. In our view, however, it would complicate the exposition significantly with relatively little
payoff in additional insight. We leave the development of a more general framework to future work.
48As pointed out by Slemrod (2008), in settings in which the costs of evasion by employers and employees differ,
it is in general not irrelevant who remits the tax. But since in Mexico the statutory payroll taxes on both firms and
workers are remitted by firms, in our setting there is no conceptually important distinction between them.
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that wr, wu, and wnet are observable to workers.
49 Both the reported wage, wr, and the net wage,
wnet, correspond to quantities that are also in principle observable to the econometrician: wr to
the wages reported by firms in the administrative records of the social security agency, and wnet to
the take-home pay reported by workers in the ENEU household survey. As mentioned in the main
text, we do not observe wnet at the firm level, and hence cannot measure the unreported wage,
wu = wnet − (1− τ)wr, at the firm level, but we will be able to construct measures at the level of
more aggregate cells.50
Future pension benefits depend on the reported wage, wr. In the interests of simplicity, we
impose an assumption of linearity on these benefits and let bwr be the amortized per-period value
of future pension benefits for each worker, where b ≥ 0. We further assume that b < τ , which
corresponds to the Mexican institutional setting, where the tax payment includes contributions for
health care as well as pension benefits. We refer to the wage inclusive of pension benefits received
by each worker as the “effective” wage, we, where we = wnet + bwr = wu + (1− (τ − b))wr.
We assume that there is no stigma or other cost to workers of firms’ under-reporting of their
wages. Under this assumption, the effective wage is the wage relevant for workers’ labor-supply




where ρ > 0 and B > 0. This labor-supply function can be derived from maximization of a quasi-
linear utility function for an individual choosing how many hours to devote to leisure versus wage
49In making the assumption that wr, wu, and wnet are all observable to the worker, we are following the main strand
of the related theoretical literature (Yaniv, 1992; Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez, 2009), which presumes that employees
collude in under-reporting. An alternative, plausible assumption would be that workers observe wnet costlessly but
only observe wr (and hence wu) at a cost. The pension reform could then be modeled as reducing this cost, in addition
to increasing the sensitivity of benefits to reported wages. Asymmetric information of this type would complicate the
model considerably, and we leave the analysis of this case to future work.
50In the theory, we also abstract from the minimum wages in Mexico (of which there are three, depending on
region).
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work.51 Note that we are not explicitly considering the extensive margin of labor supply or the
lump-sum (i.e. independent of reported wage) benefits of participation in the social-security system.
Such lump-sum benefits would affect employees’ utility levels and participation decisions, but would
not affect the evasion behavior that is the primary object of our analysis. An alternative approach
to deriving the labor-supply elasticity (A3) would be to model individuals as choosing whether to
supply labor to the formal sector (i.e. registered firms) or the informal sector (i.e. unregistered
firms), as for instance in Marrufo (2001) or Galiani and Weinschelbaum (forthcoming). In this
paper we focus on evasion within the formal sector, and leave the analysis of individuals’ and firms’
choices about whether to enter the formal sector to future work.
2.11.2 The Firm’s Problem
We build on a standard model of heterogeneous firms under monopolistic competition, similar to
Melitz (2003) but without international trade. Assuming a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) representative
consumer, the demand for each differentiated variety, ω, can be written:
x(ω) = Ap(ω)−σ (A6)
51Suppose that for each worker,
U(c, L) = u(c) − βL
ρ+1
ρ (A4)
where c is consumption, L is hours supplied, and we assume β > 0, ρ > 0. Let the consumption good be the
numeraire. The hours constraint is L ≤ L. As is standard in the literature on labor supply, we think of individuals
as having “total income” weL and consuming leisure hours at a price we. Hence the budget constraint is:
c+ (L− L)we = weL (A5)





and N is the number of workers in the workforce.
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where x(ω) is the quantity consumed; p(ω) is the price; and σ is a parameter capturing the elasticity
of substitution between varieties.52 A captures the general level of demand, which individual firms
treat as exogenous; in this partial-equilibrium framework, we abstract from the determinants of
the level of demand and treat A as a parameter. We make the standard assumption that σ > 1.
Firms are assumed to be heterogeneous in a productivity parameter, ϕ, with density g(ϕ), with
positive support over [ϕmin, ϕmax] and zero support elsewhere.53 There is assumed to be no cost
of differentiation, and each firm differentiates and produces a distinct variety; hence ϕ also indexes
varieties. There is a fixed cost of operation to be paid in each period, f . Each firm’s production
function is simply x = ϕL, where L is labor input; this can be rewritten L = xϕ .
We assume that the cost of evasion is increasing in the unreported wage, wu, and the output of
the firm. In particular, we assume that the cost of evasion can be expressed in the multiplicatively
separable form xc(wu), where c(0) = 0, c
′(wu) > 0, and c
′′(wu) > 0.
54 As mentioned in the main
text, there are a number of possible justifications for the assumption that costs of evasion are
increasing in output. One is simply that auditors are more likely to audit larger firms because their
operations are more visible, as suggested by Besley and Persson (2013, p. 66) — a conjecture that
appears anecdotally to be relevant in Mexico.55 Another is the argument of Kleven, Kreiner, and










where Ω represents the set of all differentiated varieties available in the market, then optimization yields (A6) with








53In Melitz (2003), firms do not know their productivity before paying a fixed cost to get a productivity draw.
Here, as in Chaney (2008), we simply take the set of firms in business as given and abstract from entry and exit of
firms. It would be straightforward to add the initial investment decision, but would not add substantively to our
analysis.
54The assumption that the marginal cost of evasion incurs per unit of output is increasing is in the spirit of Slemrod
(2001), who makes a similar assumption in the context of evasion by individuals.
55Also, as noted in footnote 26, employers with 300 or more employees have to submit an audit from a certified
public accountant; this may be another reason why evasion is more costly for larger firms.
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Saez (2009) that collusion in under-reporting is more difficult to sustain in larger firms.
The labor market is competitive, and firms are price-takers of the effective wage, we. The firm
chooses the unreported wage, wu; together we and wu pin down wr.
56 From the definitions of the
wage variables above, the total wage paid by the firm is then wf =
we−(τ−b)wu
1−(τ−b) . The firm also
chooses the output price, p. Given the price, output, x, and hence labor demand, L, are pinned
down by the firm-specific demand curve, (A6). Per-period profit for each firm can be written:
π(wu, p;ϕ,we) =
{
p− we − (τ − b)wu




The firm’s problem is to choose wu and p to maximize π.
The first order condition for the choice of wu is:
c′(wu) =
τ − b
ϕ(1− (τ − b))
(A10)
The left-hand side is the marginal cost of evasion and the right-hand side is the marginal benefit in
the form of reduced tax payments, both per unit of output. Note that the solution to this equation,
call it w∗u(ϕ), depends neither on the output price, p, nor on the market-determined effective wage,
we. Note also that, given our assumptions on the c(·) function, in general we have that w∗u(ϕ) > 0;
we do not expect perfect compliance, even for highly productive (hence large in equilibrium) firms.







we − (τ − b)w∗u(ϕ)




56We abstract from minimum wages, of which there are three in Mexico, depending on region. We consider the
role of the minimum wages in the empirics below.
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The term in brackets is simply marginal cost and, as usual with Dixit-Stiglitz demand, price is a
fixed multiplicative mark-up over marginal cost. Given the optimal choices w∗u(ϕ) and p
∗(we, ϕ),
the optimal output of the firm is given by:
x∗(we, ϕ) = Ap
∗(we, ϕ)
−σ (A12)









Note that the firm’s labor demand is decreasing in the effective wage, we, since price is increasing






Since we are assuming that the set of firms in the market stays fixed, and since each firm’s labor
demand is declining in the effective wage, we, we know that aggregate labor demand is also declining
in we.




where aggregate labor supply, LSagg(we), is given by (A3).
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2.11.3 Evasion vs. Firm Size in Cross-Section
We now consider how the extent of evasion, as measured by the unreported wage, wu, varies with
firm size in cross-section, for a given effective wage we. Differentiating both sides of (A10) holding
we fixed and rearranging, we have:
dw∗u
dϕ
= − τ − b
ϕ2c′′(wu)(1− (τ − b))
< 0 (A16)
That is, evasion is decreasing in firm productivity.57
Firm output is unambiguously increasing in productivity. To see this, first note that price is









we − (τ − b)w∗u(ϕ)
ϕ2(1− (τ − b))
}
< 0 (A17)
Prices are lower in higher-ϕ firms for the standard reason that labor costs are lower per unit of









Together (A16) and (A18) imply an unambiguously negative relationship between firm output and
evasion.
The relationship between employment and productivity, and hence between employment and
57Given that the effective wage, we, is constant across firms, this immediately implies that the reported wage is





ϕ2c′′(wu)(1 − (τ − b))2
> 0
99














Higher productivity leads firms to have greater output, which increases employment (the second
term). But it also reduces the amount of labor required to produce a given level of output (the
first term). Using (A11) and (A18)-(A19), it can be shown that labor demand will be increasing







we − (τ − b)w∗u(ϕ)
1− (τ − b)
}
(A20)
The term in brackets on the right-hand side is the total wage paid by the firm, wf , and hence the
right-hand side is labor cost per unit of output; c(w∗u(ϕ)) is the cost of evasion per unit of output
at the optimum. The condition thus requires that the equilibrium cost of evasion not be too large
relative to labor costs. If enforcement were perfect, firms would set w∗u(ϕ) = 0, condition (A20)
would clearly be satisfied, and employment would be unambiguously increasing in productivity, as
in Melitz (2003). But here the fact that the equilibrium cost of evasion per unit of output is positive
dampens the responsiveness of output to productivity (since it raises prices and (p∗)−σ−1 enters the
expression for dx
∗
dϕ in (A18)) and reduces the magnitude of the second term in (A19) relative to the
first. In this context, it is theoretically possible that employment is declining in productivity. At
the same time, previous work in Mexican data has found a positive correlation between employment
and productivity (see Verhoogen (2008, Table A1)) and the positive correlation between size and
productivity is robust across countries and datasets (see e.g. Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson
(2008) for the U.S.). It seems clear that the empirically relevant case is the one in which (A20)
holds. We will focus on this case hereafter. In this case, the extent of evasion is declining in
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employment, as it is in output.
2.11.4 Response of Evasion to Pension Reform
We now consider the response of evasion to the pension reform, which we model as an increase in
the parameter b relating the reported wage to the amortized per-period pension benefits. Here we
allow the equilibrium effective wage, we, to vary endogenously in response to the policy change.




(1− (τ − b))2ϕc′′(w∗u(ϕ))
< 0 (A21)




but since the effect is negative for all values of ϕ, the aggregate effect will be negative for a given
set of firms over time.58
It is worth emphasizing that the response of w∗u(ϕ) to the policy change here does not depend
on the market-determined effective wage, we, or the incidence of the policy change on that wage. In
this sense, the model suggests that it is not unreasonable to examine the effect of the policy change
on evasion separately from the question of incidence, which is how we proceed in the empirical
analysis.
58Given the discussion of cross-sectional patterns in Section 2.11.3, it is interesting to consider the heterogeneous


















is given by (A16). Without imposing further structure on the cost of evasion, we do not have a clear
prediction for a differential response by firm size.
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2.11.5 Incidence of Pension Reform on Wages
Now consider the effect of the reform on the effective wage, we. Differentiating both sides of the
labor market equilibrium condition (A15), and using the fact that the integrand and its derivatives




























r(we, ϕ) = (we −
w∗u(ϕ))/(1− τ + b).)
The incidence depends in part on the labor-supply elasticity, ρ. In the limit as the labor supply
elasticity becomes infinite (and hence B also becomes infinite), we have limρ→∞
dwe
db = 0. For finite
positive values of ρ, we have dwedb > 0. That is, for a finite labor-supply elasticity, some of the
increase in pension benefits will redound to workers. The upper bound on the incidence on workers























That is, for a given set of active firms, the upper bound on dwedb is equal to a weighted average of
the equilibrium reported wages across firms, with weights µ(ϕ).
Now consider the effect of the pension reform of the (firm-specific) reported wage and net wage.
59See e.g. Bartle (1976, Theorem 31.7).
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ϕc′′(w∗u(ϕ))(1− τ + b)2
+
1










ϕc′′(w∗u(ϕ))(1− τ + b)
+
1− τ







In general, without imposing additional assumptions on the distribution of firm productivities
and/or other parameters, the signs of the responses are ambiguous.
There is a special case in which the response of the net wage can be signed, namely when firms









ϕc′′(w∗u(ϕ))(1− τ + b)
+
1− τ
1− τ + b
{w∗r(we)− w∗r(we, ϕ)} (A28)
where w∗r(we) is from (A24). When firms are homogeneous, the term in brackets on the right-hand




ϕc′′(w∗u(ϕ))(1− τ + b)
< 0 (A29)
In this case, we have a clear prediction that the net wage will fall in response to the pension reform.
When firms are heterogeneous, however, the term in brackets on the right-hand side of (A28)
may be sufficiently positive that the upper bound is positive and hence the sign of
dw∗net
db remains am-
biguous. Intuitively, the strength of the reduction in w∗net(ϕ) depends on the firm’s own w
∗
r(we, ϕ),
while the strength of the increase in the equilibrium effective wage, we, depends on the aggre-
gate increase in labor demand, which is related to the weighted-average reported wage, w∗r . For
lower-productivity firms with relatively low w∗r , the latter may dominate the former.
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For the reported wage, there is an additional reason for ambiguity in the sign of the incidence
60In principle, it is also possible to sign an average effect on w∗net(we, ϕ). Using the µ(ϕ) weights from (A25),
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effect. On one hand, a higher b means that the government offers a greater benefit for a given wr,
which allows the firm to reduce its wage payment conditional on a given effective wage, we. On
the other hand, the reform induces the firm to report a greater share of the total wage payment
(i.e. raise wr relative to wu). The
dw∗r
db term cannot be signed, even under the assumption of
homogeneous firms.
Summarizing this subsection, we have no clear predictions for the incidence of the pension
reform on the observable wage variables, wnet and wr. At the same time, we emphasize again that
the predictions for the response of evasion to the reform do not depend on the incidence.
2.12 Appendix: Data
2.12.1 IMSS Administrative Data
As mentioned above, all private Mexican employers are legally required to report wages for their
employees to the Mexican social security agency, Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS). Not
all employers comply; those that do not are commonly defined as being in the informal sector.
The raw IMSS data can thus be considered a census of private, formal-sector, non-petroleum-sector
employers and their workforces for 1985-2005.61 (Public-sector workers and employees of the state-
























ϕc′′(w∗u(ϕ))(1 − τ + b)
]
g(ϕ)dϕ < 0 (A31)
and we can conclude that
dw∗net
db
< 0. The µ(ϕ) weights will not be observable, however, and it will not be feasible in
our data to construct this average effect.
61Generally an employer identification number in the data refers to an establishment, rather than a firm. However,
more than one establishment can be associated with a single identification number. We do not have access to
information on which establishments belong to which firms, and throughout the paper we treat each employer with
a separate identification number as a separate firm.
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the daily wage of individuals. The wages are a measure of total compensation, called the salario
base de cotización, which includes earnings and benefits, including payments made in cash, bonuses,
commissions, room and board, overtime payments, and in-kind benefits.62 The data are reported
as a sequence of spells for each worker, with beginning and end dates. In principle it is possible to
recover a wage for every individual for every day of every year. We extracted data for June 30 for
each year. At the level of individuals, the data also contain information on age, sex, and state and
year of the individual’s first registration with IMSS. At the establishment level, the data contain
information only on location and industry (using IMSS’s own 4-digit industrial categories, of which
there are 276.)
We impose the following criteria in cleaning the data. (1) In its internal records, IMSS classifies
wage records according to different types, referred to as modalidades. We use only modalidades
corresponding to permanent workers for which consistent, reliable wage figures are available.63
(2) We require that an individual have a positive wage. (3) We treat workers in single-worker
establishments as self-employed and exclude them.64 (4) If two observations appear for the same
individual, we select the standard modalidad65 and the highest-wage observation within it. (5) We
require that individuals be 16 years or older and 65 years or younger. (6) We drop observations with
missing sex, industry, or location. (7) We drop workers outside of non-petroleum manufacturing,
construction, retail, restaurants, and hotels, as explained in the main text. (8) We include workers
employed by firms located in the original 16 metropolitan areas sampled in the ENEU (described
below).
62In principle, the wage reports should include the aguinaldo, the holiday bonus that employers are required to pay
each December, on a pro-rated basis throughout the year. IMSS has no means to enforce this requirement for wages
above the minimum reportable wage, however, and it is possible that some establishments do not comply.
63In the internal classification system, we use modalidades 10, 13, and 17. This excludes rural casual laborers, self-
employed individuals who are insured through IMSS, employees of rural agricultural cooperatives and credit unions,
freelance workers, taxi drivers, miscellaneous public-sector workers insured through IMSS, and a number of smaller
categories.
64Including establishments with single workers yields similar results to those reported in the main text.
65The order of priority of modalidades we impose is 10, 13, 17. See footnote 63.
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Over time, IMSS raised the maximum reported income in conjunction with the maximum
taxable income. Initially, the maximum reported income was set at 10 times the minimum wage;
this was increased to 18 times the minimum wage in 1993 and to 25 times the minimum wage
in 1994. The lowest real value for the maximum reported income occurred in 1991; we impose a
topcode equal this value to ensure comparability across years. Prior to 1991, IMSS allowed firms
to report wages below the relevant minimum wage, and in other years a very small number of
observations have wages below the minimum wage. We drop all observations with real daily wages
below 30 pesos; observations with wages greater than 30 pesos but lower than the minimum wage
are kept unchanged.
2.12.2 ENEU Household Data
In the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENEU), households are interviewed quarterly for five
quarters, and then rotate out of the sample. The original ENEU sample focused on the 16 largest
Mexican metropolitan areas.66 Over time, the coverage of metropolitan areas expanded but we
focus on the original 16 metropolitan areas in order to maintain a consistent sample for as many
years as possible.67
Wages reported in the ENEU are based on the take-home (after-tax) pay reported by respon-
dents, and include bonuses that workers receive on a regular basis (monthly or more frequently).68
66The 16 metropolitan areas are: Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Puebla, Leon, Torreon, San Luis Potosi,
Merida, Chihuahua, Tampico, Orizaba, Veracruz, Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo. Mexico
also had a nationally representative survey that covered rural areas, the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo (ENE), but
until it was combined with the ENEU in 2000 it was carried out at less regular intervals: 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996,
1997, 1998, and 1999. Beginning in 2000, the combined ENEU/ENE survey was referred to as the Encuesta Nacional
de Empleo Trimestral (ENET) and following a redesign in 2004 it has been known as the Encuesta Nacional de
Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE).
67The 16 metropolitan areas gradually expanded to include additional municipalities over our sample period. We
include the new municipalities (and include establishments in the IMSS data in the new municipalities.)
68The wording of the relevant question (7a on 1994 survey) is: “En el trabajo principal de la semana pasada
... ¿[c]uánto ganó o en cuánto calcula sus ingresos? (Asegúrese de que la cantidad sea lo que la persona recibe
efectivamente.)” Translation: “In the job you worked last week ... how much did you earn or how much do you
calculate your income to be? (Assure yourself that the quantity is what the person actually received.)” The phrase
in parentheses is an instruction to enumerators. The manual for enumerators goes into greater detail (p. 225): “Para
los trabajadores a sueldo, marcará la opción que corresponda al periodo de pago y la cantidad que debe anotar es el
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This measure differs from the wage measure in the IMSS administrative records in that it excludes
workers’ social security contributions and other taxes as well as the aguinaldo, the yearly holiday
bonus employers are required to pay in December of each year.
The hourly wage figures were constructed as follows. (1) We recovered monthly wages for
the job worked last week (as converted from hourly, daily, weekly or bi-weekly basis by INEGI
enumerators). For a small number of workers, wages were reported in wage categories relative
to the minimum wage; we calculated monthly wages for these workers using the midpoint of the
wage categories.69 Individuals who reported not working in the previous week or who were missing
wage information were dropped. (2) Monthly hours were calculated as 4.3 times hours worked in
the previous week. Responses of “irregular hours, less than 35”, “irregular hours, between 35 and
48” and “irregular hours, more than 48” were assigned values of 20, 42 and 60 hours per week,
respectively. Workers with missing weekly hours were dropped. (3) The hourly wage was calculated
as monthly wage divided by monthly hours. (4) The daily wage was calculated by multiplying the
hourly wage by eight. (5) The wage was deflated to constant 2002 pesos using the main consumer
price index (INPC) from Banco de Mexico, the Mexican central bank. (6) We imposed a topcode
equal to the real value of the IMSS topcode in 1991 and dropped workers with a real daily wage
below 30 pesos (approximately US$3).
The ENEU asks individuals about their main job as well as any secondary employment. We
focus solely on the main job reported in the ENEU. We follow sample selection criteria similar
to those we impose on the IMSS. Our baseline ENEU sample includes men ages 16-65 working
INGRESO NETO, lo que realmente recibió y pudo disponer la última vez que le pagaron en su trabajo, es decir, no
debe anotar los descuentos hechos por impuestos, cuotas al seguro social, .... ” Translation: “For salaried workers,
mark the pay period and the quantity that should be noted is the NET INCOME, that which the respondent really
received and could spend the last time he/she was paid, that is to say, you should not include taxes, contributions to
social security ...”
69Prior to 1994, the categories were (for some wage w and the relevant minimum wage MW ): w < .25 ∗MW ;
.25 ∗ MW ≤ w < .5 ∗ MW ; .5 ∗ MW < w ≤ 1 ∗ MW ; 1 ∗ MW < w ≤ 2 ∗ MW ; 2 ∗ MW < w ≤ 3 ∗ MW ;
3 ∗MW < w ≤ 5 ∗MW ; 5 ∗MW < w ≤ 10 ∗MW ; and 10 ∗MW < w. In 1994, the survey combined the first three
categories into a single “less than the minimum wage” category and added a category of greater than 20 times the
minimum wage.
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in non-petroleum manufacturing, construction, retail, restaurants, and hotels. We also drop self-
employed workers, owners, and unpaid workers (retaining workers who receive a fixed wage, work
for a commission, or work in a cooperative). The sample thus constructed is referred to as the “full
ENEU sample” in Table 2.2. As explained in Section 2.4, in our ENEU baseline sample we focus
on workers who report receiving IMSS through their main employment and who work full-time,
defined as at least 35 hours in the last week.
When we include indicators for schooling, occupation, and industry in regressions using ENEU
data only (i.e. Table 2.7), the sets of indicators are defined as follows. For schooling, we generate
9 categories: less than primary education (< 6 years), primary (6 years), some secondary (cor-
responds to junior high school, 7-8 years), secondary (9 years), some preparatory (corresponds to
high school, 10-11 years), preparatory (12 years), some college (13-15 years), college (16 years), and
more than college (> 16 years). The occupation definitions used by the ENEU changed over the
study period. To maintain consistency across years, we generate the following 22 categories (the
numbers in the parentheses correspond to occupation categories from the Clasificación Mexicana
de Ocupaciones (CMO) 1996): professionals (11), technical and specialized personnel (12), educa-
tors (13), artists/entertainers/athletes (14), CEOs/directors (211), managers/administrators not
including CEOs/directors (21, not including 211), agricultural workers (41), production supervi-
sors (51), production workers (52), machine operators (53), production assistants (54), drivers and
drivers’ assistants (55), supervisors in administration/services (61), secretaries (620), administrative
assistants, not including secretaries (62, not including 620), salespeople with fixed establishments
(71), salespeople without fixed establishment (ambulantes) (72), bellhops, gardeners, janitors (812),
providers of personal services, excluding bellhops, gardeners, janitors (81, not including 812), do-
mestic workers (82), security guards/law enforcement/military (83), others (99).70 For industry,
70The occupational categories from the CMO used by the ENEU from 1987-1994 are the following: profession-
als (11), technical and specialized personnel (12), educators (13), artists/entertainers/athletes (14), CEOs/directors
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we include indicators at the two-digit level using the Clasificación de Actividad Económica, the
industry classification used by the ENEU; there are 50 two-digit industries in the broad sectors we
focus on.
2.13 Appendix: Results for Women
Figures 2.A1-2.A6 and Tables 2.A6-2.A11 present results for women analogous to the results for men
in the main text. They can be easily summarized. Figures 2.A2-2.A5 and Table 2.A8 indicate that
the cross-sectional patterns we observe for men largely apply to women as well. Tables 2.A9-2.A11
indicate that the difference-in-difference results, by contrast, are not robust. As discussed in the
text, there are a number of possible reasons for this. Women’s labor force participation changed
relatively rapidly over the study period and that many women receive IMSS benefits through
their spouses, which provides an incentive to remain in the informal sector. In addition, because
of relatively low labor force participation by older women, sample sizes in the ENEU household
survey are often inadequate, especially when analyzing the data separately by metropolitan area
(or metropolitan area, firm size and sector).
(220), managers/administrators not including CEOs/directors (21, 22, 31 not including 220), agricultural workers
(41, 42, 431, 439, 526), production supervisors (51), production workers (520, 522, 523, 527), machine operators
(521,524,525), production assistants (53, 529), drivers and drivers’ assistants (430, 83), supervisors in administra-
tion/services (610), secretaries (611), administrative assistants, not including secretaries (612, 613, 614, 615, 616,
617, 618, 619), salespeople with fixed establishments (71), salespeople without fixed establishment (ambulantes (72),
bellhops, gardeners, janitors (812), providers of personal services, excluding bellhops, gardeners, janitors (81, not
including 812), domestic workers (82),security guards/law enforcement/military (84), others (99).
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2.14 Appendix: Figures




















1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Year
IMSS admin. records ENEU full−time w/ IMSS
ENEU w/ IMSS ENEU permanent w/ IMSS
ENEU w/out IMSS
Notes: Samples are the same as those in Columns 1 and 3-6 of Table 2.A6; refer to that table for details. ENEU totals
are calculated using sampling weights. The dashed vertical line indicates the date the pension reform was passed by
Congress (Dec. 21, 1995); the solid vertical line indicates the date the reform took effect (July 1, 1997). Observations
correspond to the second quarter of each year. See Section 2.4 and the Appendix for details of sample selection.
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0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550
real daily salary (constant 2002 pesos)
IMSS admin. records
ENEU household survey
Notes: The ENEU wage is the real daily take-home wage reported to the ENEU household survey. The IMSS wage
is the real daily pre-tax reported wage from the IMSS administrative records. Wages in 2002 pesos. Average 2002
exchange rate: 9.66 pesos/dollar. Samples are IMSS and ENEU baseline female samples. Data in IMSS sample are
from second quarter of 1990, in ENEU sample from all four quarters of 1990 pooled. Vertical lines indicate minimum
wages in the three minimum-wage zones in Mexico (A, B, C). Bins are 5 pesos wide. The rightmost bin captures
all individuals with reported wages at or above the minimum IMSS topcode over the study period (from 1991). See
Section 2.4 and the Appendix for further details.
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40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
real daily salary (constant 2002 pesos)
IMSS admin. records
ENEU household survey
Notes: Histogram is similar to Figure 2.6 but only includes workers with wages less than 200 pesos/day (approx.
$20/day) in constant 2002 pesos. Bins are 2 pesos wide.
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Notes: Histograms are similar to those in Figure 2.7. Vertical lines indicate minimum wages in the three minimum-wage zones in Mexico (A, B, C). Bins are 2
pesos wide. Average 2002 exchange rate: 9.66 pesos/dollar. See Section 2.4 and the Appendix for further details.
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0 50 100 150 200
real daily wage, ages 56−65
IMSS
ENEU
Notes: The wage variables are the real daily take-home wage from ENEU and real daily post-tax reported wage from IMSS. Densities are estimated using an
Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth 3 pesos for IMSS data and 6 pesos for ENEU data (using Stata kdensity command). Wages are in 2002 pesos. Average 2002
exchange rate: 9.66 pesos/dollar. Rows correspond to years 1990, 1997, 2003; columns to age groups 16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65. Samples are IMSS and
ENEU baseline female samples, only including workers with wages less than 200 pesos/day. IMSS data are from second quarter; ENEU data are pooled across
quarters within specified year. See Section 2.4 and the Appendix for further details.
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1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Year
age 16−25 age 26−35
age 36−45 age 46−55
age 56−65
Notes: Each wage gap is the difference between the log median net wage from the ENEU survey and the log median
post-tax reported wage from the IMSS administrative records, using the ENEU and IMSS baseline female samples.
To calculate deviated wage gaps, we calculate wage gaps separately by age group-year-metro area, regress them on
a full set of metro area-year dummies, and average the residuals at the age-group level. The dashed vertical line
indicates the date the pension reform was passed by Congress (Dec. 21, 1995); the solid vertical line indicates the




Table 2.A1. IMSS Contribution Rates, Pensions and Child Care
General pension fund Personal retirement account Childcare
E W G TC E W G TC E W G TC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Jan 01 1973 - Jun 28 1986 3.750 1.500 0.750 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10 1.000 0.000 0.000 10
Jun 29 1986 - Jan 04 1989 4.200 1.500 0.300 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10 1.000 0.000 0.000 10
Jan 05 1989 - Dec 31 1990 4.200 1.500 0.300 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10 1.000 0.000 0.000 10
Jan 01 1991 - Dec 31 1991 4.900 1.750 0.350 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10 1.000 0.000 0.000 10
Jan 01 1992 - Apr 30 1992 5.040 1.800 0.350 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10 1.000 0.000 0.000 10
May 01 1992 - Dec 31 1992 5.040 1.800 0.360 10 2.000 0.000 0.000 25 1.000 0.000 0.000 10
Jan 01 1993 - Jul 20 1993 5.180 1.850 0.370 10 2.000 0.000 0.000 25 1.000 0.000 0.000 10
Jul 21 1993 - Dec 31 1993 5.180 1.850 0.370 10 2.000 0.000 0.000 25 1.000 0.000 0.000 18
Jan 01 1994 - Dec 31 1994 5.670 2.025 0.405 10 2.000 0.000 0.000 25 1.000 0.000 0.000 25
Jan 01 1995 - Dec 31 1995 5.810 2.075 0.415 10 2.000 0.000 0.000 25 1.000 0.000 0.000 25
Jan 01 1996 - Jun 30 1997 5.950 2.125 0.425 10 2.000 0.000 0.000 25 1.000 0.000 0.000 25
Jul 01 1997 - Jun 30 1998 2.800 1.000 0.200 15 5.150 1.125 0.225 25 1.000 0.000 0.000 25
Jul 01 1998 - Jun 30 1999 2.800 1.000 0.200 16 5.150 1.125 0.225 25 1.000 0.000 0.000 25
Jul 01 1999 - Jun 30 2000 2.800 1.000 0.200 17 5.150 1.125 0.225 25 1.000 0.000 0.000 25
Jul 01 2000 - Jun 30 2001 2.800 1.000 0.200 18 5.150 1.125 0.225 25 1.000 0.000 0.000 25
Jul 01 2001 - Jun 30 2002 2.800 1.000 0.200 19 5.150 1.125 0.225 25 1.000 0.000 0.000 25
Jul 01 2002 - Jun 30 2003 2.800 1.000 0.200 20 5.150 1.125 0.225 25 1.000 0.000 0.000 25
Jul 01 2003 - Jun 30 2004 2.800 1.000 0.200 21 5.150 1.125 0.225 25 1.000 0.000 0.000 25
Jul 01 2004 - Jun 30 2005 2.800 1.000 0.200 22 5.150 1.125 0.225 25 1.000 0.000 0.000 25
Jul 01 2005 - Jun 30 2006 2.800 1.000 0.200 23 5.150 1.125 0.225 25 1.000 0.000 0.000 25
Jul 01 2006 - Jun 30 2007 2.800 1.000 0.200 24 5.150 1.125 0.225 25 1.000 0.000 0.000 25
Jul 01 2007 - . 2.800 1.000 0.200 25 5.150 1.125 0.225 25 1.000 0.000 0.000 25
Notes: Numbers represent contribution rates as a percentage of a worker’s daily wage. E = employer contribution, W = worker contribution, G = government
contribution, and TC = top-code, representing the maximum taxable income for the purposes of each calculation, as a multiple of the minimum wage in Mexico
City. The “General pension fund” columns (columns 1-4) indicate contributions to the general IMSS pension fund; The “Personal retirement account” columns
(columns 5-8) indicate contributions to individuals’ personal retirement accounts. See Table 2.A2 for details on health care contributions.
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Table 2.A2. IMSS Contribution Rates, Health Care
Variable component Fixed component Additional for wage>3xMW
E W G TC E W G TC E W G TC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Jan 01 1973 - Jun 28 1986 5.625 2.250 1.125 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10
Jun 29 1986 - Jan 04 1989 6.300 2.250 0.450 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10
Jan 05 1989 - Dec 31 1990 8.400 3.000 0.600 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10
Jan 01 1991 - Dec 31 1991 8.400 3.000 0.600 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10
Jan 01 1992 - Apr 30 1992 8.400 3.000 0.600 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10
May 01 1992 - Dec 31 1992 8.400 3.000 0.600 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10
Jan 01 1993 - Jul 20 1993 8.400 3.000 0.625 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 10
Jul 21 1993 - Dec 31 1993 8.750 3.125 0.625 18 0.000 0.000 0.000 18 0.000 0.000 0.000 18
Jan 01 1994 - Dec 31 1994 8.750 3.125 0.625 25 0.000 0.000 0.000 25 0.000 0.000 0.000 25
Jan 01 1995 - Dec 31 1995 8.750 3.125 0.625 25 0.000 0.000 0.000 25 0.000 0.000 0.000 25
Jan 01 1996 - Jun 30 1997 8.750 3.125 0.625 25 0.000 0.000 0.000 25 0.000 0.000 0.000 25
Jul 01 1997 - Jun 30 1998 0.700 0.250 0.050 25 13.900 0.000 13.900 25 6.000 2.000 0.000 25
Jul 01 1998 - Jun 30 1999 0.700 0.250 0.050 25 14.550 0.000 13.900 25 5.510 1.840 0.000 25
Jul 01 1999 - Jun 30 2000 0.700 0.250 0.050 25 15.200 0.000 13.900 25 5.020 1.680 0.000 25
Jul 01 2000 - Jun 30 2001 0.700 0.250 0.050 25 15.850 0.000 13.900 25 4.530 1.520 0.000 25
Jul 01 2001 - Jun 30 2002 0.700 0.250 0.050 25 16.500 0.000 13.900 25 4.040 1.360 0.000 25
Jul 01 2002 - Jun 30 2003 0.700 0.250 0.050 25 17.150 0.000 13.900 25 3.550 1.200 0.000 25
Jul 01 2003 - Jun 30 2004 0.700 0.250 0.050 25 17.800 0.000 13.900 25 3.060 1.040 0.000 25
Jul 01 2004 - Jun 30 2005 0.700 0.250 0.050 25 18.450 0.000 13.900 25 2.570 0.880 0.000 25
Jul 01 2005 - Jun 30 2006 0.700 0.250 0.050 25 19.100 0.000 13.900 25 2.080 0.720 0.000 25
Jul 01 2006 - Jun 30 2007 0.700 0.250 0.050 25 19.750 0.000 13.900 25 1.590 0.560 0.000 25
Jul 01 2007 - . 0.700 0.250 0.050 25 20.400 0.000 13.900 25 1.100 0.400 0.000 25
Notes: E = employer contribution, W = worker contribution, G = government contribution, and TC = top-code, representing the maximum taxable income for
the purposes of each calculation, as a multiple of the minimum wage in Mexico City. The “Variable component” columns (columns 1-4) indicate contribution rates
as a percentage of a worker’s daily wage. The “Fixed component” columns (columns 5-8) indicate fixed contribution rates for each worker, shown as a percentage
of the minimum wage in Mexico City. The variable and fixed components (columns 1-8) must be paid for all workers. The “Additional for wage>3xMW” columns
(columns 9-12) indicates additional contributions as a percentage of a worker’s daily wage exceeding three times the minimum wage in Mexico City, applicable
only for workers whose daily wage exceeds that value. See Table 2.A1 for details on pension and child care contributions.
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Extra benefit for each
additional year (%)
1 or less 80.00 0.563
1.01 to 1.25 77.11 0.814
1.26 to 1.5 58.18 1.178
1.51 to 1.75 49.23 1.430
1.76 to 2 42.67 1.615
2.01 to 2.25 37.65 1.736
2.26 to 2.5 33.68 1.868
2.51 to 2.75 30.48 1.958
2.76 to 3 27.83 2.033
3.01 to 3.25 25.60 2.096
3.26 to 3.5 23.70 2.149
3.51 to 3.75 22.07 2.195
3.76 to 4 20.65 2.235
4.01 to 4.25 19.39 2.271
4.26 to 4.5 18.29 2.302
4.51 to 4.75 17.30 2.330
4.76 to 5 16.41 2.355
5.01 to 5.25 15.61 2.377
5.26 to 5.5 14.88 2.398
5.51 to 5.75 14.22 2.416
5.76 to 6 13.62 2.433
6.01 or higher 13.00 2.450
Notes: Base replacement rate is based on average nominal wage in the five years preceding retirement. Extra benefit
is for each year of contribution exceeding the minimum contribution length of ten years.
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Notes: Data from second quarter of each year. Real minimum wages are for daily wages in Mexico City (zone A),
reported in constant 2002 pesos. Average 2002 exchange rate: 9.66 pesos/dollar.
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Table 2.A5. Pension Wealth Simulation, Male Worker Entering System on June 30, 1997
Real Daily Wage
Years of
Contributions Plan 43 100 200 300 500 1079
35 PRA 398.6 815.0 1626.2 2437.3 4059.7 8751.9
PAYGO 398.6 398.6 603.8 890.2 1483.6 3200.1
30 PRA 398.6 523.4 1044.3 1565.3 2607.1 5620.5
PAYGO 398.6 398.6 510.7 743.3 1238.9 2672.1
25 PRA 398.6 398.6 659.1 987.8 1645.3 3546.9
PAYGO 398.6 398.6 406.9 579.5 965.8 2083.2
20 PRA 87.9 202.4 403.9 605.4 1008.4 2173.9
PAYGO 398.6 398.6 398.6 449.6 749.3 1616.2
15 PRA 51.1 117.8 235.0 352.2 586.6 1264.7
PAYGO 398.6 398.6 398.6 398.6 504.5 1088.2
10 PRA 26.8 61.7 123.1 184.5 307.4 662.6
PAYGO 398.6 398.6 398.6 398.6 398.6 560.3
5 PRA 10.7 24.6 49.0 73.5 122.4 264.0
PAYGO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Notes: Values represent real present discounted value of the future stream of pension benefits in thousands of 2002 pesos under the pre-reform pay-as-you-go
(PAYGO) and personal retirement account (PRA) systems, for a male worker who enters the system on June 30, 1997. 43 pesos is real daily minimum wage (in
Mexico City) in 1997, 1079 pesos is the topcode we impose (corresponding to the lowest real value of IMSS topcode over study period.) See Section 2.2.3 and the
Appendix for further details.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. 1990
real avg. daily post-tax wage 88.29 133.55 136.91 124.84 128.57
(0.08) (2.16) (2.65) (3.59) (2.50)
age 28.12 28.35 28.03 29.17 27.82
(0.01) (0.21) (0.23) (0.47) (0.24)
fraction employed in ests >100 employees 0.55 0.45 0.54 0.21 0.54
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
N (raw observations) 803579 6685 5126 1559 4745
N (population, using weights) 803579 1023858 738698 285160 677053
B. 2000
real avg. daily post-tax wage 90.86 128.04 135.88 109.72 140.56 129.65
(0.07) (1.82) (2.21) (3.06) (2.49) (2.18)
age 30.44 30.34 29.85 31.50 30.17 29.71
(0.01) (0.18) (0.19) (0.40) (0.21) (0.20)
fraction employed in ests >100 employees 0.64 0.49 0.62 0.19 0.64 0.62
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N (raw observations) 1251832 9670 7227 2443 6305 6607
N (population, using weights) 1251832 1652164 1157184 494980 1001866 1056013
Notes: All columns focus on wage-earning female workers ages 16-65 in manufacturing, construction, and retail/hotel/restaurant sectors in 16 metropolitan areas
from the original ENEU sample. Column 1 reports statistics for IMSS baseline female sample; Column 2 for full ENEU (household survey) sample (satisfying
aforementioned criteria); Column 3 for employees in ENEU who report receiving IMSS benefit in current employment; Column 4 for employees in ENEU who
report not receiving IMSS benefit; Column 5 for employees in ENEU who report receiving IMSS benefit and having a written contract of indefinite duration;
and Column 6 for employees in ENEU who report receiving IMSS benefit and working at least 35 hours in previous week (the ENEU baseline female sample).
Standard errors of means in parentheses. In IMSS data, the fraction in establishments with >100 employees variable refers to permanent employees. In the ENEU
survey, the establishment-size question asks the total number of employees (without specifying permanent vs. temporary.) For further details, see Section 2.4 and
the Appendix.
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Table 2.A7. Age Composition by Firm Size Category, 1990, Women
Age category (employment as % of row total)




1-10 employees 45.9 29.6 14.8 6.9 2.8 13.7
11-50 employees 49.0 29.2 14.0 5.8 2.0 20.9
51-100 employees 52.1 28.8 13.0 4.8 1.4 10.2
101-250 employees 55.0 28.3 11.9 3.8 1.0 14.0
> 250 employees 52.0 28.6 13.2 4.8 1.4 41.2
all firm sizes 50.9 28.9 13.4 5.2 1.6
B. ENEU
1-10 employees 51.6 28.0 12.7 6.1 1.6 12.2
11-50 employees 51.4 26.5 14.7 5.0 2.3 21.3
51-100 employees 56.0 24.1 15.3 4.0 0.5 11.8
101-250 employees 51.7 32.2 10.7 3.3 2.1 11.4
> 250 employees 52.7 28.7 13.5 3.9 1.2 43.4
all firm sizes 52.6 28.0 13.6 4.4 1.5
Notes: Data are from IMSS and ENEU baseline female samples. Percentages are calculated based on employment (using sampling weights, in the case of the
ENEU) in each cell. Panel B drops observations in ENEU baseline female sample that are missing the firm-size variable (which make up fewer than 1% of
observations). For further details, see Section 2.4 and the Appendix.
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Table 2.A8. Cross-Sectional Patterns of Evasion, 1990, Women
wage gap (medians) wage gap (means) exc. mass (15th percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
age 26-35 -0.017 -0.005 -0.098*** -0.087*** -0.111*** -0.105***
(0.035) (0.033) (0.031) (0.029) (0.020) (0.018)
age 36-45 0.003 0.029 -0.160*** -0.140*** -0.081*** -0.065***
(0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.034) (0.020) (0.018)
age 46-55 0.061 0.101** -0.139*** -0.109** -0.081*** -0.056**
(0.049) (0.047) (0.044) (0.043) (0.024) (0.022)
age 56-65 -0.002 0.033 -0.203*** -0.184** -0.058* -0.033
(0.078) (0.073) (0.075) (0.073) (0.031) (0.030)
11-50 employees -0.198*** -0.234*** -0.100** -0.130*** -0.100*** -0.118***
(0.039) (0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0.019) (0.016)
51-100 employees -0.246*** -0.281*** -0.166*** -0.200*** -0.140*** -0.158***
(0.046) (0.042) (0.044) (0.041) (0.022) (0.019)
101-250 employees -0.236*** -0.256*** -0.118** -0.140*** -0.118*** -0.131***
(0.048) (0.046) (0.047) (0.044) (0.025) (0.022)
> 250 employees -0.193*** -0.203*** -0.065 -0.065* -0.085*** -0.089***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038) (0.021) (0.021)
construction 0.146*** 0.123** 0.045*
(0.056) (0.051) (0.024)
retail/services -0.137*** -0.108*** -0.127***
(0.030) (0.028) (0.014)
constant 0.506*** 0.689*** 0.593*** 0.463*** 0.452*** 0.499*** 0.547*** 0.572*** 0.586***
(0.019) (0.025) (0.058) (0.017) (0.026) (0.055) (0.013) (0.013) (0.026)
metro area effects N N Y N N Y N N Y
R-squared 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.16 0.04 0.05 0.25
N 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 766
Notes: Data are from IMSS and ENEU baseline samples, collapsed to metro area/age group/firm-size category/sector level for 1990. The omitted category for age
is 16-25, for firm size is 1-10 employees, and for sector is manufacturing. The wage gap (medians) is log median real daily take-home wage from the ENEU minus
log median real daily post-tax reported wage from IMSS, calculated. Wage gap (means) is analogous, using mean in place of median. Excess mass is calculated
as described in Section 2.5 and Figure 2.9. In calculating evasion measures, we pool ENEU data across quarters within year. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% level. See
Section 2.4 and the Appendix for further details of data processing.
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1(age > 55)*1988 -0.164 -0.067 -0.088
(0.138) (0.116) (0.071)
1(age > 55)*1989 -0.206* -0.109 -0.027
(0.122) (0.109) (0.034)
1(age > 55)*1990 -0.095 0.010 -0.043
(0.128) (0.114) (0.041)
1(age > 55)*1991 -0.143 -0.058 -0.114**
(0.123) (0.123) (0.055)
1(age > 55)*1992 -0.079 -0.062 -0.027
(0.131) (0.115) (0.036)
1(age > 55)*1993 0.076 0.087 0.009
(0.146) (0.128) (0.034)
1(age > 55)*1994 0.043 0.079 0.015
(0.141) (0.116) (0.032)
1(age > 55)*1995 0.047 0.076 0.035
(0.148) (0.131) (0.039)
1(age > 55)*1996 -0.019 0.076 0.015
(0.130) (0.119) (0.035)
1(age > 55)*1998 -0.051 -0.023 0.026
(0.124) (0.117) (0.035)
1(age > 55)*1999 0.040 0.034 0.022
(0.132) (0.112) (0.032)
1(age > 55)*2000 0.055 0.063 0.025
(0.123) (0.108) (0.033)
1(age > 55)*2001 0.039 0.175 0.036
(0.122) (0.109) (0.031)
1(age > 55)*2002 0.091 0.132 0.003
(0.120) (0.108) (0.035)
1(age > 55)*2003 0.114 0.070 0.007
(0.124) (0.111) (0.033)
age group-metro area effects Y Y Y
metro-year effects Y Y Y
R-squared 0.72 0.61 0.81
N 1279 1279 1279
Notes: Data are from IMSS and ENEU baseline samples, collapsed to metro area/age group/year level. Wage gap
(medians) is log median real daily net wage from ENEU minus log median post-tax daily wage from IMSS. Wage gap
(means) is defined analogously, using means in place of medians. Excess mass is calculated as described in Section
2.5 and Figure 2.9. In calculating evasion measures, we pool ENEU data across quarters within year. *** 1%, **
5%, * 10% level. See Section 2.4 and the Appendix for further details of data processing.
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Table 2.A10. Differential Effects of Pension Reform on Employment Gap, Women
dep. var.: log(empl., ENEU) - log(empl., IMSS)
(1) (2)
1(age > 55)*1988 -0.181 -0.257
(0.231) (0.217)
1(age > 55)*1989 0.177 0.196
(0.194) (0.189)
1(age > 55)*1990 0.141 0.137
(0.200) (0.177)
1(age > 55)*1991 0.232 0.252
(0.201) (0.191)
1(age > 55)*1992 -0.185 -0.177
(0.237) (0.242)
1(age > 55)*1993 0.161 0.186
(0.222) (0.204)
1(age > 55)*1994 -0.021 -0.022
(0.232) (0.218)
1(age > 55)*1995 -0.316 -0.323
(0.256) (0.250)
1(age > 55)*1996 -0.092 -0.090
(0.207) (0.207)
1(age > 55)*1998 -0.117 -0.146
(0.183) (0.189)
1(age > 55)*1999 -0.292 -0.336
(0.220) (0.218)
1(age > 55)*2000 -0.158 -0.158
(0.220) (0.223)
1(age > 55)*2001 0.145 0.147
(0.201) (0.179)
1(age > 55)*2002 -0.009 -0.006
(0.261) (0.234)
1(age > 55)*2003 -0.267 -0.264
(0.223) (0.232)
age group effects Y
age group-metro area effects N Y
metro-year effects Y Y
R-squared 0.45 0.55
N 1258 1258
Notes: Samples are IMSS and ENEU baseline samples, collapsed to metro area/age group/year level. *** 1%, **
5%, * 10% level. See Section 2.4 and the Appendix for further details of data processing.
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Table 2.A11. Differential Effects of Pension Reform on ENEU Take-Home Wage,
Women
dep. var.: log daily net wage, ENEU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1(age > 55)*1988 -0.327*** -0.273*** -0.254*** -0.228*** -0.219***
(0.107) (0.094) (0.081) (0.079) (0.078)
1(age > 55)*1989 -0.383*** -0.297*** -0.248*** -0.230*** -0.231***
(0.098) (0.085) (0.076) (0.072) (0.071)
1(age > 55)*1990 -0.306*** -0.264*** -0.225*** -0.230*** -0.235***
(0.106) (0.087) (0.079) (0.075) (0.074)
1(age > 55)*1991 -0.370*** -0.308*** -0.270*** -0.286*** -0.287***
(0.099) (0.083) (0.075) (0.072) (0.072)
1(age > 55)*1992 -0.225** -0.208** -0.189** -0.180** -0.178**
(0.115) (0.101) (0.087) (0.085) (0.085)
1(age > 55)*1993 -0.323*** -0.278*** -0.252*** -0.242*** -0.258***
(0.103) (0.093) (0.089) (0.088) (0.086)
1(age > 55)*1994 -0.148 -0.100 -0.099 -0.102 -0.091
(0.110) (0.100) (0.091) (0.090) (0.089)
1(age > 55)*1995 -0.163 -0.188** -0.167** -0.182** -0.177**
(0.108) (0.089) (0.081) (0.079) (0.078)
1(age > 55)*1996 0.055 0.028 0.036 0.024 0.025
(0.122) (0.100) (0.090) (0.087) (0.086)
1(age > 55)*1998 -0.248** -0.194** -0.224*** -0.217*** -0.222***
(0.114) (0.096) (0.084) (0.081) (0.080)
1(age > 55)*1999 -0.032 -0.022 -0.008 -0.005 -0.010
(0.120) (0.095) (0.086) (0.082) (0.081)
1(age > 55)*2000 -0.274*** -0.210** -0.187** -0.190** -0.187**
(0.104) (0.092) (0.085) (0.083) (0.082)
1(age > 55)*2001 -0.177* -0.137 -0.152* -0.138* -0.137*
(0.105) (0.088) (0.078) (0.076) (0.074)
1(age > 55)*2002 -0.109 -0.144* -0.137* -0.136* -0.135*
(0.101) (0.084) (0.076) (0.073) (0.072)
1(age > 55)*2003 -0.202* -0.242** -0.212** -0.222** -0.219**
(0.122) (0.097) (0.091) (0.089) (0.088)
age group effects Y Y Y Y Y
metro-year effects Y Y Y Y Y
schooling effects N Y Y Y Y
married indicator N Y Y Y Y
occupation effects N N Y Y Y
industry effects N N N Y Y
firm-size effects N N N N Y
R-squared 0.11 0.39 0.47 0.48 0.48
N 309175 309175 309175 309175 309175
Notes: Sample is ENEU baseline sample. Take-home wage is the post-payroll-tax net wage as reported on ENEU.
Estimates use population sampling weights provided in ENEU dataset. Controls include sets of 9 schooling indicators,
22 occupation indicators, and/or 50 industry indicators, in addition to the sets of five age-group and firm-size
indicators, in indicated columns; details of category definitions are in the Appendix. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% level.
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Macroeconomic policies have microeconomic consequences as they alter prices, incomes, and the
choice sets of individuals and firms. This paper focuses on one of the most important structural
changes in recent history—the removal of international trade barriers. Specifically, in the context
of India, we examine the implications of tariff cuts for fertility, sex-selection, and child mortality,
and highlight the distributional effects of trade policy across gender and socioeconomic strata.
The 1991 trade liberalization of the Indian economy was externally imposed by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in response to a severe balance of payments crisis, which we argue was an
exogenous shock to industry-level tariffs in India. Moreover, the resulting changes in tariff- and
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) were quite large in magnitude. In the manufacturing sector, the average
tariff declined from 117 percent to 39 percent and the share of imports covered by NTBs fell from
82 percent to 17 percent between 1990-1991 and 1999-2000 (Gupta and Kumar (2008)). We exploit
heterogeneity in the pre-reform industrial composition of Indian districts, combined with differences
in tariff cuts by industry, to identify districts that were more or less exposed to trade liberalization.3
We then estimate the effect of this differential exposure on parents’ fertility decisions and children’s
health.
Using retrospective birth histories constructed from large-scale household surveys and an instrumental-
variables strategy, first we show that the sex ratio at birth decreased and fertility as well as child
mortality increased in districts more exposed to tariff cuts. However, these effects vary significantly
across social strata. We find that tariff cuts improve the likelihood of birth and survival for girls
in socially disadvantaged families. Births to lower-caste, uneducated, and less wealthy women are
more likely to be female in districts that are relatively more exposed to tariff declines. Moreover,
these daughters are significantly less likely to die within one, six, and twelve months of birth.
3Among several other papers, this identification strategy has been used by Hasan, Mitra, and Ural (2006-07),
Topalova (2007), Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010b), Topalova (2010), and Gaddis and Pieters (2012).
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However, mortality for girls born to upper-caste, more educated, and wealthier mothers increases
significantly. These “high-status” women are also more likely to give birth to boys, but the sex
ratio effects are not as strong as the mortality results. Fertility rises for low-status women and falls
for high-status women.
The analysis of heterogeneity, in combination with the findings of prior literature on the effects
of the Indian trade reform, allows us to distinguish between three potential mechanisms: (a) changes
in household income, (b) changes in relative female bargaining power, and (c) altered future labor
market returns from daughters relative to sons.4 Topalova (2010) has shown that relative wages
decreased in impacted industries and relative poverty increased in Indian districts more exposed to
trade reform.5 To the extent that income shocks are linked to investments in children’s health6 and
parents’ decisions about the number and the sex-composition of their children,7 we expect tariff
cuts to influence fertility and sex ratios. Additionally, structural adjustments resulting from trade
liberalization may change the relative demand for female labor,8 or the gender wage gap9 and, thus,
influence fertility through changes in relative female bargaining power. Similarly, if female fetuses
are selectively aborted due to the lower economic value of daughters relative to sons, any effect of
trade liberalization on the demand for female labor could also influence the sex ratio at birth (Qian
(2008)).
Using data from the National Sample Survey (NSS), we show that tariff declines result in a
significant increase in adult employment for lower-caste women and upper-caste men. On the other
4More open trade may also influence relative commodity prices in an economy and, hence, consumption levels
(Porto (2007)). Changes in the amount and the type of food (and nutrients) consumed by the mother and her children
due to differences in dietary preferences across districts could affect child health outcomes, in general, and infant
mortality, in particular (Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006)).
5Although, using state-level data, Hasan, Mitra, and Ural (2006-07) conclude that greater exposure to trade
openness is not associated with slower reduction in poverty in rural India. For a more detailed discussion, we refer
the reader to Topalova (2010).
6Strauss and Thomas (1998), Strauss and Thomas (2008), Case (2001), Case (2004), Paxson and Schady (2005)
7Edlund and Lee (2009), Almond, Li, and Zhang (2013)
8Katz and Murphy (1992), Kucera (2001), Kucera and Milberg (2000), Gaddis and Pieters (2012)
9Wood (1991), Black and Brainerd (2004)
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hand, adult employment decreases for upper-caste women and lower-caste men, albeit insignifi-
cantly. These results suggest that differential changes in labor market returns by gender and social
status are the most likely explanatory channel for our findings. Parents from socially disadvantaged
groups are investing more in daughters in two ways. First, girls are more likely to be born, poten-
tially due to reduced use of sex-selective abortions. Secondly, they take better care of the daughters
since, conditional on being born, infant mortality for low-status girls decreases. Low-status boys
do not benefit equally because their potential earning opportunities have not increased as much.10
We make a number of contributions. Most papers in the field of international economics have
examined the effects of trade liberalization on industrial outcomes such as productivity, employ-
ment, and wages.11 We highlight that trade policy can also have substantial implications for
less obvious outcomes such as fertility and child mortality.12 Moreover, we add to the extremely
limited literature on the distributional effects of more open trade, especially along the gender di-
mension.13 Despite methodological shortcomings, existing papers suggests that trade openness has
not unambiguously benefited everyone (Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007a)). However, the identities of
10This may also be due to limited occupational mobility for low-status men as suggested by Munshi and Rosenzweig
(2009)). It is also possible that low-status parents strategically choose not to over-invest in their sons so that they
continue to participate in the traditional occupational networks of lower-caste men (Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006)).
11Tybout (2003), Trefler (2004), Hanson (2007), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007b), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007a),
Harrison, McLaren, and McMillan (2011), Kovak (2013)
12In a similar vein, Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010b) and Kis-Katos and Sparrow (2011) examine the
impact of trade policy on children’s schooling and child labor in India and Indonesia, respectively.
13Since beginning work on this paper, we have become aware of another study, Chakraborty (2012), analyzing
the impact of district-level exposure to trade liberalization on sex ratios in India. While she also follows Topalova
(2010) to construct district-level tariff measures, our paper differs from Chakraborty (2012) in a number of ways.
First, her outcome variable measures sex ratios among children still living in 1999. This measure will capture the
impact of trade liberalization on the sex ratio at birth as well as its impact on male and female infant mortality.
Our paper disentangles this impact by analyzing the sex ratio at birth and infant mortality separately. Second, she
uses a difference-in-difference approach comparing the outcomes of children born between 1988 and 1996 (the treated
group) to children born between 1980 and 1988 (the control group) in districts with different levels of exposure to
trade liberalization, measured as the decline in district-level tariffs from 1990 to 1991. Our paper measures district-
level tariff exposure for each year from 1987 to 1997, allowing us to directly link trade liberalization to each birth
based on the year of birth. Finally, Chakraborty (2012) uses birth histories from the 1999 National Family Health
Survey of India (NFHS) while we use the 2002-2004 District-Level Household Survey of India (DLHS). In addition to
having a larger sample size, our dataset has the additional advantage of allowing us to compare births to the same
mother at different points in time through a mother fixed effect approach. Ultimately, we believe that our empirical
specifications and larger sample size allow us to better isolate the causal effect of trade liberalization on fertility
outcomes.
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“winners” and “losers” are not precisely known. Topalova (2010) finds that the slower decline in
poverty caused by tariff cuts most affected the poorest sections of the Indian society. In addition,
the decrease in education expenditure on children in response to the immediate change in family
income affected girls more (Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010b)). Our results paint a slightly
different picture. We find that adult female employment increases and mortality of girls relative
to boys decreases in lower-caste families. The losers, however, are also female, albeit at the other
end of the social hierarchy—from upper-caste, more educated, and relatively wealthy households.
We show that (a) the labor market outcomes for men and women from different social strata have
changed differentially, and (b) households are responding to this altered economic landscape via
fertility and investments in children’s human capital. Interestingly, we find that the results of
Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010b) exhibit substantial heterogeneity by caste: in districts
more exposed to tariff cuts, the decrease in schooling they find is driven by upper-caste children;
children from scheduled caste households are, in fact, more likely to be in school and less likely to
work. These distributional effects can play an important role in exacerbating or combating histor-
ical socio-economic inequalities and, hence, it is crucial to take them into account while estimating
the total costs and benefits of trade policies.
Second, our paper adds to the somewhat scarce literature on the determinants of discrimination
against female children in several developing societies. While overall fertility and child mortality
have decreased, the sex ratio at birth has sharply increased in many Asian countries, including
India. A “preference” for sons relative to daughters is widely believed to be the underlying cause of
prenatal and postnatal discrimination against girls, but credible explanations for this difference in
valuation are limited, especially in the Indian context.14 Our finding that girls fare better (worse)
in terms of mortality rates precisely in groups where the relative earning potential of women has
14Carranza (2012) is an exception.
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improved (worsened) is consistent with the findings of Qian (2008) in the context of China, and
emphasizes the economic roots of seemingly subjective discrimination.
Third, our fertility results underscore the fertility-sex ratio trade-off present in countries with
a stronger valuation of sons (Anukriti (2013)). If son preference persists over time,15 parents may
substitute less than perfectly between sons and daughters despite an increase in the relative benefit
from girls. They may continue to have the desired number of sons but decrease prenatal (as well
as postnatal) discrimination against girls, and hence, fertility may increase as the sex ratio at
birth decreases, consistent with our results for low-status families. On the flip side, a decrease
in the relative returns from girls, as we observe for high-status families, may enhance the use of
sex-selective abortions, causing fertility to fall and the sex ratio at birth to rise.
Lastly, on the technical side, our ability to control for state-specific time trends and mother
fixed-effects in the regression analysis makes our identification more robust than previous literature
on the effects of tariff reforms on household and individual outcomes.
In Section 3.2, we provide a summary of the Indian trade reform. In Section 3.3, we outline
our empirical methodology and describe the data. Section 3.4 presents the regression estimates,
Section 3.5 discusses the underlying mechanisms, and Section 3.6 conducts some robustness checks.
Section 3.7 provides a brief discussion and Section 3.8 concludes the paper.
3.2 India’s Trade Liberalization
We analyze the effect of trade liberalization on household fertility decisions and children’s health
in the context of India’s 1991 trade reform. Faced with a balance of payments crisis in August
1991, the Indian government embarked on several major economic reforms as conditions of an
International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout. Included among these requirements was a unilateral
15Abrevaya (2009), Almond and Edlund (2008), Almond, Edlund, and Milligan (2011), and Dubuc and Coleman
(2007) find evidence for persistence in son preference among Asian immigrants to the United States, Canada, England,
and Wales.
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reduction in the overall level and the dispersion of import tariffs as well as the removal of non-tariff
barriers (NTBs), such as import licensing.
The period after the IMF bailout, therefore, marks a sharp break in Indian trade policy. The
maximum tariff fell immediately from 400 percent to 150 percent, with later revisions bringing
the maximum tariff to approximately 45 percent by 1997 (Hasan, Mitra, and Ural (2006-07)).
Meanwhile, the average tariff fell from 80 percent in 1990 to 37 percent in 1996 and the standard
deviation of tariffs declined by 50 percent (Topalova (2010)). NTBs also fell, with the proportion
of goods subject to quantitative restrictions receding from 87 percent in 1987 to 45 percent by 1994
(Topalova (2010)).
In addition to the sharp decline in trade protection, the 1991 episode possesses several important
features that are valuable for our analysis. Since the policy reform was imposed as part of the IMF
bailout, the tariff cuts were largely unanticipated by firms and households in India. As other
commentators have observed, the removal of trade barriers was implemented swiftly as a form of
“shock-therapy” and was not part of any pre-existing development plan (Bhagwati (1993), Goyal
(1996)). It is, therefore, unlikely that our results are driven by any adjustments in fertility in
anticipation of these reforms.
The quick initiation of the liberalization episode also reduces concerns about industries with
greater political influence or higher productivity shaping the structure of the tariff reform in a way
that would undermine our empirical strategy (described in detail in the following section). Topalova
(2007) finds that industry-level tariff changes are uncorrelated with several proxies of an industry’s
political influence prior to the Indian reform, such as the number of employees, proportion of
skilled workers, and industrial concentration. Previous studies also find no correlation between an
industry’s future tariffs and its productivity before 1991 or productivity growth during 1989-1997
(Topalova (2004)). Finally, tariff changes through 1997 were spelled out in India’s Eighth Five
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Year plan (1992-1997), suggesting little room for manipulation of tariffs based on political economy
concerns during this time period.
It must be noted that, like Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010b), we ignore changes in
NTBs, primarily due to data availability issues. Thus, our results measure the effect of only one
important dimension of the trade reform, i.e. the tariff cuts. The exclusion of NTBs is potentially
harmful for our empirical strategy if the trends in NTBs were in the opposite direction as compared
to tariffs. But as mentioned by Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010b), there is a positive
correlation in tariffs and NTBs during our sample period. Thus, our results are biased only to the
extent that some of the effects we assign to tariff cuts may have instead been caused by the removal
of NTBs.16
3.3 Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Measuring Exposure to Tariff Reduction
The impact of trade liberalization on a developing economy, such as India, can be felt through many
channels. The availability of cheaper imported final goods can be welfare-improving for consumers,
while the reduction in tariffs on intermediate inputs can increase firm productivity. Although a
decrease in consumer prices could certainly influence fertility behavior, this effect will be common
across all households in India. On the other hand, an increase in supply of cheaper imported
products that compete with domestic goods can reduce employment and wages at domestic firms.
Like many other papers in the literature, our measure of tariff protection emphasizes this latter
effect of trade openness on employment.
National tariff protection varies across industries and over time in India. Moreover, there is
16Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010b) also argue that despite incomplete removal of NTBs by 1997, the
volume of imports increased in response to tariffs cuts suggesting that the latter were a significant and important
part of the reform.
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substantial heterogeneity in the industrial composition of Indian districts prior to 1991. Therefore,
depending on their industrial composition of employment at the time of reform, some Indian dis-
tricts experienced relatively larger reductions in trade protection than others. Following Topalova
(2010) and others, our identification strategy relies on this comparison to estimate the causal effect
of tariff reform.
Specifically, we interact the national nominal ad-valorem tariff faced by industry i in year t
, tariffit, with the share of employment in industry i and district d in 1991, empshare
1991
id , to




empshare1991id × tariffit (1)
Since the employment shares are based on a district’s industrial composition before the initiation of
trade liberalization, our tariff measure is free of any endogenous changes in employment composition
that take place due to the removal of tariff barriers.
Even though tariff cuts took place across a wide range of industries, certain industries, such
as cereals and oilseeds production, were non-traded, i.e. only the government was allowed to be
an importer of goods in these industries.17 Consequently, tariffdt assigns a zero tariff to the
non-traded industries for the entire time period. This implies that districts with higher levels of
employment in the non-traded sector in 1991 will mechanically have lower tariffdt (Hasan, Mitra,
and Ural (2006-07)). Since a large proportion of non-traded employment is in the cereal and oilseeds
sectors, and workers in these industries tend to be poor rural farmers, this introduces a negative
correlation between poverty and tariffdt.
Previous studies have addressed this concern by constructing a second measure of district tariffs
that only depends on employment in traded industries (Hasan, Mitra, and Ural (2006-07), Topalova
17Other non-traded industries during our sample period were services, trade, transportation, and construction.
136
(2007), Topalova (2010)). We follow the literature and create this measure as follows, where emp1991id










The only difference between the two measures of tariff protection in (1) and (2) is that the latter
excludes employment in non-traded industries while constructing weights for industry-level tariffs.
The traded tariff measure is, therefore, independent of the proportion of workers in the non-traded
sector and is uncorrelated with initial poverty levels within a district.
3.3.2 Data
We use data from the second round of the District-Level Household Survey (DLHS-2) of India. The
DLHS-2 surveyed 507,000 currently-married women (aged 15 - 44 years) from 620,000 households
in 593 districts during March 2002 - October 2004. This survey includes a complete retrospective
birth history for every woman interviewed, containing information on the month and the year of
child’s birth, birth order, age of the mother at birth, and the age at which the child died, if the
child is deceased.
We focus our analysis on rural areas within Indian districts. Topalova (2010) finds an insignifi-
cant relationship between tariff protection and poverty in urban areas of Indian districts, which she
attributes to pre-existing trends in poverty and the presence of other reforms in addition to trade
liberalization that impacted urban areas. Due to concerns of simultaneous reforms and pre-existing
trends in urban areas, we focus on rural areas only.
Since we focus on district as the geographical unit of interest, ideally we would like to know
the district in which a birth takes place. However, DLHS-2 only includes district of residence
identifiers at the time of survey. As a result, we assume that all births to a woman take place in
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her district of residence at the time of survey. This implicitly assumes that mothers do not migrate
to a different district after initiating child-bearing. This is a reasonable assumption in this context
since inter-district migration in India is low and mostly consists of women relocating as a result
of marriage. In addition, this assumption is problematic only if the measurement error induced
by it varies, systematically, with our measures of district-level tariff protection. Later, in Section
3.6 we show that the tariff cuts had no significant effect on the gender and caste composition of
in-migrants from other districts.
We restrict our sample to the 1987-1997 time period. There are two reasons for this. First,
1987 is the earliest year for which we have tariff data. Second, the tariff changes during 1992-1997
were spelled out in India’s Eighth Five Year Plan, so they are unlikely to have been influenced by
political economy decisions. After 1997, however, industry-level tariffs are negatively correlated
with the industry’s current productivity (Topalova (2004)), suggesting that these latter changes
may be endogenous to an industry’s performance. For this reason, we only focus on years up to
1997. Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of nominal national industry-level ad-valorem tariff during
1987-1997. Average tariff fell from about 95 percent in 1987 to about 30 percent in 1997.
We impose three additional sample-selection criteria. First, we only include births for whom
the mother’s age at birth was between 13 and 40. Second, we exclude birth parities of 11 or higher.
We use these restrictions due to the small number of births to women outside of the 13-40 age
range and the small number of births with parity above 10. However, our results are not sensitive
to the exclusion of these observations. The DLHS questionnaires were also administered to women
who were visiting the household at the time of the survey. Since there is no information on their
permanent district of residence, we exclude them from our analysis. Our final sample comprises
464,916 births to 269,661 women in 408 districts.
The district-level tariff data comes directly from Topalova (2010). Industry- and district-wise
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employment data comes from the 1991 Census of India while tariff data at the six-digit level was
collected by Petia Topalova from the Indian Ministry of Finance publications. The rainfall data
used later comes from the annual district-level precipitation time series created by Ram Fishman
using Indian Meteorological Department database. Lastly, we use Rounds 43 (1987-88) and 55
(1999-00) of the Employment-Unemployment survey of the National Sample Survey (NSS) of India
to examine the effects of tariff cuts on children’s schooling and labor force participation, adult
employment, and in-migration by caste and gender.
3.3.3 Regression Framework
The question of interest in this paper is how the removal of tariff barriers influences households’
fertility decisions and children’s health outcomes. In particular, we investigate whether reductions
in tariff protection faced by a woman (based on her district of residence) impact the probability
that she gives birth in a year, the sex ratio of these births, and their mortality rates. Our regres-
sion framework is similar to Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010b) and Topalova (2010) and
compares women (births) in districts that were more or less exposed to tariff cuts.
We start by reshaping the retrospective birth data to create a woman-year panel and construct
a dummy variable, birthmdt, that equals one if a woman m in district d gives birth in year t, and
is otherwise zero. Then, we estimate the following base specification using ordinary least-squares
(OLS):
birthmdt = β0 + β1tariffdt + β2Xmdt + γd + τt + δdt+ εmdt (3)
The main regressor of interest, tariffdt, represents the level of tariff protection assigned to a women
based on her district of residence. Although the variation in tariffdt occurs at the district-level,
we also control for a vector of individual covariates, Xmdt,that may impact the outcome variables,
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including indicators for a woman’s age in year t, the number of previous births, the household’s
caste18 and religion.19 Inclusion of district fixed-effects, γd, controls for time-invariant differences
across districts while year fixed-effects, τt, control for any India-wide shocks that may influence our
outcomes. The inclusion of year fixed-effects also highlights that our empirical strategy does not
estimate the overall effect of trade liberalization on fertility, sex ratios at birth, or mortality, since
any economy-wide impact on consumer prices or productivity will be captured by the year-effects.
Since our data spans all years between 1987 and 1997, we also include linear district-specific time
trends in our regressions.
The sex ratio and mortality regressions are run using the retrospective panel of births. The
base OLS specification is similar to (3):
yimdt = β0 + β1tariffdt + β2Ximdt + γd + τt + δdt+ εimdt (4)
where i indexes a child born to mother m in district d and year t. For mortality regressions, the
outcome is an indicator variable for whether a child dies before Q months of birth, where we allow
Q to equal one, six, or twelve months.20 For the sex ratio regressions, the outcome is an indicator
variable that equals one if the child is male, and zero otherwise. The remaining controls are the
same as in (3).
Since a large majority (89 percent) of women in our sample report giving birth to more than
one child during the time period we study, we also run specifications with mother fixed-effects:
birthmdt = β0 + β1tariffdt + β2Xmdt + τt + φm + δdt+ εmdt (5)
yimdt = β0 + β1tariffdt + β2Ximdt + τt + φm + δdt+ εimdt (6)
18Caste categories are scheduled caste (SC), scheduled tribe (ST), other backward caste (OBC), and general caste.
19Religion categories are Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Christian, and Others.
20Infant mortality is defined as death before age 1, while child mortality usually refers to death before age 5.
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where γm represents the mother fixed-effect and controls for all unobserved, time-invariant het-
erogeneity across women that could influence her fertility decisions. Xmdt and Ximdt now include
just the indicators for number of previous births and woman’s age in year t. By including mother
fixed-effects, we are essentially comparing the birth outcomes for the same woman under different
levels of tariff protection in her district. Our ability to control for district-specific time trends
and mother fixed-effects makes our identification more robust than previous literature. A positive
(negative) β1 implies that tariff decline is associated with a decrease (increase) in the outcome of
interest, relative to the national trend.
The coefficient β1 is identified under the assumption that changes in our tariff measure are
uncorrelated with district-specific, unobserved time-varying shocks (or mother-specific, unobserved
time-varying shocks in (5)-(6)) that influence fertility, sex ratios, and infant mortality. Since we
interact a district’s pre-reform industrial composition with national changes in industry tariffs to
construct tariffdt, any source of bias would have to be correlated with both pre-reform industrial
composition and national tariff changes by industry. Like Topalova (2010), Edmonds, Pavcnik, and
Topalova (2010b) and others, we assume that this is not the case. Nevertheless, we test the validity
of this assumption by checking that our results are robust to the inclusion of other observable
district-specific, time-varying shocks, such as rainfall shocks.
For our sex ratio regressions, t refers to the year of conception, instead of the year of birth.
Since an ultrasound test, followed by an induced abortion, are believed to be the primary channel
through which parents exercise control over the sex of their births in India during our sample period
(Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010)), and these technologies are most effective and safe during the first
or second trimesters of birth (Epner, Jonas, and Seckinger (1998)), district-level tariff protection
during the year of conception is more relevant for explaining the effect of trade reform on sex ratios
at birth. We define the year of conception as the year nine months prior to the month of birth,
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thereby implicitly assuming that no birth is premature.
One concern is that tariffdt may be correlated with the pre-reform size of a district’s non-
traded sector and, hence, correlated with its initial level of poverty. If this is the case, OLS
estimates in specifications (3)-(6) will be biased. We deal with this issue by using traded tariff,
tradedtariffdt as an instrument for tariffdt. Figure 3.2 plots both these measures for our sample
period. Since non-traded industries are automatically assigned a zero tariff for all years, the average
tariff measure is, by construction, substantially lower than the average traded tariff measure. While
tradedtariffdt declined from about 88 percent to 31 percent, tariffdt decreased from about 7
percent to 2 percent during 1987-1997. There is a significant correlation between the two measures
(first-stage regression estimates presented later) and they both exhibit a sharp downward trend.21
Moreover, tradedtariffdt is independent of the baseline proportion of workers in the non-traded
sector and therefore, uncorrelated with initial poverty levels within a district. This validates the
use of traded tariff as an instrument.
Next, we look at the time trends in fertility, the sex ratio at birth, and infant mortality in India
during our study period. The total fertility rate declined from 4.1 in 1987 to 3.3 in 1997 (Figure 3.3).
The male-female sex ratio in the 0-6 age group has been rising rapidly (Figure 3.4), especially since
the 1980s. Increased availability of technology for sex-selection combined with declining fertility
and a strong preference for sons are widely believed to be the causes for this growing sex-imbalance
in the child population. According to DLHS-2 data, under-5 mortality in rural India fell from 127
deaths per 1000 live births in 1987 to 95 deaths per 1000 live births in 1997. As Figure 3.5 shows,
infant mortality has been declining over time. Mortality before age 1 is much higher than mortality
during ages 1-4. Mortality for girls is larger during ages 1-4. It is important to keep in mind that
our identification strategy does not estimate the causal impact of tariff reductions in explaining
21The only exception is an increase in tariffs from 1992 to 1993. Due to measurement error concerns, we also run
regressions that exclude the data for 1993. Our results remain the same and are available upon request.
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these aggregate trends. Instead, we estimate the effect of tariff reductions on deviations from the
trend. Table 3.1 provides a description of the socio-economic characteristics of our sample.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Fertility
We begin by looking at the effect of changes in district-level tariff exposure in a year on the
probability that a woman gives birth in that year.22 Column (1) in Table 3.2 presents the baseline
results controlling for district and year fixed-effects. In Column (2) we also control for mother’s
years of schooling, indicators for mother’s age in that year, her number of previous births, and
household’s caste and religion. In Column (3) we add district-specific linear time trends. Finally,
Columns (4) and (5) also control for mother fixed-effects. In all specifications, robust standard
errors are clustered at the district level and district-level sampling weights are used.23
The OLS results in Panel A indicate a positive and significant relationship between our district-
level tariff measure and the probability that a woman gives birth across all columns. These positive
coefficients suggest that women in districts more exposed to trade liberalization (i.e. a relative
decline in our tariff measure) witnessed a relative decrease in fertility. However, for reasons pre-
viously described, changes in the tariff measure utilized in Panel A may be negatively correlated
with a district’s initial poverty level. If women in initially poorer districts also experience relatively
smaller declines in fertility over our time period for reasons unrelated to trade liberalization, OLS
will overestimate the causal effect of tariff protection on fertility. We, therefore, instrument for our
tariff protection measure using traded tariff protection, which is uncorrelated with the size of the
non-traded sector, as previously argued. Panel B of Table 3.2 shows the first-stage regression of a
22Throughout this paper, we use the term fertility to indicate probability of birth in a given year. A higher
probability of birth does not necessarily imply higher completed fertility. It is possible that our results capture
changes in the timing of births rather than changes in overall fertility levels.
23The unweighted regressions yield very similar results, which are available upon request.
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district’s tariff measure on a district’s traded tariff protection. In all specifications, traded tariff
has a significant and strong first-stage impact on district tariff protection, indicating that traded
tariff is a strong instrument for district tariff.24
When we use traded tariff as an instrument (Panels C and D of Table 3.2), district tariff pro-
tection in a year has a negative and largely significant effect on the probability that a woman gives
birth in that year. The fact that our coefficient of interest changes sign when instrumenting for
district tariff protection suggests that including non-traded industries in the tariff measure intro-
duces a significant upward bias, likely due to the correlation between initial poverty and changes
in the tariff measure. The reduced form coefficient of traded tariff is also negative throughout and
significant (except in Column (4)).
The IV coefficients indicate that the Indian trade reform had a substantial effect on fertility – a
woman living in a district that experienced the average decline in tariff protection of 7 percentage
points was between 0.6 percentage points (Panel C, Column 1) and 1.7 percentage points (Panel
C, Column 5) more likely to give birth in a given year.25
3.4.2 Sex Ratio at Birth
Having established that a reduction in a district’s relative tariff exposure leads to an increased
probability of birth in rural India, we turn our attention to the sex-composition of these births.
The sex ratio at birth (SRB) deviates from the natural SRB if female fetuses are terminated more
frequently than male fetuses due to less prenatal care or sex-selective abortions. In India, prenatal
sex-determination is illegal, but widely prevalent, leading to a large number of female fetuses being
aborted. Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010) estimate that approximately 480,000 sex-selective abortions
took place in India annually during 1995 - 2005. Trade liberalization can affect the SRB by (a)
24The first stage F-statistic is large in all specifications.
25Table A3.1 in the Appendix presents the IV results for urban areas and we find a similar increase in the likelihood
of birth in response to tariff cuts. Coefficients are negative and significant across all five specifications.
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changing the demand for sex-selective abortions due to changes in the relative demand for sons, (b)
changing the demand for sex-selective abortions due to changes in parents’ ability to afford prenatal
sex determination and abortion resulting from changes in income, (c) through income shocks which
impact fetal viability differentially based on the sex of the fetus (Trivers and Willard (1973)),26 or
(d) through greater access to sex-determination technology via imports of ultrasound machines, for
example.27
Sex-determination can be effectively performed through an ultrasound test around 12 weeks
of gestation or through amniocentesis around 8-9 weeks of gestation. If a mother has an induced
abortion, it is likely to take place during the first or second trimester of pregnancy. This suggests
that the relevant tariff variable to examine the effect of trade liberalization on the sex of a birth
is not the tariff at the time of birth, but the tariff during the first two trimesters of pregnancy.
Therefore, we use tariff in the district of birth in the year of conception as the explanatory variable
for all sex ratio regressions.
Using the retrospective panel of births, Table 3.3 presents the results from OLS and IV regres-
sions of an indicator for male birth on district-level tariff during the year of conception.28 The
OLS coefficients in Panel A show that a child born in a district with a relative decline in tariff
protection during the year of conception is less likely to be a boy ; but the effect is not significant
at conventional levels. Panels B, C, and D present the IV regression estimates. The first stage
coefficients of traded tariff are positive and highly significant throughout. The IV and reduced
form coefficients of district tariff in the year of conception are always positive, but only significant
when we include the mother fixed-effects in Columns (4) and (5).29 For a district with the average
26The Trivers-Willard hypothesis suggests that negative shocks to the fetal environment make births less likely to
be male.
27Changes in prenatal sex-determination technology, however, are likely to impact the entire country, or at least
all districts within a state similarly. Since our measure of tariff protection varies at the district level, this channel is
unlikely to explain our results.
28Each cell indicates a separate regression. As before, all regressions use district-level sampling weights and robust
standard errors are clustered at the district level.
29However, the coefficients for non-mother fixed-effects specifications are also significant when we use alternate
145
decline in tariffs of 7 percentage points, Column (4) in Panel C suggests that the likelihood of a
male birth decreases by 2 percentage points. Thus, the reduction in trade protection seems to have
caused some relative improvements in the probability of a female birth in rural Indian districts
more exposed to tariff declines.30
The fact that we find significant results when we control for mother fixed-effects and not without
them highlights the importance of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in factors that influence
decisions about sex-selection. Apart from the monetary cost of prenatal sex-detection and sex-
selective abortion, unobserved subjective son preference is likely to be an important factor in
parents’ decisions about sex-selection. Although in specifications without mother fixed-effects we
control for some observable socio-economic characteristics that are likely to be correlated with
son preference, for example religion, it is possible that they do not fully capture the unobserved
heterogeneity across women. In Section 3.5.1, we present evidence for heterogeneity in the effects
on the sex ratio at birth across socio-economic groups.
3.4.3 Infant Mortality
Next, we examine the effect of tariff decline on infant mortality. Following the same format as before,
Table 3.4 presents results from OLS (Panel A) and IV regressions (Panels B and C) of indicators
for whether a child dies within one, six, or twelve months of birth on district-level tariff protection.
Across all specifications, the coefficient estimates are negative, indicating that a larger decline in
tariff protection within a district is associated with a relative increase in infant mortality within
one, six, as well as twelve months of birth. However, our OLS and IV estimates lose significance at
conventional levels when we add district-specific linear time trends to the regressions (except for
levels of clustering, e.g. district-year. Here, we report results with more conservative standard errors, which in our
case are obtained from clustering at the district level.
30Table A3.1 in the Appendix shows that the effects on SRB in urban areas were insignificant even for the mother
fixed-effects specification. Moreover, the coefficients are of the opposite sign as compared to the rural results.
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mortality within 12 months).
The magnitude of coefficient estimates increases as we change our outcome variable from mor-
tality within one month of birth to mortality within six months to twelve months of birth. The fact
that we find significant results on mortality within the first month of birth for some specifications
suggests that trade liberalization also influences parents’ ability to invest in the health of a child
while in-utero.31 However, the increase in the magnitude of the coefficients as we look at mortality
within six and twelve months implies that trade liberalization prevents families from making the
necessary investments in a child’s health to prevent infant death even after birth.32
Moreover, the estimated effects are economically significant. For example, our coefficient esti-
mate of -0.118 in Column (4), Panel C3 of Table 3.4 indicates that, relative to other districts, a
district that experienced the average decline in tariff protection of 7 percentage points witnessed
an increase in infant mortality within twelve months of birth of 0.8 percentage points – about a 9
percent increase with respect to the baseline (1987) mortality within a year of birth in all districts
(9 percent).
In Table 3.5, we interact the tariff measure with a dummy for the child being male to test if
the effect on mortality differs by child’s sex. Previous research on the Trivers-Willard Hypothesis
indicates that male children are less likely to survive relative to females in harsher environments
(Almond and Edlund (2007)). If a decline in tariff protection increases poverty and decreases
health investments in pregnant women or newborn children, we might expect trade liberalization
to have a greater effect on mortality rates of male children. The main effect of our tariff measure
suggests that there is a significant increase in mortality within twelve months of birth for girls.33
31Investments in health while in-utero are also likely to be affected by the tariff in the year of conception. In order
to examine this channel, we also run regressions using tariff in the year nine months prior to the year of birth as
the explanatory variable. The tariff coefficients are negative but not always significant and smaller in magnitude in
comparison to the coefficients in Table 3.4.
32We find no significant effect on any mortality outcome for urban areas in Table A3.1 in the Appendix.
33Similar results are obtained for mortality within one and six months of birth and are available upon request.
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The coefficient of the interaction term is positive everywhere, suggesting a smaller effect on boys.
However, the interaction term is significant only in Columns (4) and (5) that include mother fixed-
effects. According to the coefficients in Column (4), in a district that experienced the average
decline in tariff protection of 7 percentage points, girls witnessed an increase in infant mortality
within twelve months of birth of 1.6 percentage points as opposed to boys for whom mortality
within twelve months increased by a much lower 0.1 percentage points. These effects are consistent
with prior evidence on postnatal neglect and discrimination in care against girls in India. To the
extent that parents are able to exercise their preference for male children at the prenatal stage
through sex-selection, an increase in sex-selective abortions can lead to a decline in relative female
mortality (Lin, Liu, and Qian (2010)). But if poverty makes sex-selection less affordable, then we
may expect the pattern we observe: a lower sex ratio at birth, but higher relative female mortality.
As we show in the next section, there is substantial heterogeneity in the effects on infant mortality
across socio-economic groups.
3.5 Mechanisms
So far, our results suggest that relative declines in tariffs in rural Indian districts lead to a significant
increase in the probability of birth and the likelihood of these births being female, although the
latter effect is significant only for the mother fixed-effects specification. Moreover, the likelihood
that a child dies within one, six or twelve months of birth significantly increases. Next, we explore
the mechanisms underlying these results.
We attempt to distinguish between three potential channels: 1) poverty, 2) female bargaining
power, and 3) relative returns from daughters. Unfortunately, our data does not contain informa-
tion on household income, consumption expenditure, wages, or mother’s labor force participation
status, making it difficult to directly test for the aforementioned causal channels. As a second best
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approach, we examine heterogeneity in effects by the socio-economic characteristics of mothers to
provide suggestive evidence about the causal mechanisms underlying our main results. This ap-
proach is based on the premise that the three channels mentioned above should affect our three
outcome variables differently, thus helping us deduce the underlying mechanisms. Moreover, it is
also possible that mechanisms differ across socio-economic groups. Before we proceed to the re-
gression results, we first discuss the expected effect on our outcome variables through each of these
three channels.
Topalova (2010) shows that districts more exposed to trade liberalization witnessed a relative
increase in poverty. Households that suffer a negative income shock due to tariff cuts may be
less able to afford modern birth control methods and sex-selective abortions, causing an increase
in births, especially female births.34 In addition, the supply of free or subsidized contraception
may decline if government finances decline as a result of trade liberalization. Moreover, if poverty
impacts the probability that a child survives to adulthood or the likelihood that a child is male,
households may choose to increase fertility if decisions about the number and the sex-composition
of children are jointly made. Poverty can also lead to increases in infant mortality if families reduce
investments in infant health as a result of a decline in income. Furthermore, if the additional girls
born as a result of the increase in poverty and the resulting inability to plan fertility are viewed as
“unwanted,” we would expect the increase in infant mortality to be higher for daughters relative
to sons. Thus, if the relative increase in poverty from trade reform is the underlying channel, we
are likely to observe an increase in fertility, a decrease in the sex ratio at birth, and an increase
in infant mortality, more so for girls. On the other hand, if poverty decreases as a result of trade
reform, we expect the opposite effects, i.e. lower fertility, a higher sex ratio at birth, and lower
infant mortality rates.
34Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010) show that wealthier families in India are more likely to practice sex-selection.
149
Aguayo-Tellez, Airola, and Juhn (2010) show that a NAFTA-related decrease in tariffs increased
intra-household bargaining power of women in Mexico. They believe this is due to two reasons.
First, technology-upgrading by firms in response to trade liberalization makes physically demanding
skills less important in blue-collar jobs. As a result, the relative wage and employment of women
improves in blue-collar occupations, as shown by Juhn, Ujhelyi, and Villegas-Sanchez (2012). Sec-
ond, trade reform leads to growth which is concentrated in initially female-intensive industries, and
thus benefits women in these industries relatively more if male and female labor are imperfect sub-
stitutes. If intra-household bargaining is the primary channel through which trade reform affects
fertility and infant mortality, then we expect to see lower fertility due to higher opportunity cost
of childbearing (Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980)), and lower
mortality due to higher relative income of mothers. However, it is not clear which direction the
sex ratio at birth would change in. For a given degree of son preference, a higher opportunity cost
of “unwanted” children for working mothers might cause greater sex-selection and, thus, result in
higher sex ratios at birth. Women in the labor force may also have a lower search cost of accessing
prenatal sex-determination and abortion.
Lastly, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) find that the new economic opportunities resulting from
globalization are mainly benefitting lower-caste girls in India. Despite increases in returns to non-
traditional white-collar occupations, lower-caste parents continue to educate their sons in local
language schools (that lead to traditional blue-collar jobs) in order to continue benefitting from
caste-based networks. However, historically, lower-caste girls have not participated in these caste-
based occupational networks due to low labor market participation, and are, hence, not constrained
by them. As a result, lower-caste parents continue to channel boys into traditional occupations
despite higher returns in more modern jobs, but their daughters benefit as a result of these improved
employment opportunities. In a similar vein, Jensen and Miller (2011) show that parents in rural
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India strategically try to prevent sons from migrating to urban areas to take advantage of better
income opportunities because they want them to work on the farm. They find large gains in
education for girls but not much for boys in response to greater employment opportunities in urban
areas. They conclude that these results are driven by changes in returns (to parents) from sons
and daughters. In our context, an increase in the relative demand for daughters, due to a relative
increase in returns to parents from girls, would imply that lower-caste parents should now be more
likely to give birth to daughters, who might also experience a decrease in mortality. In other words,
the increase in female births in this scenario is driven by more “wanted” girls, unlike the poverty
channel where more “unwanted” girls are born due to reduced affordability of sex-selection or lower
opportunity cost of children. If the decrease in female mortality is sufficiently large, we will also
observe an overall decrease in mortality across all births. The impact on the likelihood of birth
depends on the extent to which parents substitute between sons and daughters in the short- and
the long-run.
The following table summarizes the predictions discussed above. So far, our main findings
appear consistent with the increased poverty channel, although the sex ratio at birth results are
weak. Armed with these predictions, we now turn to analyzing heterogeneity in our effects across
three dimensions – household’s caste, mother’s education level, and household’s wealth index – to
distinguish between these potential mechanisms.
Expected effect on:
Channel Birth Sex Ratio at Birth Mortality
↑ Poverty + – +
↑ Female bargaining power – Unclear –
↑ Relative returns to daughters Unclear – –
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3.5.1 Heterogeneous Effects
We begin our examination of heterogeneity with a household’s caste. We divide our sample into four
categories - scheduled caste (SC), scheduled tribe (ST), other backward caste (OBC), and general
caste - and interact our tariff variable with indicators for these categories. Table 3.6 presents these
results for the birth dummy, male birth dummy, and mortality within twelve months. General
caste is the omitted category. Panel A shows that the main effect of tariff in the year of birth is
positive (insignificant in Column (3)) while the interaction terms for SC, ST, and OBC mothers
are negative, highly significant, and larger in magnitude than the main effect. This implies that
lower-caste women experience a significantly larger increase in the probability of birth relative to
upper-caste mothers. Thus, our overall findings for fertility seem to be driven mainly by higher
fertility for lower-caste mothers. There are no significant differences in our sex ratio results across
caste groups, however.
The fertility effects are consistent with either the poverty or the returns channel working for
the lower-caste households. Scheduled and other backward castes have historically been more
economically and socially disadvantaged in India. A relative increase in poverty levels is, therefore,
likely to affect them more strongly than upper-caste households. But, as the mortality results show,
births to general caste mothers are significantly more likely to die due to tariff cuts while births
to lower-caste mothers have significantly lower likelihood of death. The interaction coefficients
for SC mothers are larger in magnitude, significant, and of the opposite sign as compared to the
main effect. This pattern is inconsistent with the increased poverty channel.35 Moreover, when we
separate the effect on mortality by child’s sex in Table 3.7, we find that the lower mortality results
for SCs and OBCs are completely driven by girls. Upper-caste girls, on the other hand, experience
35Another possibility is that lower-caste households actually benefit from tariff cuts and experience a relative
decrease in poverty which lowers mortality. But in that case, we would not expect to see their fertility increase, which
is what we find in Panel A.
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a rise in mortality.
In Table 3.8 we repeat the same exercise by mother’s education level. We divide women into
three categories - uneducated women, those with 1-5 years of schooling, and women with more than
5 years of schooling. Panel A shows that there is no effect on the likelihood of birth for mothers
with more than primary education. But, births increased significantly and the probability that
these births are male decreased significantly for uneducated mothers. For mortality within a year
of birth, we observe a similar pattern as our caste results. For uneducated mothers, there is a
relative decrease in mortality, whereas more educated mothers experience an increase. When we
split the mortality results by child’s sex in Table 3.9, we find a pattern somewhat similar to Table
3.7. Although both boys and girls born to uneducated mothers experience a relative decrease in
mortality whereas those born to mothers with more than primary education experience a relative
increase in mortality, the effects are larger for girls. To the extent that lower-caste women are likely
to have a lower educational attainment, these results together highlight the possibility of gains for
girls born to lower-status parents from tariff reductions through a relative increase in returns on
the labor market.
To further explore the mechanisms, we next examine how our effects vary by the wealth index
of the household. DLHS combines information on ownership of durables, type of toilet facility,
cooking fuel, housing, source of lighting, and drinking water to calculate a standard of living score
for each household. On the basis of these scores, households are divided into three categories:
low, medium, and high standard of living (SLI) households. Ideally, we would like to know the
household wealth score for each year in our sample period. But, unfortunately, since we create
our birth and woman panels retrospectively from a single cross-section, we know a household’s
wealth category only at the time of survey. To the extent that trade reform affects standards of
living, the wealth index variable is not exogenous. However, if most households move within a
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wealth category, and not across categories (e.g. a high-SLI family becoming low-SLI) due to tariff
reduction, this comparison is still informative. With these caveats in mind, Panel A in Table 3.10
shows that the higher fertility and the decreased likelihood of a birth being male are mainly driven
by low-SLI families. In fact, medium- and high-SLI families experience a significant decrease in the
likelihood of birth. Unlike the weak effects in Table 3.3, there is a significant decrease in the sex
ratio at birth for relatively poorer, low-SLI families and a slightly significant increase for the high-
SLI households in response to the tariff decline. The magnitude of this effect is remarkably similar
across all specifications and suggests that in districts with an average relative decline in tariff of 7
percentage points, the sex ratio at birth decreases by 1.5 percentage points in low-SLI households.
Yet again, the mortality results suggest that the effects for low-SLI women are potentially driven by
the returns channel. Mortality decreases for births to low-SLI women relative to high-SLI families.
For latter, the main effect is an increase in mortality. When we split the mortality results by child’s
sex in Table 3.11, we find that both boys and girls born to high-SLI mothers experience a relative
increase in mortality whereas those born to low-SLI mothers experience a significant decrease in
mortality relatively. But unlike the caste results in Table 3.7, the difference between the results for
boys and girls is not remarkable.
3.5.2 Supporting Evidence
Next, we utilize data from NSS to shed further light on potential mechanisms. If a relative change in
the returns from children on the labor market is an underlying channel for our previous findings, we
also expect differential changes in educational investments by socio-economic status in response to
tariff cuts. To test this, we follow Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010b) and estimate the effect
of tariff cuts on schooling and child labor outcomes of 10-14 year old children in rural Indian districts
using the 43rd (1987-88) and the 55th (1999-00) rounds of the NSS Employment-Unemployment
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survey. Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010b) find that schooling increased and child labor
declined at a slower rate in districts that were relatively more exposed to tariff cuts. We extend
their analysis and examine heterogeneity in these outcomes by the caste of the household.36 Since
the 43rd round does not distinguish between OBC and general castes, we divide the sample into
three categories - SC, ST, and the rest. Table 3.12 presents the IV estimates for the effects of tariff
reform on an indicator for the child being in school (School) and five categories of work. Work is
an indicator for a child’s principal activity status being work-related37, irrespective of her school
attendance status. Work only indicates that the child’s principal activity is work and she does not
attend school. Market work implies that the child works as a regular salaried/ wage employee, a
casual wage laborer, in a household enterprise (farm or non-farm), or as a beggar. Domestic work
indicates that the child’s principal activity is domestic work. Lastly, Idle refers to children who
neither work nor attend school.
Table 3.12 shows that the estimates presented in Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010b)
exhibit substantial heterogeneity by caste and are consistent with our previous findings. Panel
A38 shows that SC children in districts relatively more exposed to tariff reform are significantly
more likely to be in school, relative to children from OBC and general castes. The overall effect
on schooling for SC children is also positive. In addition, Columns (2) - (4) show that SC children
are less likely to work, both relative to the excluded category as well as overall, as tariffs decrease.
We also observe a significant decrease in the likelihood of an SC child being Idle in response to the
reform. On the other hand, general and OBC children are significantly less likely to be in school
when tariffs decrease relatively in their districts. However, the effects on work categories for these
non-SC and non-ST children are not significant. These results are consistent with tariff declines
36The NSS does not provide information on mother’s education or the household wealth status.
37This includes the following categories of work: regular salaried/ wage employee, casual wage laborer, begging,
work in a household enterprise, and domestic work.
38In Table 3.12 Panel A, we do not control for the sex of the child since it is also affected by the tariff cuts. However,
the results remain the same when we control for child sex.
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resulting in a relative increase in the returns from lower-caste children, relative to general and OBC
children. However, further disaggregation of the sample by child sex in Panels B and C does not
reveal differential effects for SC boys and girls.
In addition, we assess the relative returns channel by examining the effect of tariff cuts on adult
employment in a manner similar to Table 3.4 in Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010b). These
results are presented in Table 3.13. The outcome variable is the number of days worked in the
last year. Column (1) shows that tariff declines are associated with a significant decrease in the
number of days worked for SC and ST men relative to non-SC and non-ST men. Overall, the latter
group experiences a significant increase in the number of days spent in wage work in response to
tariff cuts, but the total effect for SC men is not large. On the other hand, in Column (2), there
is a significant increase in the number of days worked for SC and ST women, relative to other
women as well as overall, as tariffs decrease. For non-SC and non-ST women we observe a decrease
in employment, albeit the coefficient is not significant. These results are consistent with trade
liberalization increasing (decreasing) the returns for lower-caste (upper-caste) females, relative to
males, in turn causing lower-caste (upper-caste) parents to give birth to more (fewer) girls and
investing more (less) in them.
3.6 Robustness
Although prior literature on Indian trade liberalization (Topalova (2010), Edmonds, Pavcnik, and
Topalova (2010b)) shows that there is no significant factor mobility in response to tariff cuts, we
explicitly check for endogenous sorting by gender and caste. We cannot use DLHS data for this
exercise since it only reports a woman’s district of residence at the time of survey. Consequently,
we use NSS data to estimate the effect of tariff cuts on the caste- and gender-composition of a
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district’s in-migrants39 using the same empirical strategy as in Section 3.5.2. These instrumental-
variable estimates are reported in Table 3.14. There is no significant change in the share of female
in-migrants and low-caste female in-migrants in a district due to the tariff reform (Rows 1 and 2).
The same is also true for the share of short-run migrants (i.e. those who have moved within the
past ten years) in Rows 3 and 4 of Table 3.14.
Although we include district-specific linear time trends in all regressions, a potential concern
with our identification strategy is the presence of other time-varying district-specific omitted vari-
ables. Since our tariff exposure index varies at the district-year level, we cannot include district-year
fixed-effects to prevent this omitted variable bias. Instead, we re-estimate all specifications by con-
trolling for district-level annual rainfall shocks as a further check of robustness. Annual fluctuations
in rainfall are an important determinant of economic outcomes in agriculture-dependent developing
countries, such as India.40 We define rainfall shock as an indicator variable that is equal to one
if the annual rainfall in a district deviates by more than 30 percent from its historic annual mean
precipitation, and zero otherwise. The point estimates on tariff measures in all specifications re-
main consistent with our previous results (with similar signs, magnitudes, and significance). These
results are available upon request.
3.7 Discussion
To sum up, we see substantial differences in how trade liberalization has affected women and
children across social strata. Broadly, we find that low socioeconomic status women experience an
increase in fertility which is driven by more female births. Since we also observe a relative decrease
in mortality for their daughters, we interpret this as a higher demand for daughters by low-status
families. The same does not hold for high-status women. There is some evidence that they have
39In-migrants are individuals whose district of residence at the time of survey is different from their last place of
usual residence (i.e. a place where the person has stayed continuously for a period of six months or more).
40Paxson (1992), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), Townsend (1994), Jayachandran (2006).
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fewer children, driven by fewer girls, and we find strong evidence that girls born to high-status
mothers fare worse in terms of higher mortality. Mortality rates for boys, however, do not seem to
be significantly affected by the trade reform, irrespective of their parents’ socio-economic status.
Thus, there appears to be a strong gender component to the effects of trade liberalization. If
tariff reforms have improved earning opportunities for women in blue-collar occupations, as recent
literature suggests, we would expect the gains to be derived by girls born to low-status families.
We find some suggestive evidence that low-caste women work more and low-caste men work less
relative to upper-caste women and men when tariffs decreases. To the extent that upper-caste and
more educated women in India are less likely to participate in blue-collar occupations, we do not
expect girls in high-status families to benefit from the new labor market opportunities in relatively
blue-collar jobs as much as low-status women. Moreover, if returns from more skilled jobs have
increased mainly for men in India, high-status families will prefer to have more sons. As supporting
evidence, we find that there is an increase in the number of days worked for non-SC and non-ST
men in districts experiencing a relative decrease in tariffs.
The effects of trade reform on fertility and child health outcomes that we find do not suggest
that there has been an increase in the relative bargaining power for women. Lastly, the apparent
increase in valuation of girls in low-status families and decrease in high-status families in response
to trade reform can also be due to differential returns from children on the marriage market instead
of or in addition to returns on the labor market (Edlund and Lee (2009)).
3.8 Conclusions
This paper analyzes whether India’s trade liberalization, beginning in 1991, affected fertility, infant
mortality, and sex ratios at birth. To identify the impact of this trade policy shock, we compare
rural districts more exposed to tariff cuts to rural districts less exposed to tariff cuts. Previous
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research using a similar empirical strategy finds that districts subject to greater reductions in tariffs
experience slower declines in poverty as well as slower increases in school enrollment ((Topalova
(2010), Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010b)). We find that lower-caste, less educated, and
less wealthy women in districts with a higher relative trade reform exposure are more likely to give
birth and these births are more likely to be female. Moreover, infant mortality (within one, six,
and twelve months of birth) decreases for these girls. In contrast, girls born to upper-caste, more
educated, and wealthier mothers experience relatively higher mortality. They are also less likely to
be born.
It is important to emphasize that these results do not suggest that more open trade leads to
overall increases or decreases in fertility, sex ratios, or infant mortality.41 However, our results do
confirm that removal of trade barriers has important distributional consequences along these di-
mensions, especially for girls. Data limitations prevent us from conducting a more rigorous analysis
of the exact channels through which tariff cuts affect individuals’ fertility decisions and investments
in children, but we highlight the potential role played by differential returns from children that vary
by socio-economic status and child sex.
41We note again that this paper only examines the effect of tariff reductions and ignores the removal of NTBs.
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3.9 Figures
Figure 3.1. Average Industry-level Tariff
Notes: This figure plots the yearly averages of nominal, national, industry-level ad-valorem tariffs using data provided
by Petia Topalova.
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Figure 3.2. Average District-level Tariff and Traded Tariff, by Year
Notes: This figure plots the yearly averages of the district-level tariff and traded tariff measures used in this paper.
District-year data on both measures was provided by Petia Topalova. Tariff is constructed as the district-specific
employment weighted sum of industry-specific national tariffs. Traded tariff is constructed in a similar way, but only
uses employment in traded sectors within a district. District-level employment shares in 1991 are used as weights.
More details are available in Section 3.3.1.
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Figure 3.3. Total Fertility Rate in India, by Year
Notes: Data from Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Govt. of India (accessed from Indiastat
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Figure 3.4. Child Sex Ratio (0-6) in India, by Year
Notes: Data from Census of India
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Figure 3.5. Infant Mortality in Rural India, by Year of Birth and Sex
Notes: This figure plots the average proportion of children who died before age 1, during ages 1-4 and before age 5,
by year of birth and sex. All-India sample weights used. Data source is DLHS (2002-04).
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3.10 Tables
Table 3.1. Summary Statistics for the Rural Sample, 1987 and 1997
Variable 1987 1997
A. Panel of Births
Birth is male 0.517 0.521
Parity of birth 2.34 2.96
Mother’s age at birth 21.04 23.28





Scheduled Caste 0.18 0.19
Scheduled Tribe 0.19 0.22
Other Backward Caste 0.38 0.38
Died within one month of birth 0.06 0.05
Died within 6 months of birth 0.08 0.06
Died within 12 months of birth 0.09 0.07
Low HH Wealth Index 0.60 0.67
Medium HH Wealth Index 0.30 0.25
High HH Wealth Index 0.10 0.08
N(births) 31,356 48,755




Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the earliest (1987) and the latest (1997) years included in our rural
sample. All regressions include every year during 1987-1997.
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Table 3.2. The Effect of Tariff Reduction on the Probability of Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. OLS
Tariff in YOB 0.129*** 0.104*** 0.069** 0.581*** 0.478***
[0.031] [0.030] [0.030] [0.109] [0.104]
B. First Stage
Traded Tariff in YOB 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.212*** 0.212*** 0.208***
[0.031] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030] [0.029]
F-stat 48.16 48.19 49.14 49.86 50.92
C. IV
Tariff in YOB -0.081 -0.118** -0.163*** -0.108 -0.244*
[0.054] [0.055] [0.061] [0.118] [0.130]
D. Reduced Form
Traded Tariff in YOB -0.018* -0.026*** -0.035*** -0.023 -0.051**
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.025] [0.025]
N 1,857,834 1,857,834 1,857,834 1,857,834 1,857,834
District FE x x x
Year FE x x x x x
Covariates x x x x
District-specific linear trends x x
Mother FE x x
Notes: YOB stands for the year of birth. Each cell constitutes a separate regression. Columns (2) - (5) include
indicators for mother’s age at birth and number of previous births. Columns (2) and (3) also include mother’s years
of schooling and household’s religion and caste dummies. Robust standard errors are in brackets and have been
clustered at the district level. All regressions use district-level sampling weights. *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 3.3. The Effect of Tariff Reduction on Probability that a Birth is Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. OLS
Tariff in YOC 0.078 0.080 0.084 0.035 0.055
[0.050] [0.050] [0.053] [0.101] [0.106]
B. First Stage
Traded Tariff in YOC 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.196*** 0.182*** 0.178***
[0.031] [0.031] [0.030] [0.028] [0.027]
F-stat 42.45 42.47 43.02 42.44 42.34
C. IV
Tariff in YOC 0.097 0.097 0.107 0.314*** 0.356***
[0.066] [0.066] [0.070] [0.113] [0.127]
D. Reduced Form
Traded Tariff in YOC 0.019 0.020 0.021 0.057** 0.063**
[0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.025] [0.028]
N 449,065 449,065 449,065 449,065 449,065
District FE x x x
Year FE x x x x x
Covariates x x x x
District-specific linear trends x x
Mother FE x x
Notes: YOC stands for the year of conception - defined as the year nine months prior to the month of birth. Each
cell constitutes a separate regression. Columns (2) - (5) include indicators for mother’s age at birth and number
of previous births. Columns (2) and (3) also include mother’s years of schooling and household’s religion and caste
dummies. Robust standard errors are in brackets and have been clustered at the district level. All regressions use
district-level sampling weights. *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 3.4. The Effect of Tariff Reduction on Infant Mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mortality in 1 month
A1. OLS
Tariff in YOB -0.035** -0.041** -0.025 -0.023 -0.013
[0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.039] [0.041]
B1. Reduced Form
Traded Tariff in YOB -0.009 -0.011* -0.007 -0.015 -0.010
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.011] [0.011]
C1. IV
Tariff in YOB -0.045 -0.052* -0.036 -0.080* -0.058
[0.028] [0.029] [0.030] [0.047] [0.047]
Mortality in 6 months
A2. OLS
Tariff in YOB -0.046** -0.054*** -0.031 -0.036 -0.018
[0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.043] [0.044]
B2. Reduced Form
Traded Tariff in YOB -0.011* -0.013* -0.008 -0.020 -0.014
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.012] [0.013]
C2. IV
Tariff in YOB -0.055* -0.064* -0.040 -0.106** -0.080
[0.033] [0.033] [0.035] [0.054] [0.055]
Mortality in 12 months
A3. OLS
Tariff in YOB -0.052** -0.063*** -0.038* -0.041 -0.019
[0.020] [0.021] [0.022] [0.046] [0.046]
B3. Reduced Form
Traded Tariff in YOB -0.014* -0.016** -0.010 -0.022 -0.016
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.013] [0.013]
C3. IV
Tariff in YOB -0.067* -0.076** -0.051 -0.118** -0.091
[0.036] [0.037] [0.038] [0.058] [0.058]
First Stage
Traded Tariff in YOB 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.201*** 0.185*** 0.180***
[0.032] [0.032] [0.030] [0.028] [0.027]
F-stat 42.85 42.88 43.88 43.14 43.44
N 473,430 473,430 473,430 473,430 473,430
District FE x x x
Year FE x x x x x
Covariates x x x x
District-specific linear trends x x
Mother FE x x
Notes: YOB stands for the year of birth. Each cell constitutes a separate regression. All regressions include indicators
for mother’s age at birth and number of previous births. Columns (2) - (5) include indicators for mother’s age at
birth and number of previous births. Columns (2) and (3) also include mother’s years of schooling and household’s
religion and caste dummies. Robust standard errors are in brackets and have been clustered at the district level. All
regressions use district-level sampling weights. *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 3.5. IV Estimates for Infant Mortality: By Child’s Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Mortality in 12 months
Tariff in YOB * Boy 0.071 0.063 0.065 0.212*** 0.214***
[0.046] [0.046] [0.046] [0.066] [0.067]
Tariff in YOB -0.104** -0.109** -0.085* -0.226*** -0.200***
[0.044] [0.044] [0.045] [0.068] [0.068]
N 473,430 473,430 473,430 473,430 473,430
District FE x x x
Year FE x x x x x
Covariates x x x x
District-specific linear trends x x
Mother FE x x
Notes: YOB stands for the year of birth. Each column constitutes a separate regression. Columns (2) - (5) include
indicators for mother’s age at birth and number of previous births. Columns (2) and (3) also include mother’s years
of schooling and household’s religion and caste dummies. The main effect of Boy is included in all specifications, but
not reported. Robust standard errors are in brackets and have been clustered at the district level. All regressions
use district-level sampling weights. *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 3.6. IV Estimates: By Caste
(1) (2) (3)
A. Birth=1
Tariff in YOB * SC -0.449*** -0.362*** -0.326***
[0.096] [0.085] [0.082]
Tariff in YOB * ST -0.730*** -0.731*** -0.793***
[0.147] [0.142] [0.151]
Tariff in YOB * OBC -0.250*** -0.211*** -0.145**
[0.077] [0.069] [0.063]
Tariff in YOB 0.191** 0.126* 0.059
[0.078] [0.072] [0.075]
N 1,857,834 1,857,834 1,857,834
B. Boy=1
Tariff in YOC * SC 0.031 0.035 0.010
[0.138] [0.138] [0.138]
Tariff in YOC * ST 0.083 0.081 0.123
[0.154] [0.154] [0.158]
Tariff in YOC * OBC -0.036 -0.034 -0.061
[0.113] [0.113] [0.112]
Tariff in YOC 0.093 0.092 0.110
[0.097] [0.097] [0.101]
N 449,065 449,065 449,065
C. Mortality in 12 months
Tariff in YOB * SC 0.248*** 0.247*** 0.207***
[0.081] [0.080] [0.079]
Tariff in YOB * ST -0.127 -0.131 -0.073
[0.085] [0.086] [0.079]
Tariff in YOB * OBC 0.138** 0.136** 0.085
[0.058] [0.058] [0.058]
Tariff in YOB -0.136*** -0.142*** -0.103*
[0.052] [0.052] [0.053]
N 473,430 473,430 473,430
District FE x x x
Year FE x x x
Covariates x x
District-specific linear trends x
Notes: YOB stands for the year of birth. YOC stands for the year of conception. General caste households are the
excluded group. The main effects of SC, ST, and OBC are included in all regressions but not reported. Columns
(2)-(3) include indicators for mother’s age at birth and number of previous births. Column (2) also includes mother’s
years of schooling and household’s religion dummies. Robust standard errors are in brackets and have been clustered
at the district level. All regressions use district-level sampling weights. *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 3.7. IV Estimates for Infant Mortality: By Caste and Child’s Sex
Girls Boys
A. Mortality in 12 months
Tariff in YOB * SC 0.334*** 0.097
[0.110] [0.100]
Tariff in YOB * ST -0.059 -0.074
[0.111] [0.103]
Tariff in YOB * OBC 0.216*** -0.028
[0.078] [0.078]
Tariff in YOB -0.167** -0.050
[0.069] [0.072]
N 227,881 245,549
District FE x x
Year FE x x
Covariates x x
District-specific linear trends x x
Notes: YOB stands for the year of birth. General caste households are the excluded group. The main effects of SC,
ST, OBC are included in all regressions but not reported. All regressions include indicators for mother’s age at birth,
number of previous births, mother’s years of schooling and household’s religion dummies. Robust standard errors are
in brackets and have been clustered at the district level. All regressions use district-level sampling weights. *** 1%,
**5%, *10%.
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Table 3.8. IV Estimates: By Mother’s Education
(1) (2) (3)
A. Birth=1
Tariff in YOB * Uneducated -0.138** -0.396*** -0.338***
[0.067] [0.069] [0.067]
Tariff in YOB * 1-5 years 0.309*** 0.102 0.109*
[0.081] [0.065] [0.065]
Tariff in YOB -0.080 0.060 0.002
[0.060] [0.053] [0.056]
N 1,354,769 1,354,769 1,354,769
B. Boy=1
Tariff in YOC * Uneducated 0.305** 0.292** 0.267*
[0.143] [0.142] [0.142]
Tariff in YOC * 1-5 years -0.152 -0.161 -0.159
[0.188] [0.187] [0.187]
Tariff in YOC -0.091 -0.082 -0.066
[0.125] [0.124] [0.129]
N 277,601 277,601 277,601
C. Mortality in 12 months
Tariff in YOB * Uneducated 0.207*** 0.258*** 0.214***
[0.066] [0.067] [0.064]
Tariff in YOB * 1-5 years -0.068 -0.044 -0.052
[0.071] [0.071] [0.071]
Tariff in YOB -0.173*** -0.216*** -0.174***
[0.056] [0.058] [0.059]
N 290,653 290,653 290,653
District FE x x x
Year FE x x x
Covariates x x
District-specific linear trends x
Notes: YOB stands for the year of birth. YOC stands for the year of conception. Women with more than 5 years
of education are the excluded group. The sample is restricted to women above age 20 at the time of survey. The
main effects of education groups are included in all regressions but not reported. Columns (2)-(3) include indicators
for mother’s age at birth and number of previous births. Column (2) also include household’s caste and religion
dummies. Robust standard errors are in brackets and have been clustered at the district level. All regressions use
district-level sampling weights. *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 3.9. IV Estimates for Infant Mortality: By Mother’s Education and Child’s Sex
Girls Boys
A. Mortality in 12 months
Tariff in YOB * Uneducated 0.292*** 0.140*
[0.084] [0.078]
Tariff in YOB * 1-5 years -0.063 -0.050
[0.109] [0.102]
Tariff in YOB -0.177** -0.164**
[0.076] [0.075]
N 139,491 151,162
District FE x x
Year FE x x
Covariates x x
District-specific linear trends x x
Notes: YOB stands for the year of birth. Women with more than 5 years of education are the excluded group. The
sample is restricted to women above age 20 at the time of survey. The main effects of education groups are included
in all regressions but not reported. All regressions include indicators for mother’s age at birth, number of previous
births, and household’s caste and religion dummies. Robust standard errors are in brackets and have been clustered
at the district level. All regressions use district-level sampling weights. *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 3.10. IV Estimates: By Household Wealth Index
(1) (2) (3)
A. Birth=1
Tariff in YOB * Low SLI -0.835*** -0.768*** -0.710***
[0.097] [0.090] [0.085]
Tariff in YOB * High SLI 0.066 0.014 0.005
[0.051] [0.046] [0.046]
Tariff in YOB 0.366*** 0.301*** 0.235***
[0.054] [0.052] [0.054]
N 1,857,834 1,857,834 1,857,834
B. Boy=1
Tariff in YOC * Low SLI 0.239** 0.234** 0.226**
[0.110] [0.111] [0.112]
Tariff in YOC * High SLI -0.247 -0.245 -0.249*
[0.150] [0.150] [0.150]
Tariff in YOC -0.022 -0.018 -0.009
[0.097] [0.097] [0.102]
N 449,065 449,065 449,065
C. Mortality in 12 months
Tariff in YOB * Low SLI 0.201*** 0.217*** 0.178***
[0.054] [0.054] [0.052]
Tariff in YOB * High SLI 0.078 0.046 0.054
[0.063] [0.063] [0.063]
Tariff in YOB -0.197*** -0.212*** -0.169***
[0.045] [0.046] [0.046]
N 473,430 473,430 473,430
District FE x x x
Year FE x x x
Covariates x x
District-specific linear trends x
Notes: YOB stands for the year of birth. YOC stands for the year of conception. Medium SLI households are the
excluded group. The main effects of High SLI and Low SLI are included in all regressions but not reported. Columns
(2)-(3) include indicators for mother’s age at birth and number of previous births. Column (2) also includes mother’s
years of schooling and household’s religion and caste dummies. Robust standard errors are in brackets and have been
clustered at the district level. All regressions use district-level sampling weights. *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 3.11. IV Estimates for Infant Mortality: By Household Wealth Index and
Child’s Sex
Girls Boys
A. Mortality in 12 months
Tariff in YOB * Low SLI 0.178*** 0.174**
[0.068] [0.071]
Tariff in YOB * High SLI -0.090 0.023
[0.084] [0.082]
Tariff in YOB -0.160** -0.173***
[0.063] [0.062]
N 227,881 245,549
District FE x x
Year FE x x
Covariates x x
District-specific linear trends x x
Notes: YOB stands for the year of birth. Medium-SLI households are the excluded group. The main effects of High-
SLI and Low-SLI are included in all regressions but not reported. All regressions include indicators for mother’s age
at birth, number of previous births, years of schooling, and household’s caste and religion dummies. Robust standard
errors are in brackets and have been clustered at the district level. All regressions use district-level sampling weights.
*** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 3.12. IV Estimates: Children’s Schooling and Labor Force Participation by
Caste
School Work Work only Market work Domestic work Idle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. All
Tariff * SC -1.027*** 0.491*** 0.517*** 0.485*** 0.006 0.510***
[0.219] [0.174] [0.175] [0.131] [0.115] [0.180]
Tariff * ST -0.003 -0.302 -0.293 -0.009 -0.293** 0.296
[0.240] [0.217] [0.215] [0.174] [0.143] [0.199]
Tariff 0.456** -0.093 -0.102 0.016 -0.109 -0.354*
[0.187] [0.134] [0.134] [0.126] [0.099] [0.184]
N 95,488 95,514 95,488 95,514 95,514 95,488
B. Boys
Tariff * SC -1.173*** 0.753*** 0.778*** 0.667*** 0.086 0.395*
[0.273] [0.197] [0.197] [0.184] [0.069] [0.222]
Tariff * ST -0.339 -0.09 -0.077 -0.146 0.057 0.416*
[0.297] [0.216] [0.214] [0.205] [0.079] [0.236]
Tariff 0.439** -0.158 -0.129 -0.085 -0.073 -0.310*
[0.201] [0.150] [0.147] [0.143] [0.057] [0.167]
N 51,153 51,170 51,153 51,170 51,170 51,153
C. Girls
Tariff * SC -1.007*** 0.331 0.359 0.266* 0.065 0.649***
[0.270] [0.245] [0.249] [0.161] [0.218] [0.223]
Tariff * ST 0.395 -0.580* -0.573* 0.183 -0.762*** 0.178
[0.316] [0.319] [0.320] [0.242] [0.288] [0.246]
Tariff 0.479 -0.006 -0.056 0.136 -0.142 -0.424
[0.298] [0.199] [0.198] [0.157] [0.192] [0.272]
N 44,335 44,344 44,335 44,344 44,344 44,335
Notes: These estimates are based on the 43rd and the 55th rounds of NSS. Robust standard errors are in brackets
and have been clustered at the district level. The main effects of SC and ST are included in all regressions but not
reported. The IV regression specification is the same as in Table 3.5 of Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010b).
Differences in sample sizes across columns are due to missing data. *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 3.13. IV Estimates: Adult Employment by Caste
Men Women
A. Days worked in the last year
Tariff * SC 329.303*** -736.672***
[57.392] [87.187]





Notes: These estimates are based on the 43rd and the 55th rounds of NSS. Robust standard errors are in brackets
and have been clustered at the district level. The main effects of SC and ST are included in all regressions but not
reported. Sample is restricted to adult men and women in the 25-50 age-group. Other controls in this regression are
the same as in Table 3.4 of Edmonds, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010b). *** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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Table 3.14. IV Estimates: Migration from Other Districts by Caste and Gender
Dependent variable - Share in the district population of: Coefficient of Tarrif
1. Female in-migrants 0.091
[0.082]
2. Low-caste female in-migrants 0.043
[0.030]
3. Female in-migrants who have moved within the last ten years 0.041
[0.035]
4. Low-caste female in-migrants who have moved within the last ten years 0.017
[0.015]
N 722
Notes: These estimates are based on the 43rd and the 55th rounds of NSS. Each coefficient is from a different
regression. Robust standard errors are in brackets and have been clustered at the district level. Low-caste refers to
SC and ST women. In-migrants refers to individuals whose place of enumeration is in a district different from their
last place of usual residence. Regressions are weighted by the number of households in a district and control for




Table 3.A1. IV Estimates: Urban India
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Birth = 1
A1. First Stage
Traded Tariff in YOB 0.317*** 0.317*** 0.325*** 0.315*** 0.323***
[0.030] [0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.028]
F-stat 108.05 108.3 126.43 118.72 135.13
B1. IV
Tariff in YOB -0.100** -0.141*** -0.143*** -0.230* -0.307***
[0.049] [0.047] [0.045] [0.127] [0.115]
N 895,134 895,134 895,134 895,134 895,134
Boy = 1
A2. First Stage
Traded Tariff in YOC 0.292*** 0.292*** 0.302*** 0.279*** 0.288***
[0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.022] [0.024]
F-stat 111.27 111.56 122.24 158.02 149.55
B2. IV
Tariff in YOC -0.040 -0.033 0.050 -0.251 -0.238
[0.110] [0.110] [0.109] [0.155] [0.151]
N 186,953 186,953 186,953 186,953 186,953
Infant Mortality
C1. Mortality in 1 month
Tariff in YOB -0.012 -0.009 0.012 -0.013 0.017
[0.034] [0.034] [0.033] [0.052] [0.051]
C2. Mortality in 6 months
Tariff in YOB -0.030 -0.027 -0.009 -0.025 -0.001
[0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.055] [0.055]
C3. Mortality in 12 months
Tariff in YOB -0.033 -0.030 -0.002 -0.038 -0.001
[0.038] [0.039] [0.038] [0.059] [0.057]
C4. First Stage
Traded Tariff in YOB 0.300*** 0.300*** 0.308*** 0.283*** 0.290***
[0.029] [0.029] [0.028] [0.023] [0.023]
F-stat 105.37 105.63 121.76 149.57 152.44
N 198,400 198,400 198,400 198,400 198,400
District FE x x x
Year FE x x x x x
Covariates x x x x
District-specific linear trends x x
Mother FE x x
Notes: YOB stands for the year of birth. YOC stands for the year of conception. Each cell constitutes a separate
regression. Columns (2) - (5) include indicators for mother’s age at birth and number of previous births. Columns
(2) and (3) also include mother’s years of schooling and household’s religion and caste dummies. Robust standard
errors are in brackets and have been clustered at the district level. All regressions use district-level sampling weights.
*** 1%, **5%, *10%.
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